The administration of United States President Donald J. Trump and Israel’s right-wing government, led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, have an ambitious plan to reshape the Middle East that dovetails with their own ideological proclivities and financial and political interests. The Abraham Accords, the fruit of the Trump administration’s first term in the White House, is at the heart of that vision, and the new US government now has a clear goal to aid Israel with territorial expansion so that both states can dominate the Levant politically and militarily. The first step towards that goal is the total displacement of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, followed by a gradual takeover of the West Bank – and politically compliant regimes in Damascus and Beirut would be the icing on the cake. Given the current power configuration, nothing stands in the way of a new US-Israel dominated region, unless a new pan-Arab bloc finds leverage to stop the takeover.
Trump’s vision for a Gaza without Palestinians
President Trump has become known for his transactional view of the world, seeing most conflicts as being easily resolved through opposing parties striking business deals that are mutually beneficial, while ignoring the underlying political problems. President Trump expressed interest in the Israeli-occupied Gaza strip well before the war of October 7, 2023 started, via his son in-law Jared Kusher, who expressed interest in the land as “valuable property.” Kusher visited Israel a year before the Gaza War started and suggested that Israel could/should move the Palestinian population into the Negev Desert to “clean up the area” for investment. Since moving back into the White House, President Trump has taken up the idea with vengeance, saying the US will “own Gaza,” and turn it into “the Riviera of the Middle East.” When asked about the fate of Gaza’s Palestinian population Trump suggested they could live much better elsewhere, perhaps with much better housing and facilities than living “in the rubble that is Gaza today.”
Trump’s controversial and imprecise language in his outlining of the takeover idea, including talk of US boots on the ground, has led some in and outside the White House to suggest that he was reconsidering the assertion. However, while Trump and his spokespeople may have allayed Republican fears of a US military campaign to occupy the Gaza strip, or of actually spending US taxpayer dollars to buy the land, the US president himself has doubled down his assertions of the US owning Gaza.
Sifting through the sandstorm of President Trump’s statements on Gaza, the Abraham Accords, and the invitation to invite Arab states to assist in the remaking of Gaza, a strategy of sorts emerges: Israel clears out Gaza’s Palestinian population, with some being enticed with financial benefits to leave voluntarily, others being parceled off to Jordan and Egypt, and the rest, likely the bulk of the population, being pushed into newly constructed refugee camps in the Negev desert. Israel’s intelligence ministry suggested such plans in a document that was leaked soon after the October 8 assault on Gaza. Trump’s “takeover” would realistically translate into acquiring the construction rights, either directly or indirectly via his billionaire friends, with Gulf countries investing in the projects and Israel providing the security arrangements.
Oil, Gas and Construction Contracts
Trump’s financial interests in Gaza go beyond reconstruction contracts, however. Oil and natural gas speculation has clearly been part of his transactional thinking. Gaza is estimated to sit on over a trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Israel of course is already engaged in offshore drilling but the exploitation of new reserves in Gaza could make it a viable exporter of natural gas to Europe.
Lebanon, after a 14-month war that dealt a heavy blow to Hezbollah and decimated several southern villages and the southern suburb of Beirut, now has a new president and cabinet. The ceasefire, agreed to under the mediation of the Biden administration, concluded on February 18 with only a partial Israeli withdrawal and continuing occasional bombardment in various parts of the country. The US and Israel are nominally pleased with the choice of Joseph Aoun as president and Nawaf Salam as prime minister. The Israeli foreign minister went so far as to congratulate Aoun, predicting a better future for Lebanon under his rule. Washington has warned, however, that Nawaf Salam should not apportion any ministries to Hezbollah, and while the new cabinet includes two Shia ministers whose names were approved by Nabih Berri, Hezbollah’s ally and speaker of parliament, the two are purportedly independents. Additionally, two planes from Iran bound for Beirut were denied permission to land by Lebanese authorities on February 16 after the US warned that Israel would bomb Beirut International Airport if they did. If Lebanon’s new president and prime minister are not formally allied with Washington and Tel Aviv, they have so far given signs they are aware of the cost of non-compliance. .
US and Israeli dominance could be shortlived
For the time being, a new balance of power in the region favors the US-Israel alliance – Iran has been quiescent and Hamas, while not totally destroyed, has been weakened but continues to rule over a decimated Gaza and a severely distressed population. Regime changes in Lebanon and Syria currently appear to be operating within parameters set by Washington and approved by Israel. However, the dominance of the US and Israel in the region may be short-lived or fall short of its goals. Gaza’s fate may well be decided by the force of Israeli arms and the Trump administration’s maneuvering. Alternatively, Saudi Arabia may refuse to play along and has thus far insisted that the displacement of Palestinians is unacceptable and that the two-state solution remains the only viable option for peace. Jordan’s King Abdallah, deflecting embarrassing questions on Trump’s Gaza plans during his visit to the White House, suggested that his reaction awaited discussions with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Crown Prince Prince Mohamed Bin Salman (MBS), the nation’s de facto ruler, has at least the option of acting as lynchpin of an alternative Arab plan on Gaza. Saudi approval of Washington’s invitation to join the Abraham Accords and to normalize relations with Israel hangs in the balance, hence granting MBS some leverage. Saudi wealth, which could mean huge investments in the reconstruction of Gaza, not to mention lucrative arms deals with the US could play a considerable role in the ‘day after’ for Gaza. In the current transactional international environment Saudi Arabia could prevail in forcing a more favorable outcome for Palestinians without having to resort to an oil boycott as was the case back in the early 1970s.
Saudi Arabia could become the regional powerhouse
Saudi Arabia has also vested itself anew in Lebanon after a decade of non-involvement. The new power structure in Lebanon, sometimes referred to as the beginning of its Third Republic, has the Saudi stamp of approval, and hence potential influence. Here, MBS may well act more cautiously, given the continued presence of Hezbollah and the delicate political balance in the country. It will be up to the Lebanese principally to choose how to react to the continued presence of Israeli troops and to continued Israeli threats of incursion.
Joseph Aoun’s inaugural speech, and the new cabinet’s initial proclamation, have both alluded to Lebanon’s intention to adopt a new defense strategy and to choose how to react to continued threats from Israel. Lebanon’s compliance with UNSC Resolution 1701 does not necessarily involve a confrontation between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and Hezbollah, even though such a confrontation is often implied in statements from Washington and Tel Aviv. Aoun could choose to merge Hezbollah fighters and arsenal into the LAF, thereby consolidating the use of force under the legitimate authority of the state or might leave Hezbollah as a separate auxiliary force to be called on to support the LAF as and when needed. If this collaboration fails to materialize, Hezbollah may well re-emerge as a credible fighting force on its own after a period of regrouping its forces and leadership cadres. Either way, Israel may not be able to rely on a compliant Lebanon for long if it chooses to hold on to parts of the country and to intervene at will in its internal affairs.
A Hadith (sayings of the Prophet) often used in Lebanon says that “Actions can only be judged by their end results.” To use the famous Sherlock Holmes quote, the game is indeed afoot but a variety of options are on the table and the outcome is far from predictable at this writing.
Dr. Nabeel A. Khoury is currently a non-resident senior fellow at the Arab Center in Washington, DC and the author of Bunker Diplomacy: An Arab-American in the U.S. Foreign Service. He served in the US foreign service for 25 years, holding roles such as deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in Yemen and spokesperson at US Central Command in Doha and in Baghdad during the Iraq war in 2003. He served as director of the office of Near East and South Asia at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).
