October 15 marked 18 months since the start of the current war in Sudan. Negotiations in Geneva, jointly convened by the United States and the Swiss governments, stalled due to the refusal of the Sudan Armed Forces, one of the two major warring parties, to attend. The Geneva negotiations did not succeed in bringing the warring SAF and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) together, nor in reaching a ceasefire, but they succeeded in obtaining pledges from the parties to open crossings and facilitate the movement of humanitarian aid. However, they did not specify mechanisms for ensuring adherence to these commitments, as was the case with the Jeddah Declaration signed on May 11, 2023. 

The Geneva negotiations aspired to bring together representatives from prior unsuccessful initiatives to end the war in Sudan. Led by the United States, the initiative brought together the sub-regional Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), and Sudan’s neighbors, and regional powers with influence over the parties. As the war drags on, rivalries among regional powers seeking to influence its outcome by supporting their preferred local ally, continue to pose difficulties for a diplomatic end to the conflict. What might make the situation even more complex is that the incoming administration of Donald J. Trump in the United States is likely to withdraw from playing a leading role as a lead mediator and delegate the resolution of the conflict in Sudan to regional allies, mainly Saudi Arabia, UAE and to some extent Egypt, who have all been accused of backing their allies among the warring parties. This means that negotiations to end conflict in Sudan will be in the hands of these competing regional powers. 

As the fighting intensifies and the prospects for diplomacy diminish, efforts are underway to reconcile the views of civilians backing the armed forces with those of the Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddam), which opposes the war and advocates for the revival of Sudan’s path to democratic civilian rule, and of which I am an active member. A more unified civilian movement pressing for a negotiated end to the conflict could significantly enhance the likelihood of a peaceful resolution.

Bringing the Port Sudan camp to negotiations

The de facto Port Sudan authorities are seeking to obtain legitimacy and recognition. They have sent letters to all diplomatic missions accredited to Sudan demanding they open embassies in Port Sudan, instead of relocating them to neighboring countries and maintaining antennas in the forced search of the government. At the same time, the de facto authorities are waging a diplomatic battle through allies to unfreeze Sudan’s membership in the African Union, which was suspended in the aftermath of the October 2021 coup. Following the coup, the Armed Forces are demanding the implementation of the Jeddah Declaration as a condition for going to negotiations, and although they signed the Jeddah Declaration on behalf of the Armed Forces, they now insist on negotiating as a legitimate government.

There is also planning to try to establish legitimacy as a fait accompli by forming a government in Port Sudan from civilian groups loyal to the National Congress Party (NCP), Sudan’s ruling party under the Bashir regime. Civilians and NCP allies have been presented alongside the army, as happened in the appearance of General Kabbashi with former Sennar Governor Ahmed Abbas and General Al-Burhan’s appearance with the commanders of the Baraa bin Malik battalion, organized by the NCP. Finally, an important indicator is the return of Engineer Ibrahim Mahmoud, the president of the NCP, to the country and his reception as a high dignitary.

It is also possible that the Rapid Support Forces will refuse to return to negotiations if the mediators accept the participation of the Port Sudan camp as a representative of a legitimate government in any negotiating platform, or that it will form a government and demand to be recognized as such by the mediators, this will not only complicate the situation create tremendous strain on current and potential mediators. In sum, the conflict over legitimacy will continue to disrupt negotiations for a peaceful solution.

The second thing that may determine the Port Sudan camp’s susceptibility to negotiations is whether they are able to change conditions on the ground in such a way as to strengthen their position to impose their will through negotiations. Complicating this is the reality that there are contradictions within this camp, in that parts of the Port Sudan camp have political and economic interests in continuing the war, with financial gain from the war economy and increased opportunities for political promotion in a new Port Sudan government. In addition, Egypt, which supports the Port Sudan camp, insists that the army should have the greatest influence in power in any future political arrangements in the aftermath of the war. To make it happen, Egypt has increased its support for the SAF.

