For observers following the trajectory of Iran’s nuclear program, the question on everyone’s mind seems to be, “What will happen now?” In 2015, under the administration of then-United States President Barack Obama, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was negotiated following years of public and private conversations between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany, known as the P5+1. The JCPOA stipulated restrictions on Iran’s uranium enrichment far beyond the constraints required by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which Iran is a signatory. In exchange, some broad-based economic sanctions against Iran, in place since just after the 1979 Revolution with several updates over the years, were lifted with a snapback mechanism in place to ensure continued compliance with the terms of the JCPOA.
When President Donald Trump unilaterally withdrew the US from the JCPOA in 2018 and reimposed the sanctions which had been suspended, some European leaders issued public statements suggesting that the JCPOA was still in place without the US, signaling a desire on the part of Europe to continue the deal under its original terms regardless of the political situation in the US. Nevertheless, the interdependence of the global economy and the dominance of the United States in the domain of international commerce made the JCPOA’s withdrawal quite consequential.
As of April 2025, Iran currently has the world’s least-valued currency. Based on the Consumer Price Index as of March 2025 the inflation rate is 37.1 percent annually, with a 42.7 percent food inflation rate. Many basic household and hygiene goods and life-saving medicines are either largely unavailable or prohibitively expensive for most Iranians to access. The Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, Abdolnaser Hemmati, was impeached by Iran’s Parliament in March of this year due to public dissatisfaction over mismanagement of the country’s economic crisis. While the factors leading to such economic turmoil are multifaceted, the impact of US-led, broad-based economic sanctions both cannot be ignored and is consistent with academic consensus on sanctions of this nature.
How did we get here?
One of Donald Trump’s signature campaign promises when he took office in 2017 was to renegotiate the so-called “Iran Nuclear Deal” such that the terms would be more favorable to the US. When the US withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018 and Trump directed the Department of State and the Department of the Treasury to reimpose economic sanctions on Iran, he did so with the objective of inflicting “maximum pressure” on Iran in order to force a return to the negotiating table with a greater willingness to grant concessions with respect to its nuclear energy program, or ideally even to force a regime change in Iran, both of which would be driven by further isolating Iran politically and economically. When neither of those two potential outcomes materialized by the time his first term ended in January 2021, it was unclear what could be expected from the incoming administration of Joe Biden.
Observers noted a shift in approach which resulted in a tentative return to talks between the United States and Iran with the goal of reinvigorating the JCPOA. These were, however, taking place in the context of a strengthened hardliner bloc in Iran who felt vindicated by Trump’s withdrawal of the United States from the original deal; they argued that they had been right all along in their distrust of engagement with the US. It would be even more of a challenge to convince the other factions of Iran’s political establishment to return to negotiations with a US president who had violated the terms of the original deal.
Though not in a strong position by September 2022, any hopes at reviving the JCPOA were obliterated at the outbreak of the mass, feminist-led, Iranian uprising that became known as the “Woman, Life, Freedom” (WLF) movement. The uprising resulted in prolonged and intense demonstrations across Iran in the wake of the suspicious death in police custody of 22-year-old Kurdish-Iranian woman Mahsa Jina Amini, who had been detained for allegedly improper hijab. The Iranian government’s characteristically harsh crackdown resulted in more than 600 deaths including dozens of minors or children, at least 9 executions, and tens of thousands of detentions along with egregious violations of due process by the authorities. The Iranian government’s response to WLF prompted the Biden Administration to completely suspend its engagement with Iran on the JCPOA amid international outrage over Tehran’s response to the popular uprising.
Though the “maximum pressure campaign” had failed to actualize the Trump Administration’s objectives during his first term, upon taking office for the second time in January 2025, the president announced a return to maximum pressure alongside a desire to engage in talks with Iran about a new “nuclear deal.” In the years since the initial onset of the “maximum pressure campaign,” Iran has strengthened its ties with Russia and China which has enabled it to withstand some of the pressure exerted by the Trump Administration. At the same time, damage to neighboring allies Hamas and Hezbollah since October 7, 2023, and the fall of Iran’s staunch ally Bashar al-Asad in Syria have limited Iran’s avenues of resistance against further erosion of its position of relative power in the region. It is as yet unclear what will be the new terms the United States intends to propose, but Iran has signaled its willingness to return to a deal under the condition that the terms would not violate Iran’s sovereignty, defensive capabilities, or rights under the NPT.
What Is Next?
Though officials from both the United States and Iran have expressed cautious – if wary – optimism about the potential for a new deal, there are several possible sticking points which could be cause for concern. First, the Trump Administration has indicated on many occasions that it believed the original JCPOA to be a “terrible deal” for the United States. Under the terms of the original agreement, Iran would enrich uranium to no more than 3.67 percent domestically, would allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to conduct regularly scheduled as well as unannounced inspections, and would ship its Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU) to a third country for full oversight. (Weapons-grade uranium is enriched to 90 percent.)
In return, many of the broad-based economic sanctions were lifted, with a “snapback” mechanism in place so that any violations by Iran would enable the United Nations to impose immediate sanctions in order to ensure continued compliance. United States officials have not publicly discussed the new terms they are aiming for which would ostensibly be more favorable to the US, though some have suggested that the US may demand a curtailing of conventional weapons systems by Iran, which Iranian officials have indicated would be completely off the table as part of the negotiations. Bolstered by a lack of conclusive evidence of a nuclear weapons program, Iran continues to insist that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful energy purposes. Therefore, it sees itself as being in a strong negotiating position to rebuff demands of this nature from the Trump Administration.
Currently, the talks scheduled to take place in Oman have been postponed for “logistical reasons” at Oman’s request. Iran’s support for Yemen’s Houthis, who are engaging in a campaign of armed attacks against Israeli cargo ships in the Red Sea in response to Israel’s blockade of Gaza, is a source of tension with the US which creates a challenging backdrop against which these talks are being held. The US is likely to demand that Iran end its support of the Houthis, which would deal a major blow to the Yemeni group as well as to Iran’s own interests in the region in light of its rivalry with Saudi Arabia which has itself carried out extensive military campaigns against the Houthis. The benefits to Iran, were a new nuclear deal to be implemented, would largely stem from the lifting of economic sanctions and the opportunity to better integrate into the global economy. For the US a new deal would benefit them by opening a new avenue by which to pursue regional security interests by leveraging pressure in ways that are currently not accessible to the US due to the lack of official communication and diplomatic ties between the US and Iran. At a time of trade wars and economic turmoil for the United States, a new “Iran Nuclear Deal” could also bolster Trump’s claims to economic prowess and enable the US to lower its energy costs and strengthen valuable commerce and trade relations in a highly significant region of the world.
Sahar Razavi is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and the Director of the Iranian and Middle Eastern Studies Center at California State University, Sacramento.
