What a difference a day makes. During his flying visit to the White House at the end of February, Sir Keir Starmer, the British Prime Minister, was rewarded for presenting an invitation for Donal Trump to a state visit to the royal castle of Balmoral in Scotland. Prime Minister Starmer’s meeting with the President of the United States ended with hints that the White House would take a balanced view in fostering peace negotiations between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, rather than favouring Moscow. There were suggestions that Russia would need to withdraw from territory it had captured. Even the idea of providing a US ‘backstop’ for a European deterrence force in Ukraine suddenly seemed possible.
The following day, the atmosphere changed. After an acrimonious meeting in the Oval Office, broadcast on global television, the US administration dismissed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, claiming that he was not ready for peace. The US also threatened to withdraw its support for Ukraine to force him into changing his stance.
President Zelensky defended the view that Ukraine should be entitled to bargain for a return of unlawfully captured territory and that the Russian Federation had violated all previous commitments and peace agreements concerning Ukraine. He also argued that strong security guarantees would therefore be a key element of any peace deal for Ukraine. President Zelensky even slipped in the Ukrainian expectation that Russia would have to pay war reparations, estimated by some to reach into the trillions.
Ukraine came willing to make concessions and negotiate
In fact, Ukraine had come ready to concede a fair bit. President Zelensky was ready to sign an odd agreement concerning the exploitation of Ukraine’s mineral wealth with strong US involvement as a way of repaying Washington’s investment in its defence over the past three years. There was a sense that Ukraine had to pay the US, the dealmaker, before there was even a hint of the nature of the deal that might emerge. The US had also made important concessions to Russia, even before the negotiations had started, for instance by ruling out North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership for Ukraine.
Ukraine also had to overcome the string of insults Washington had directed at its President over the past weeks, describing him as an unelected dictator, much as the Russian Federation has done over the past years. President Trump even seemed to claim Russian aggression was somehow attributable to its victim, to Ukraine. There was also some doubt as to whether Ukraine would even be allowed a role in its own peace process to be conducted under US direction.
Nevertheless, there was a sense that the visit of Prime Minister Starmer, preceded by French President Emmanuel Macron, had paved the way for a return to relative normality. Like PM Starmer’s royal invitation, President Zelensky would have to pay homage to the US President by uttering some words of gratitude and then signing away a portion of Ukraine’s wealth in the minerals deal. This might be the price for conducting a peace process that would respect the bounds of international law and the rights and interest of the victim of armed aggression. Of course, things turned out differently on that day.
Key takeaways from the Oval Office catastrophe
The catastrophe at the Oval Office did illuminate a number of things. Ukraine has not given up on its demand to have some or all of its occupied territory back, at least as an opening position. A simple ceasefire that would freeze the present line of confrontation might not be enough in place of a more comprehensive settlement. And, any such settlement would need to include the famous security guarantees for Ukraine. That might take the form of US-led or supported air defences for Ukraine after a settlement, perhaps arrayed around Ukraine rather than deployed on its territory, and intelligence and logistical support. This would back up tens of thousands of armed forces of European NATO members on the ground in Ukraine.
The US President, on the other hand, appeared to argue for a ceasefire as a step that would in itself end the conflict and save lives. Other aspects appeared less relevant. He appeared to reject linking a cessation of hostilities with other elements of a settlement, such as addressing territorial questions or the problem of security guarantees.
Moscow has a history of maintaining so-called ‘frozen’ conflicts throughout Eastern Europe. The term ‘frozen’ rather disguises the indefinite occupation of territories of neighbouring states (Georgia) by the Russian Federation, or at least their removal from the authority of their rightful sovereign (Moldova). Hence, a ceasefire on its own might be tantamount to the permanent loss of some 20 percent of the territory of Ukraine, with the prospect of renewed aggression at a subsequent point.
