The Islamic Republic of Iran is no stranger to crisis, but in the last 12 months we have witnessed a whole new level of risk and uncertainty. The long-standing Iranian policy has been to support Hizbullah and Hamas, as both a badge of honor to lord over Arab states, as well as evidence of its commitment to the Palestinian cause. Iranian support for anti-US and anti-Israeli militias in the region has allowed Tehran to avoid getting its hands dirty in direct military confrontation. But this strategy no longer holds. The Gaza war has brought Iran into direct confrontation with Israel. In April 2024, Iran launched a barrage of missiles and drones at Israel in response to the Israeli attack on its consulate in Damascus, marking its first direct attack on the state. This opened a new chapter in Iran’s foreign policy: Iran is no longer operating in the shadows of proxy war but is directly involved in combat.
Against this seismic shift in Iranian strategic thinking, the ruling regime lost President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash and elected a new president: Masoud Pezeshkian. This is an extremely challenging time for any leader, and it is doubly challenging for Pezeshkian because he represents the reformist camp and campaigned on the theme of tension-reduction with the international community. Pezeshkian’s electoral campaign emphasized economic recovery, improving Iran’s international standing and reducing state infringement of social freedoms (ie. mandatory hijab). This reform agenda stood in sharp contrast with the message of his conservative opponent Saeed Jalili, who presented an ideological mantra on fighting the West. Yet Pezeshkian is now part of the political leadership that could alienate Iran from the international community even further and put Iran on a collision course with the United States.
A reformist president faces manifold challenges
Pezeshkian’s challenges are manifold: they include the nature of his electoral win; the extent of his authority; and the assertiveness of his hard-line opponents. These challenges place insurmountable barriers to his reform agenda.
Masoud Pezeshkian was elected president in the second round of voting in July 2024, securing the majority of the vote against his hardline conservative opponent Saeed Jalili. The participation rate at the second round was just below 50 percent of the electorate. This low turn-out points to a systemic deficiency, a deep-seated crisis of legitimacy as large segments of the public have lost confidence in the ruling regime. Electoral participation in presidential elections in Iran has fluctuated, with high participation rates typically benefitting reformist candidates. Mohammad Khatami’s win in 1997 was marked by a high 80 percent participation rate, dropping for his second term in 2001 to 66 percent. Hassan Rouhani’s win in 2013 came on the back of 73 percent participation rate, remaining at the same level for his second term election in 2019. The picture surrounding Pezeshkian’s win stands in contrast to his reformist predecors.
Many reformist voters stayed away from the ballot boxes as they saw Pezeshkian’s candidacy as a cynical ruse to generate an impression of choice and boost regime legitimacy. Narges Mohammadi, a Nobel laureate and political prisoner, for example, dismissed the election as a deceitful mockery. The reformist voting block appears disillusioned with prospects of change from within. The low turn-out has demonstrated a major crisis of legitimacy for the ruling regime.
The limits of presidential powers in the Islamic Republic
President Pezeshkian has limited scope of authority within the political structure of the Islamic Republic of Iran. He is not the head of state and cannot make major strategic foreign policy or domestic policy decisions. The head of state is the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei who appoints the head of the judiciary, head of armed forces and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and national media. Under his control, a Guardian Council vets parliamentary bills and candidates while the Supreme National Security Council decides on matters of war and peace and major strategic initiatives, such as Iran’s engagement in Syria and war with Israel. In this closed political system, the president has limited room to maneuver. While Pezeshkian may say the right things about resetting unpopular policies (eg. mandatory hijab regulations), his capacity for meaningful change is marginal.
Conservative hold tightens amidst tense regional politics and discontent
The tense international context and the growing gap between large segments of the public and the ruling regime has seen a significant strengthening of the conservatives’ hold on many levers of power. The Iranian parliament is dominated by the conservative camp and has a record of undermining reformist presidents. The Parliament, for example, played the role of a spoiler against Rouhani’s attempts to keep international nuclear dialogue alive when it adopted a resolution for increased uranium enrichment. It is certain the conservative parliament will be at loggerheads with President Pezeshkian on major issues such as resetting relations with the international community or retracting state imposition of mandatory dress-code for women. In the same vein, the IRGC has gained a pronounced role in Iran’s foreign and security policy decision making. The exchange of fire with Israel in April 2024, has effectively elevated the role of the IRGC in Iran’s security thinking that emphasizes the doctrine of ‘forward defence’ by sustaining a network of friendly forces in the region (dubbed the ‘axis of resistance’)to defend Iranian national interests outside its borders. All this has been taking place under the watchful eye of the Supreme Leader Khamenei.
The killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh while in Tehran for President Pezeshkian’s inauguration was a stark reminder of the combustible nature of regional politics. Pezeshkian may wish to avoid further escalation, but the Supreme Leader and IRGC have promised a response in kind to Israel. They clearly see Iran’s defense credibility undermined by Haniyah’s assassination, requiring appropriate response. This is a highly volatile situation, as any military response to Israel risks drawing the United States into the conflict. As the president, Pezeshkian sits on the Supreme National Security Council and is privy to military deliberations and planning, albeit with little scope to effect change. The irony of Pezeshkian’s recent election win, in contrast to the limits of his power is palpable.
Prof Shahram Akbarzadeh is the Convenor of the Middle East Studies Forum at Deakin University (Australia) and Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Middle East Council on Global Affairs (Doha). He is the author of award-winning book: Middle East Politics and International Relations: Crisis Zone