Escalation of hostilities

Military confrontations are escalating on the Khartoum, Sennar and El Fasher axes. What is new in this escalation is that SAF has resumed offensive operations, which have not been seen since the first months of the war since which time the army has remained on the defensive. It is possible that if SAF improves its position on the ground, this may have a positive impact on its acceptance of negotiations. However, it is also possible that the RSF will counterattack, especially since the attacking party usually suffers the greatest losses in lives and equipment. With the escalation of operations, it is not far-fetched to speculate that the RSF could expand the war to Blue Nile and Gedaref. Of course, in such a scenario, within weeks, we may be talking about another hot winter of hell for civilians, as the state capitals of Damazin and Gedaref have become two of the largest shelters for people fleeing fighting in other states. If the war expands, tens of thousands of people will be killed by hunger and bullets, and mass displacement, perhaps in the millions, towards South Sudan, Ethiopia, and Eritrea is likely to continue. The most important and distressing event in the current escalation and the intransigence of the Port Sudan camp to accept negotiations without preconditions is the announcement by the RSF’s commander Hemedti in his speech on October 9 to stop all negotiations at all levels. This is the first announcement of its kind by the RSF since the establishment of the Jeddah Platform and the subsequent attempts in IGAD, the African Union and finally in Geneva. 

The changing nature of the war

The war was accompanied by an organized campaign of hate speech and racism, and the result is a state of acute polarization. In SAF areas, extremist and racist discourse is used towards individuals from western Sudan, who are assumed to be the base of support for the RSF, and mobilization and recruitment are carried out on an ethnic and tribal basis. The armed forces prefer to form tribal militias rather than recruit directly into the armed forces, pursuing a long-established practice of reliance on proxy tribal militias to wage war on behalf of the national army. This has made the detention, inhumane treatment, and worst, the killing of people based on their ethnicity, accent, and facial features a reality.

Jihadist brigades and the so-called Special Forces, formed from remnants of the paramilitary units of the former National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS) have emerged as the worst perpetrators. Their forces carried out the most brutal forms of repression in the areas that have been recently reclaimed from the RSF. The ability of a civilian to stay alive in RSF-controlled areas has come to imply that he or she is a collaborator. This attitude will inevitably lead to the killing of more civilians whenever land changes hands. All these factors point to the transformation of this war into a comprehensive civil war based on race, color, and complexion. Discourse to mobilize populations in the northern, eastern and central states against populations from western Sudan, is likely to lead to discrimination against other groups from western Sudan, even those fighting in the ranks of the army alongside it, and ethnic tensions have been observed in the states of River Nile, North, Red Sea, Gedaref and Kassala. If such discourse continues, perhaps the day will come when the allies in the Port Sudan camp will fight each other on ethnic grounds.

In conclusion, four key observations can be drawn from the last year and a half of fighting. First, the multiplicity of negotiation initiatives has proven to be a distraction and created opportunities for the warring parties to procrastinate and manipulate negotiations to gain legitimacy. Second, it is clear that the Port Sudan camp does not hesitate to hold civilians dying of hunger, disease and bullets as hostages to pressure the international community to help it achieve the military objectives that it has failed so far to achieve through military action through negotiations. Third, regional rivalries have contributed to undermining political pressure to bring the parties to the negotiation table without conditions and prioritize protecting civilians.

Key actors, whether mediators or political actors in Sudan can develop policy recommendations based on these observations. Unless there is a shift in these dynamics, we are likely to witness ever fiercer fighting, especially as the US role is likely to diminish during the presidential elections and the fact that a new administration might not continue on the same path or approach of the outgoing Biden’s administration. In this potential vacuum, Sudanese actors have an opportunity to take the initiative, and the role of regional actors, especially Egypt and the African Union, is expected to increase.

In this context, Sudanese political actors should redouble their efforts to overcome their differences and agree on a common position to end the war and restore Sudan’s transition to democracy.

At the international level as well, it is clear that new approaches are needed. In particular, the international community should:

1. Unify all regional efforts led by the African Union under a unified leadership.
2. Target local, civic, and religious leaders and other opinion leaders in a broad campaign to enable them to resist the influence and proliferation of hate speech by both of the warring parties.
3. Avoid granting legitimacy to either party. Any granting of recognition to the de facto authorities in Port Sudan is likely to push the RSF to act to push for similar recognition. These actions are likely to increase divisions and complicate the prospects of a political solution.
4. Take action to protect civilians and deliver humanitarian aid whether by putting pressure on the parties to increase respect for civilians or by creating safe areas on the borders with Egypt, South Sudan and Chad. 

Bakry Eljak Elmedni is an assistant professor at the School of Business, Public Administration and Information Sciences at LIU’s Brooklyn Campus and has worked in program design, policy and planning  with international and local NGOs and civil society groups. He is an active member in the Taqaddum coalition of civilian forces in Sudan. This is an abridged article that originally appeared on the Sudan Transparency Policy Tracker website and can be read in full here.