The year 2024 marked a turning point in Syria’s protracted conflict, culminating in the fall of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This historical moment has shifted regional power dynamics, triggered swift international responses, and, most importantly, reshaped Syria’s political landscape – setting the stage for an uncertain transitional phase.
In late November, opposition forces led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) launched a series of coordinated offensives against regime strongholds. By early December, key cities, including Homs and Damascus, had fallen, forcing Assad to flee to Russia. In the aftermath, Mohammed al-Bashir, former head of the Salvation Government – an administrative authority established in Idlib under the influence of HTS to manage civilian affairs in opposition-held areas – was appointed to lead a caretaker government tasked with managing essential services and maintaining order as an interim administration until March 2025. Simultaneously, Ahmed al-Sharaa (Abu Mohammad al-Jolani), leader of HTS, announced plans to address constitutional issues and political reforms, stating that a National Conference would mark the next stage of the transitional government.
Additionally, he declared that all armed factions in Syria would be dissolved and integrated into a unified national army, with all weapons placed under state control. The Military Operations Administration in Syria has since announced an agreement to dissolve all military factions and integrate them under the Ministry of Defense — a significant step toward centralizing military authority. However, challenges remain, including ongoing clashes with the Kurdish led Syrian Democratic Forces in Manbij, the presence of foreign fighters from Central Asia allied within various factions, and the need to completely address rivalries and competing loyalties among local militias to ensure lasting cohesion and stability.
The aftermath of Assad’s fall has also triggered significant political upheaval within the Syrian opposition ranks, which is likely to pose significant challenges to the interim leadership.
Opposition fragmentation and Kurdish crossroads
On one side, the Syrian Negotiation Commission and the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces – both established to represent opposition interests under UN auspices and advocate for a transition under UNSCR 2254 – have faced high-level resignations. These platforms, long hindered by internal fragmentation and limited influence on the ground, are now struggling to remain relevant and establish collaboration with the new authorities in Damascus. Despite ongoing efforts, progress remains slow.
On the other side, in northeastern Syria, the ongoing Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) soon raised the Syrian revolution flag as a signal of willingness to align with Damascus. However, navigating the transitional phase poses significant challenges for the Kurdish political project. The AANES must balance protecting Kurdish autonomy, securing meaningful inclusion in the emerging political and military structures, and contributing to the broader vision of a unified Syria. Simultaneously, it faces continuous clashes with Turkish-backed rebels along the northern border, Kurdish internal divisions that threaten cohesion, and the pressing need to prevent the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) from exploiting the power vacuum to regain control over territory. While the SDF retains leverage through its control of vital oil fields, dams, and ISIS detention facilities, these overlapping pressures leave its position still fragile and its path forward uncertain.
Regional and international dynamics
On the regional stage, although Türkiye remains wary of the Syrian Democratic Forces, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has welcomed the opposition’s gains, viewing them as a strategic victory against Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. Ankara has since engaged in high-level talks with the new leadership in Damascus, emphasizing border security and the repatriation of Syrian refugees. As such, Türkiye has emerged as an ally for the new Syrian authorities, offering support while gaining leverage to expand its influence in the shifting regional dynamics.
Israel, on the other hand, has taken an assertive stance. In the days following Assad’s fall, Israel carried out targeted strikes on military sites in Syria and established temporary positions within the UN-monitored buffer zone. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed these measures as defensive, aimed at preventing a security vacuum on Israel’s borders. However, Damascus has strongly condemned these incursions, with Al-Sharaa warning against foreign interference.
On the international stage, the geopolitical realignment in Syria has prompted swift diplomatic responses. The United States and UK, while maintaining HTS’s designation as a terrorist organization, has signaled a willingness to engage with Syria’s new leadership under strict conditions tied to governance reforms and inclusivity.
A landmark diplomatic summit was held in Aqaba, bringing together key regional and international players, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Türkiye, the US, some European states, the EU, and the UN. Notably absent were Russia and Iran, underscoring their diminishing influence. The Aqaba statement underscored support for an inclusive, Syrian-led political transition involving all political and social forces. Similarly, the G7 issued a joint statement calling for respect for human rights, transparency, and accountability in Syria’s transitional process while signaling openness to supporting reconstruction efforts if conditions for freedom and security are met. Some diplomatic missions have also been re-established in Damascus.
The future of UNSC resolution 2254
UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen made an inaugural visit to Damascus following Assad’s departure. Pedersen emphasized the need to reinvigorate the peace process under UNSC Resolution 2254 and called for an inclusive approach to governance that addresses long-standing grievances while preventing further fragmentation in Syria.
