When former President Joseph Biden won the 2020 election, many expected a swift revival of negotiations to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), given his role as Vice President under President Obama when the deal was signed in 2015. However, direct engagement with Iran never materialized.
Several factors stalled diplomacy. Biden faced a battered economy, deep political polarization, and the risk of backlash from Republicans over any deal with Iran. The October 2023 Hamas attacks and the resulting Israel-Hamas war further made negotiations with Iran politically toxic, given Tehran’s support for Hamas. From Iran’s side, trust in the US had eroded. The 2018 US withdrawal from the JCPOA under Trump convinced Iranian leaders that Republican opposition could undo any future deal. Uncertainty surrounding Biden’s health and reelection prospects also encouraged Tehran to wait for the 2024 US election outcome.
Early stages of renewal of negotiations under Trump
When Trump returned to office in 2024, fears of a military confrontation resurfaced, fueled by his past withdrawal from the JCPOA and the killing of Iranian commander Qassim Soleimani in 2020. Yet, despite lingering tensions, immediate escalation appears less likely than initially feared.
In fact, in April, we witnessed the early stages of renewed indirect negotiations, and momentum has built surprisingly quickly. Contrary to expectations, Iran and the United States now appear closer to reaching a diplomatic agreement than sliding toward war. Discussions accelerated notably after April 26, when both sides initiated technical-level talks on nuclear issues and sanctions, suggesting a shared understanding of a diplomatic framework, similar to the final stages before the 2015 JCPOA.
The key question is: what has changed?
Iran’s Axis of Resistance Suffers setbacks
One major factor is the unprecedented direct confrontation between Iran and Israel. Exchanges of fire in October and April of 2024 brought the two nations closer to full-scale war, highlighting to both Iranian and American leaders the dangers of maintaining the status quo.
Meanwhile, Iran’s strategic position has weakened. Its “Axis of Resistance,” long a tool of regional influence, has suffered major setbacks, including the fall of the Assad regime and severe Israeli strikes against Hezbollah leadership. Facing this new vulnerability, Tehran is more cautious about risking open conflict.
Finally, President Trump’s personal style plays a role. Trump’s past actions, including the killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani he ordered and his provocative statements on Gaza, reinforce his reputation for bold, unpredictable decisions, including the willingness to escalate militarily against Iran.
Appealing to the “madman theory” of unpredictability is not the only change in President Trump’s approach. While he brandishes the threat of military action, he also offers incentives, stating that a good deal could lead to Iran’s prosperity and even calling for Iran to become “a great country.” This dual messaging marks a shift from his previous tactics.
Greater political understanding between administrations in US and Iran
Another important development is that both sides have become more sophisticated in reading each other’s psychology. Unlike during Trump’s first administration, Iranian officials now seem to understand that many of Trump’s decisions are personal. They have tailored their messaging accordingly. For instance, Foreign Minister Araghchi, in a speech prepared for the Carnegie Endowment (later published online), argued that Iran’s nuclear energy plans could revive the struggling US nuclear industry.
Additionally, in response to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu’s statement that a “good deal” would require the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear program, Araghchi criticized Netanyahu’s attempts to influence President Trump, subtly highlighting that Trump does not appreciate being publicly manipulated, a point well understood by those familiar with his personality.
This suggests that Iranian negotiators are deliberately using Trump’s psychological profile to try to drive a wedge between him and Netanyahu.
Trump scales back overt threats of military action
At the same time, President Trump appears to have gained a better understanding of Iranian psychology. He seems to recognize that overt threats are often counterproductive with Iranian leaders. Instead of issuing blunt and direct ultimatums, as he did in his first term, Trump now frames the situation in more passive terms, often stating that there are “two options”: reaching a deal or facing “a bad outcome,” without explicitly threatening military action.
Trump also appears to recognize Iran’s sensitivities regarding its ballistic missile program and regional influence. In his recent statements, he has consistently emphasized that his primary concern is preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, signaling he is not demanding broader concessions.
The rapid progress in negotiations between Trump and Iranian leaders has surprised not only observers but also America’s regional partners, particularly Israel and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. However, their reactions have diverged.