But what are the alternatives? One the one hand, there is the Zelensky plan, providing for peace through victory over the Russian aggression. While this sounds just and right, it is unlikely that a victory that remains elusive on the battlefield can be generated on paper instead. At the other extreme, there could be ratification of Russian victory, following the present position of Moscow. This requires the de jure acceptance that four Ukrainian provinces that have now been captured in large measure and supposedly annexed are legally part of Russia.
A third alternative lying somewhere in the middle of the two extremes is a plan that would offer a ceasefire with elements of a political settlement. The plan would provide for steps to stabilize a ceasefire and offer interim arrangements for a period of 10 to 15 years, until the situation might be addressed in a broader, Pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation.
Europe takes matters into its own hands
Panicked by the outcome of the meeting in the Oval Office, key European governments proceeded to hold a summit in London to chart a future course of action. A United Kingdom and French initiative, providing for the deployment of a large force supplied by European NATO member states, is likely to receive a significant boost, given the sense that the US cannot be much relied upon in safeguarding Ukraine and Western Europe in the future.
The problem is that it would be rather dangerous to place such a force along the line of confrontation with Russia, assuming that a ceasefire is achieved. Russia is vehemently opposed to such a deployment. After all, it has justified its invasion of Ukraine in part with the argument that NATO has violated the pledges given at the end of the Cold War and crept towards the very border of the Russian Federation. In view of Moscow, these borders now include the areas East of the line of confrontation.
Would the European states really be willing to commit to the defence of Ukraine along that fragile line? Throughout the conflict thus far, great emphasis has been placed on avoiding a direct confrontation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This proposal would guarantee a war between NATO members and Russia from the first day of renewed hostilities in Ukraine, should it come to that.
In truth, a deployment of this kind could only be possible if it is part of a broader peace settlement, accepted by the Russian Federation and offering stability. In other words, sizable European forces could only be deployed under circumstances when they would be needed less — in the context of a credible and stable settlement. They do not make up for the absence of such a stable settlement in case there is only a brittle ceasefire — rather such a minimal outcome makes their presence impossible or at least unlikely.
On the other hand, if there is to be a broader settlement going beyond a mere ceasefire, it is clear that any significant force provided by NATO members is out of the question, given Moscow’s opposition. Hence, the debate about deploying a European ‘assurance’ force, and the role of a ‘US backstop’ in their support, is rather unreal.
This leaves room for the third option, which tries to build a stable settlement over a prolonged interim period, until the European security order can be addressed once more in calmer times. But what are the issues that could actually be addressed in such a settlement? First, there is the difficult issue of territory. In addition to Crimea, captured in 2014, Russia formally annexed four more Ukrainian Oblasts, or provinces, in September of 2022. They are now, President Putin argues, part of the constitutional territory of the Russian Federation and this must be formally acknowledged by Ukraine and the international community.
Negotiations that acknowledge new diplomatic and on-ground realities
Early in the conflict, several options were explored to circumvent the problem. The provinces might nominally remain within Ukraine, but be governed autonomously and with the involvement of Russia. Or, Moscow might obtain a Hong Kong-like long-term lease over the territories it has occupied, with Ukraine maintaining de jure title. Alternatively, should Russia gain title, Ukraine would be compensated with NATO membership, at least guaranteeing the security of what would remain.
These options are now off the table, given the hard realities on the ground and the sudden change in the diplomatic balance of power brought about by the arrival of President Trump. Moscow asserts that it will not accept the proposition that the new territorial additions to its sacred motherland are merely rented. NATO membership for Ukraine to make up for territorial losses was never really on the cards.
On the other hand, there can be no formal recognition of territorial change brought about by armed aggression. Neither President Trump nor President Putin can overturn the most basic tenet of what is left of the international legal order to that extent. Hence, the obvious solution is that any peace agreement will merely deal with the administration of the territories under the control of both sides. There will be no clarification of their status, pending a large, Pan-European conference aiming to establish a new security order for the continent a decade or so down the line. Ukraine has already pledged not to use force to recapture lost territory in the meantime.
