Debates about the so-called “day after” in Gaza — the moment a permanent ceasefire is reached, and reconstruction can start — began almost immediately after Israel began its relentless bombing campaign against the enclave on October 8, 2024. As I have written elsewhere, this cycle of “bomb, rebuild, repeat,” that Palestinians have become accustomed to for almost two decades — has always been a distraction. Wittingly or not, focusing attention on the future of Gaza has given space and time for the destruction of Gaza, the killing of 5 percent of the population (mostly women and children), and the slow starvation and forced displacement of the rest of the inhabitants into the ever shrinking so-called ‘safe zones’ that have never offered or guaranteed safety to anyone. For more than three weeks now, no food or supplies have been allowed to reach northern Gaza. It now appears that Israel may be implementing “the Generals’ Plan,” which calls for forcing out the remaining approximately 400,000 Palestinians sheltering in the north through starvation (more than 1.2 million Palestinians lived there before the war). Those refusing to leave will be treated as legitimate military targets.
Despite what has been described by many, including United Nations experts, as a campaign to ethnically cleanse the better part of Gaza, the administration of President Joe Biden wants to take advantage of Israel’s accidental drone killing of Yahya Sinwar, a mastermind of the October 7 attack on Israel, to take the “day after” debates from the theoretical to the implementable. But is the “day after” really nearing?
“Day after” proposals: Arab boots and bucks
Almost immediately following Sinwar’s killing, reports emerged of a United States-brokered deal linking Saudi-Israeli normalization, a US-Saudi security pact, and Gaza reconstruction. A group of bipartisan US lawmakers came out in support of imposing a transitional authority over Palestinians in Gaza that would eventually take what remains of the strip and call it “Palestine.” According to US Senator Lindsay Graham, the enclave would become something like an emirate but not a representative democracy which might threaten Israel’s security. Alongside this plan—or perhaps in conjunction with it—stands a UAE-Israeli proposal that the Biden administration may implement after the US presidential elections. Though that plan refers to a post-conflict “day after” for Gaza, it is not hinged on a ceasefire deal with Hamas, nor does it involve the Palestinian Authority (PA) which operates today in a limited capacity and in only a limited area of the West Bank. The UAE-Israel plan would allow for the installation of a temporary international presence in Gaza to scale up humanitarian aid, administer law and order, establish some semblance of governance for the strip, and reconnect Gaza to the West Bank. The UAE would be part of the temporary presence and provide boots on the ground but all hinges on its receipt of a specific invitation from a very weak, financially strapped, and beleaguered PA. The architects of the plan seem to believe that the PA has become so desperate after having been starved of a substantial portion of its operating revenue for so long that it will want to hand over both security and governance to another authority or a third state Israel consents to so long as there is a possibility for a two-state solution down the road. With virtually the entire Israeli political spectrum opposed to a Palestinian state anywhere in the occupied territories, handing over governance and security would invariably become the PA’s final act.
The notion of dispensing with Palestinian-led governance in Gaza and relying instead on a temporary mechanism involving Arab regimes is echoed in a joint proposal from former US national security officials. The plan, which also involves the deployment of private security forces in Gaza, may be getting some traction in Washington circles. One of the authors of the proposal recently co-chaired the inaugural summit of the invite-only “Middle East America Dialogue” along with the last two US ambassadors to Israel from the Donald Trump and Biden administrations. Current Israeli government officials and opposition party leaders, members of Congress, senior Biden officials, and representatives of a number of Arab countries also attended to discuss the future of Gaza among other topics — but without Palestinians present. Whatever plan or amalgamation of plans comes to pass, Palestinian governance is deemed less legitimate than even mercenary forces. A Sykes-Picot 2.0 designed for Palestinians without Palestinians aims to deny the indigenous people of Palestine their right to self-determine again.
