After 26 months without a president and amidst mounting international pressure to find one, the Lebanese parliament elected President Joseph Aoun on January 9, a move that was followed days later by the designation of Nawaf Salam as Prime Minister. This means that for the first time since 2008 Hezbollah no longer has a close ally nor is in full control of the executive branch.
This transformational moment in restructuring the executive power dynamics of Lebanese politics comes at a critical moment in Hezbollah’s history following a devastating war with Israel that killed its leader Hassan Nasrallah and destroyed most areas considered Hezbollah’s stronghold. Hezbollah became more vulnerable after signing the ceasefire with Israel last November, which gave the international leverage to oversee the disarmament of Hezbollah and link any reconstruction funding to having an executive branch that is not under Hezbollah’s control.
On Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas and several other Palestinian militant groups launched coordinated armed incursions from the Gaza Strip into the Gaza envelope of southern Israel. As Israel retaliated, Hezbollah joined the conflict gradually from the Lebanese border in support of Hamas. Last September-October, Israel launched an attack on Hezbollah and invaded southern Lebanon in a round of violence that ended with a ceasefire that took effect on Nov. 27, 2024.
Presidential appointments and foreign interference
Unsurprisingly, Aoun’s election came after international pressure following a protracted presidential vacuum. The Permanent Five (P5) countries (United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar) meet regularly to discuss through their ambassadors in Lebanon and have recently increased the pressure to advance Aoun’s presidency. Indeed, no Lebanese President since declaring the independence of Lebanon has been elected without foreign interference. Meanwhile, Salam remains in the process of forming a cabinet that requires a simple majority vote of confidence from the Parliament, hence he can form a cabinet with a simple majority of 65 out of 128 deputies in the Lebanese parliament and does not need the 30 confidence votes of Hezbollah and Shiite affiliated political party, Amal. However, forming the cabinet without their vote not only reopens the question of sectarian representation in multi-confessional societies but might also render the cabinet’s job quasi-impossible.
Politically, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, a close Hezbollah ally and highly influential official in Lebanese politics, can create legal obstacles if the Amal movement he leads switches to the opposition, which might complicate the government’s ability to pass its legislative agenda and reforms. Moreover, the new government’s main mandate is to implement the ceasefire with Israel and begin reconstruction efforts, and without having Hezbollah on board it is more difficult to achieve these objectives in the current conditions.
Salam has been meeting with Hezbollah and Amal representatives who agreed in principle to take part in the government, however, challenges and delays persist. Berri insists on having the finance ministry, which he believes is the third Shiite signature needed for key national decisions after the Maronite President and Sunni Prime Minister. Hezbollah is also seeking a ministerial post, however, the Trump administration has stated that international support for the new Lebanese government depends on not having Hezbollah part of it. Salam, who is new to governance, has a dilemma between remaining loyal to his ideals of reforms and the realities of Lebanese politics and international pressure. Hezbollah has no choice but to avoid confrontation with the new government, which has been backed by the international community, to secure funding for reconstruction following the recent war with Israel. Hence, both the Aoun-Salam need Hezbollah and the other way around.
Possible divisions over Hezbollah’s interpretations of the ceasefire agreement
Indeed, some differences will most likely cause friction, mainly in how the parties interpret the ceasefire deal with Israel. Hezbollah argues that the agreement strictly applies to the south of the Litani River, which is the area near the border with Israel, while President Aoun as well as the international community argues that it applies to both north and south of the Litani River, which means Hezbollah must disarm across Lebanon. President Aoun said in his oath speech that the Lebanese state should have exclusive control of arms in dealing with Israel, hence posing a challenge to Hezbollah’s arsenal of weaponry. Given the international pressure and the approach of the incoming administration of United States President Donald Trump, Hezbollah might have no choice but to concede given the evolving dynamics in Lebanese politics but might not immediately give up all heavy weapons.
The potential degradation of Hezbollah’s military capabilities is having an impact as the armed group’s clout in Lebanese politics is already in decline after losing control of the two main border crossings to receive cash and arms from the Iranian regime. Hezbollah has also lost control of Beirut International Airport as the Lebanese Armed Forces began to inspect all luggage coming to Lebanon since last September. Moreover, Hezbollah has lost the arms supply route from Iran via Iraq and Syria into Lebanon, and its Secretary General Naim Qassem has hinted that the party might at some point find a way to work around this obstacle, even though it is not clear yet how they would secure transfer of arms.
An uncertain transitional period
Yet, when it is most vulnerable, Hezbollah might also be keen to turn its weapons against fellow Lebanese political parties as it did in May 2008 to challenge the government’s decision to dismantle Hezbollah’s telecommunications system. Shortly afterward, Hezbollah adopted the same corrupt Lebanese oligarchy to maintain its control over the political system, contributing to Lebanon’s economic and financial collapse. However, times are different now in many ways. First, both Hezbollah and the Iranian regime are significantly weaker given the international economic pressure and Israel’s military offensive. Second, Lebanon remains in a fiscal crisis that Hezbollah cannot manage alone without international aid for the Lebanese government. Third, there is frustration and concerns among Hezbollah’s Shiite constituents who saw their homes and businesses fully destroyed during the recent war with Israel and questions on how the reconstruction will be funded. Hezbollah is aware of these constraints that might limit its ability to challenge the ongoing dynamics in Lebanese politics.
Lebanon is in a transformational period that remains uncertain. The international pressure is unprecedented to implement the ceasefire with Israel and adopt economic reforms, and the national consensus in Lebanon is around the need to find a new way forward for the country. Business as usual is no longer possible or affordable.
Joe Macaron is a Global Fellow with the Wilson Center’s Middle East Program with over two decades of experience with high-profile international organizations. He has previously held roles at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, the Colin Powell Center for Policy Studies, and Arab Center Washington DC. A former journalist, he has managed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) public engagement in the Middle East and North Africa and served in different capacities in the United Nations system. He holds a PhD in Politics and International Studies from the University of Bath.