Instead, the sides would agree to a comprehensive ceasefire along the present line of confrontation. This will be transformed into a more permanent Line of Control once Ukraine withdraws from the Russian territory it occupies in the Kursk region. That withdrawal can be compensated for by way of adjustments of the line in other areas.
Each side would withdraw 7.5 km from the permanent Line of Control, creating a Demilitarized Zone of 15 km. Heavy weapons would be withdrawn beyond 35 km from the line.
A Demilitarized Zone and hold on Ukraine joining NATO
The Demilitarized Zone would be controlled by an International Disengagement Force of around 7,500 military and civilian personnel acceptable to both sides. The force would be mandated by the UN Security Council, but could be managed by the OSCE, or a group of states supporting the settlement.
Ukraine would agree not to join NATO, at least until the holding of the Pan-European conference on security and cooperation. Russia has insisted that there can be no NATO deployments on Ukrainian territory — talk about a 100,000-strong NATO force along the Line of Control, or a NATO air defence force for Ukraine, is pure fantasy.
Ukraine could, however, be allowed to complete its EU integration journey.
The security of Ukraine would be ensured through bilateral security cooperation with other states, which may include individual NATO members. This would formalize and enhance the significant number of bilateral arrangements that are in place already and implement Ukraine’s own design for its future security short of NATO membership, widely known as the Rasmussen/Yermak plan.
The plan provides for the building-up of a strong military-industrial base, delivery of significant amounts of military equipment at NATO standard, comprehensive training, etc. A limited number of military/technical personnel from cooperating states, say 1000 each, could be based in Ukraine, fulfilling a tripwire function, but there would be no deployment of fighting units from NATO states.
This could be matched by a provision for the snap-back of any sanctions that might be lifted gradually as the settlement is implemented, in case of violations. Instead of the present, entirely Western sanctions that have had limited effect, these would be truly universal measures based on a decision of the UN Security Council. The snap-back would be automatic, operating independently of a Russian veto in the UN Security Council.
Ukraine would confirm that it will never acquire nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction, verified through international mechanisms. There could be no limits on Ukraine’s conventional arms, but it might need to renounce the possession of missiles and other unmanned aerial vehicles of a range beyond 350 km. There would be provision for voluntary returns of the displaced to areas now under the control of the Russian Federation if they wish it, or compensation for property lost for those who do not wish to return. This would be flanked with language rights and other protections for non-dominant groups in those areas and throughout the remainder of Ukraine.
An International Group of Supporting States could supervise a settlement
The settlement would be supervised by an International Group of Supporting States, consisting of three contingents. There would be the US, UK, France, Germany and Italy, balanced by Belarus, China, India, Brazil and South Africa. In addition, Norway, Sweden, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia might join, along with Turkey. The International Group of Supporting States would supervise all the above arrangements and administer a significant International Fund for compensation for individuals and companies affected by war damages. The Fund would receive significant international contributions, also from the Russian Federation, in lieu of reparations.
It would not be legally possible to accommodate a Russian demand for a general and universal amnesty for launching and conducting an aggressive war. The Council of Europe would probably be invited to re-consider the establishment of a special tribunal to try President Putin for the crime of aggression planned for this April. The UN Security Council has the authority to suspend prosecutions before the International Criminal Court for one year at a time.
It is now questionable whether Ukraine can actually opt into a US-led settlement process or rather be forced into it by the withdrawal of US military and economic support. In doing so might commit itself to an eventual outcome that simply endorses Russian positions, going beyond the compromises suggested above. Perhaps the US has not removed itself from the role of honest broker, or mediator, in relation to this conflict and others, like Turkey and Qatar, may need to generate their own process, in contact both with the EU and the US. Alternatively, the US will need to realize that there cannot be a settlement for Ukraine without Ukraine, just as Ukraine will need to realize that it cannot continue a war with Russia without the US.
Marc Weller is Professor of International law and International Constitutional Studies at Cambridge and served as legal advisor in many international peace negotiations. He is General Counsel of ICDI. The full text of a proposed draft settlement is available here.