Israel appears uneasy with shifting US policy towards Iran
Israel appears uneasy with the shift. Unlike during the Obama administration, when Prime Minister Netanyahu openly challenged US policy, Israeli officials are now taking a more cautious approach. They begin by complimenting Trump personally before warning against any deal that permits Iran to maintain uranium enrichment capabilities.
By contrast, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, are pursuing engagement. On April 17, 2025, Prince Khalid bin Salman became the first senior Saudi royal to visit Iran since 2006. Rather than opposing the talks, Saudi Arabia seems interested in expanding diplomatic ties.
Their reasons are clear. The direct exchanges between Iran and Israel in October 2023 and April 2024 demonstrated that Arab states could not isolate themselves from a regional war. Their geographic proximity and relatively limited military capabilities would leave them highly vulnerable to Iranian retaliation.
Additionally, recent tensions in the Red Sea between the United States and the Houthis, particularly in March and April 2025, further alarmed Arab leaders. The Houthis’ decision to largely respect the ceasefire with Saudi Arabia, likely under Iranian influence, signaled to Riyadh that diplomatic engagement with Tehran could help safeguard their interests.
Domestic politics also factor heavily. With King Salman now 89 years old, the succession to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is inevitable. To ensure a smooth and stable transfer of power, Mohammed bin Salman must preserve both internal and regional stability—making a war between Iran and Israel, or Iran and the United States, a deeply unwelcome prospect.
Divergence in domestic US politics towards Iran
Israel and the Arab states are not the only actors influencing Iranian-American negotiations. Domestic actors within the United States — and within President Trump’s administration, also play a significant role, though they are not unified.
Vice President J.D. Vance and Special Envoy to the Middle East Steven Witkoff favor a pragmatic approach advocating negotiations, while others, like Secretary of State Rubio, push for maximalist demands such as the complete dismantlement of Iran’s uranium enrichment, a position Tehran is unlikely to accept.
Crafting a mutually acceptable deal is extremely difficult. Washington demands assurances that Iran’s nuclear program will not approach weaponization or lead to nuclear proliferation. Any Iranian stockpile of medium or high-enriched uranium would be a major red flag.
For Iran, dismantling its enrichment program would represent a major political defeat after decades of investment and enduring sanctions. Tehran also insists that any deal must bring meaningful sanctions relief, something it felt was lacking even after the 2015 JCPOA due to persistent fears of US secondary sanctions tied to human rights and terrorism issues.
Recent negotiations signal cautious optimism
A possible compromise could allow Iran to maintain very low-level enrichment — around 3.6 percent — on a small scale, with a few hundred centrifuges operating at a monitored, non-fortified facility rather than Fordow or Natanz.
Such an arrangement could allow Iranian leaders to preserve national pride by maintaining a limited enrichment cycle, while reassuring the United States that Iran remains far from the threshold of weaponization. In addition, the United States might insist on enhanced monitoring and verification measures for Iranian nuclear facilities.
In return, Washington could provide stronger assurances to corporations and foreign investors that the sanctions relief would be real and lasting. This could involve the US Treasury Department issuing clear guidance that sanctions relief tied to the nuclear agreement would not be easily reversed based on unrelated issues like human rights or terrorism.
If both sides can agree on such a framework, reaching a deal is not out of the question. At present, it seems that both Iran and the United States are at least working toward these conditions.
While recent developments signal cautious optimism regarding a political resolution to the nuclear dispute, ultimately, only time will reveal whether a final agreement can be achieved.
Arman Mahmoudian is a research fellow at the University of South Florida Global and National Security Institute. He is also an adjunct professor at the USF Judy Genshaft Honors College, teaching courses on Russia, the Middle East, and International Security. He holds a PhD in Politics and International Affairs from the University of South Florida. He earned his Master’s in International Relations in Russia and my Bachelor’s in Law in Iran. His research and commentary have been featured in Foreign Policy, The National Interest, Stimson Center, Atlantic Council, Gulf International Forum, and other platforms. Follow him on LinkedIn and X.