The World Court, Palestinian self-determination, and Gaza
What is transpiring in secret discussions in Washington and in other foreign capitals far from Palestine stands in stark contrast to the monumental July 2024 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice which found Israel’s presence in the occupied territories to be illegal and perpetuating a situation of apartheid. Thus, the court ruled that Israel must immediately end its presence in the occupied territories and evacuate all its settlers. Though not legally binding, the World Court’s decision is a statement of law made at the request of the member states of the UN General Assembly who have also now resolved in Resolution ES-10/24 to give Israel one year to withdraw its troops and dismantle existing settlements. In addition, the body required, among other things, that all states refrain from recognizing the legitimacy of Israel’s control over the occupied territories and not render aid or assistance to the illegal situation, or enter into treaty relations with Israel in all cases in which it purports to act on behalf of the occupied territories. In light of this, establishing a temporary presence for Gaza not at the direction of or led by a recognized Palestinian representative leadership, and one wholly dependent on Israeli consent, would contravene the call to free Palestinians from foreign domination and to support their right to self-determination.
What do Palestinians want?
Unsurprisingly, Palestinian views regarding what should come after a ceasefire in Gaza align with the ICJ ruling and international law. They do not want a return to the pre-October 7 status quo in which Palestinians have their future subject to an Israeli veto. In fact, despite all the devastation wrought in Gaza since October 7, the majority of Palestinians still support Hamas’s challenge to Israel’s indefinite occupation (the vast majority reject the notion that Hamas is responsible for war crimes committed on October 7). Any attempt to sublimate Palestinian self-determination to Israel following its deliberate starvation of Palestinians in Gaza and other war crimes including possible genocide would only lead back to the conditions that set the stage for October 7. In a September 2024 poll of 1200 people, 790 from the West Bank and 410 in the Gaza Strip, when asked which entity Palestinians in the occupied territories preferred to govern Gaza after a ceasefire, 58 percent (73 percent in the West Bank and 36 percent in the Gaza Strip) said they would prefer the return of Hamas to power. Only 12 percent chose to bring the Gaza Strip under the control of international forces and more than two-thirds opposed an Arab security deployment in Gaza.
Deals like the one proposed by ousted Fatah Central Committee member Nasser Al Qudwa and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, which attempt to turn back the hands of time to 2008 when a lame duck Olmert offered a territorial swap and Palestinian sovereignty over a part of East Jerusalem but no meaningful refugee return, have little credibility in the post-October 7 world Palestinians and Israelis find themselves in today. Neither Al Qudwa nor Olmert have a constituency from which to draw support nor are they representative of their peoples. Hamas leader in Lebanon, Osama Hamdan, asserts that the Islamist organization will accept only two options: a consensus government or an administrative body under the supervision of the Palestinian government. Though the current PA Prime Minister Mohammad Mustapha has called for an independent agency to coordinate the Gaza reconstruction, he calls for it to be overseen by a Palestinian board of directors including from members of the diaspora. Security would be provided by a police force vetted and selected by the PA which would also control border crossings with support from the European Union.
The distance between what both the ICJ requires and what Palestinians insist upon is worlds apart from what the United States and various Arab regimes have been discussing among themselves. If October 7 has taught anything it is that marginalizing Palestinians in decisions about their future or holding them captive to Israeli notions of security can only stand for so long. What will bring stability and security for both Israelis and Palestinians, reduce the likelihood of recurring violence, and open the possibility for a future in which the people of the region can live together as neighbors in equal dignity—that is, what ought to be meant by the “day after”—requires a plan for realizing Palestinian self-determination. Palestinian agency and freedom, however, is still perceived as the problem rather than the solution by those designing the plans.
Zaha Hassan is a human rights lawyer and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Her research focus is on Palestine-Israel peace, the use of international legal mechanisms by political movements, and U.S. foreign policy in the region. Previously, she was the coordinator and senior legal advisor to the Palestinian negotiating team during Palestine’s bid for UN membership, and was a member of the Palestinian delegation to Quartet-sponsored exploratory talks between 2011 and 2012. She regularly participates in track II peace efforts and is a contributor to The Hill and Haaretz. Her commentaries have appeared in the New York Times, Salon, Al Jazeera English, CNN, and others.