In the past, the UN has played a central mediation role in Syria, under the leadership of Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi, but subsequent Special Envoys have struggled to achieve any meaningful progress. Their efforts have been hampered by entrenched geopolitical rivalries among the P5 members of the Security Council, deep mistrust between Syrian factions, and the Assad government’s consistent reluctance to engage in genuine negotiations. As the dust settles on Assad’s regime and Syria enters an long-awaited transitional phase, the question remains whether this transition will follow the parameters outlined in UNSCR 2254 (2015).
After all, UNSCR 2254 (2015) remains the most internationally-supported framework for a political solution in Syria, but it must be adapted to reflect the new realities on the ground. In this evolving landscape, traditional power structures have shifted and the representation at the negotiating table initially conceived no longer follows clear or pre-established lines. Upholding the resolution’s principle of a Syrian-led, Syrian-owned process requires thus adopting a whole-of-society approach that ensures meaningful inclusion at every stage.
If a national dialogue through a national conference is to take place next year, its success will hinge first on ensuring genuine inclusivity – where all sectors of Syrian society, including marginalized communities, displaced populations, and civil society actors, have a seat. This inclusivity must go beyond symbolic participation and allow a transformative space where the root causes of the conflict can be discussed: governance failures, systemic corruption, sectarian divides, and historical grievances.
As in 2025 we might see elections for a constituent assembly and the drafting of a new constitution as upcoming steps, it is important to recognize that in both processes, this whole-of-society approach proves relevant – not only for legitimacy but also for expertise. Syrian civil society, with its years of experience in constitutional discussions, policy advocacy, and local governance, offers an accumulated knowledge that can help shape a more forward-looking constitutional framework.
In parallel, the UN must recalibrate its power as a key enabler of the broader framework, one that persuades regional and international actors to support this phase of Syrian-led national engagement. Without effectively managing agendas on the international and regional scenarios, Syria risks remaining a battleground for proxy conflicts or falling prey to regional powers acting as spoilers.
Syria’s urgent priorities for a lasting peace
While Syrian authorities in 2025 will need to address these political priorities, they will also navigate a series of pressing short- and medium-term needs that demand immediate attention and sustained international support. While rebuilding critical infrastructure, including roads, hospitals, schools, and power grids, is essential to restore basic services and provide economic recovery, humanitarian needs remain immense – including food and medical security, addressing housing, land, and property rights, and managing population displacements. A key aspect of this will be facilitating the safe, voluntary, and dignified return of refugees and internally displaced persons under conditions that guarantee their safety and rights. Simultaneously, achieving national unity and building a cohesive national army capable of representing all Syrians is equally vital, as this effort must go hand in hand with stopping all forms of violence and preventing cycles of vengeance.
Beyond these immediate needs lies an enormous moral and political challenge: addressing the fate of the thousands of missing and forcibly disappeared individuals. This issue remains a deep wound in Syrian society and must be prioritized to build trust. However, this represents a delicate balance between transitional justice and peace that must be carefully managed: accountability mechanisms contribute to preventing impunity and healing divisions but overly punitive measures risk alienating key factions whose cooperation is vital for long-term stability and reconciliation.
These priorities are not just peripheral tasks – they represent core pillars of Syria’s transition. Conflict resolution in Syria cannot be reduced to power-sharing arrangements or a mere transition of power — it requires addressing the full spectrum of pressing priorities. Meeting these will test the capacity of emerging institutions to deliver stability and effective governance. However, this moment also offers an opportunity to draw on untapped national resources and national expertise, including contributions from Syrian diaspora actors and civil society who have remained outside the conflict but possess valuable knowledge and skills to help shape the country’s next chapter.
While the coalition of forces that swept into power on December 8 appears to grasp the difficulties of transitioning to a stable system so far, the reality is that Syria is only at the beginning of its journey toward peace: True conflict resolution means addressing these structural, societal, and humanitarian challenges head-on – this conversation has only just begun.
Jusaima Moaid-azm Peregrina is a Syrian-Spanish researcher and lecturer at the University of Granada, specializing in International Law, International Relations, and Middle Eastern studies. She holds a PhD in Social Sciences, with her dissertation focusing on UN mediation in the Syrian conflict. Her work explores peace mediation, conflict resolution, civil society inclusion, and women’s political participation with a focus on Syria, Libya, and Yemen. She is a project coordinator at the Euro-Arab Foundation for Higher Studies and has published extensively on the intersections of conflict, governance, and societal inclusion.
