The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has witnessed a broad spectrum of proposed scenarios to bring it to an end, ranging from hardline approaches that call for a military conclusion to more realistic ones that favor a partial political settlement. Among these scenarios, the proposal of United States President Donald Trump, has stood out. It calls implicitly for Ukraine to accept the status quo, beginning with recognizing Russia’s sovereignty over the territories it has annexed since 2014. However, this proposition clashes with the will of the Ukrainian people, who reject it. Opinion polls indicate that more than 80 percent of Ukrainians refuse to give up any part of their territory. This popular reality constrains President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and prevents him from offering concessions that would impair the territorial integrity of the state, lest he meet the same fate that his predecessor encountered following the loss of Crimea.
Ukraine continues to demand complete withdrawal
In contrast, Ukraine, supported by the European powers, is demanding a complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the occupied territories, as well as the provision of multidimensional security guarantees. However, as this path has faltered and proven difficult to impose on the ground, attention has been turning to a more realistic scenario that, to a large extent, resembles the armistice agreement between the two Koreas in 1953. It is built on freezing the conflict and observing a ceasefire without reaching a comprehensive peace agreement.
This scenario would allow Ukraine to avoid more military and human losses without recognizing Russia’s sovereignty over Crimea, the Donbass, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, territories that, from Kyiv’s perspective, would remain “occupied” or “disputed.” At the same time, it would close the door to Ukraine’s accession to the NATO alliance, a demand that Moscow considers to be a non-negotiable national security matter.
On the other hand, this scenario would give Russian President Vladimir Putin an opportunity to declare a “strategic victory” over the West without making formal concessions and with the possibility of consolidating his control over the occupied territories through sham referendums, incorporating them into the Russian constitution, or even treating them like vassal separatist regions, as he did in Abkhazia and Ossetia in Georgia. The Kremlin would maintain its military presence in these regions as a permanent pressure card and as a means of strengthening Russia’s position as a power still capable of challenging the West.
A scenario that might weaken Ukraine, while protecting its sovereignty
Although this scenario would weaken Ukraine, it would not lead to its disintegration. Rather, it would guarantee its survival as a sovereign state, which would allow for European military and economic support to continue, especially in light of the division of the European continent between an East fearful of Russian expansion and a West wary of direct involvement versus states that show tendencies of unconditional support for Moscow.
In this context, the fragility of European strategy has clearly emerged, especially after the Trump administration marginalized the European Union on security and defense issues. Washington’s declared positions have laid bare the extent of Europe’s dependence on American cover and revealed that the Union, despite its economic size, remains unable to formulate an independent foreign policy capable of protecting its collective interests. Furthermore, the decline of the United States’ commitment to the continent’s security, both during and after the Trump era, has led to a growing sense of anxiety in many European capitals, which have begun to realize that the Atlantic Alliance no longer necessarily guarantees their security as it did in the past.
“Intermediate” states could play a mediation role in ending the conflict
At the level of international mediation, the United States is not qualified to play the role of neutral mediator because it is a major party to the conflict, whether through its military and economic support for Ukraine or through its political rivalry with Russia. It had been assumed that the United Nations would assume a leading role in sponsoring the negotiations for a solution, but what happened sheds light on the failure of the United Nations Organization and, with it, the international system as a whole to manage complex crises. This failure recalls to mind the bitter experience of the League of Nations in the period between the two World Wars, when it failed to prevent major military escalations and humanity slid toward all-out war. Today, the world once again appears to be on the threshold of an international system that suffers from a chaos similar to that which preceded World War II, since an international authority capable of imposing the law is absent and the rules upon which modern international relations are based are receding.
In this complex scene, the power of “intermediate” states also emerges, i.e., those who do not line up directly behind either of the two parties, like Turkey, India, and the Gulf states, who are now playing sensitive diplomatic and economic roles and attempting to mediate or achieve strategic gains from this transformation. This multiplicity of centers of influence signals the end of the era of “unipolarity” that followed the Cold War and the beginning of an unstable international order governed by fragile balances of power and flexible alliances that shift according to circumstantial interests.
As for China, it is monitoring developments on the scene with a vigilant strategic eye. It does not want the West to emerge victorious from this conflict, just as it does not desire the expansion of Russian influence. Rather, it seeks to prolong the attrition and create suitable conditions for broadening its influence, particularly in Taiwan and its Asian surroundings. Freezing the conflict would also provide it with opportunities to invest in
Russian reconstruction and strengthen its economic presence in Eurasia.
As for Moscow, it remains capable of shifting to a long-term war of attrition, especially after recapturing areas such as Kursk. This is in line with the Kremlin’s doctrine, which considers time to be a strategic weapon no less important than conventional weapons.
Said Salmi is a former Professor of Geopolitics at Franche Comté University in France, researcher and documentary producer at Noon Films, a British production house.
