Last week, thousands descended on New York for diplomacy’s grand annual pilgrimage: the General Assembly. The slogan for this year’s assembly “Restoring Trust, Managing Transformation: A United Nations that Delivers for All” felt stilted, particularly as it was unaccompanied by a plan of action. The 81st GA occurs as the UN sits as a spectator on the sidelines of almost every major conflict – from Ukraine, to Sudan and Gaza. Faith in the global institution is at an all-time low and its future remains uncertain in the midst of budget cuts and proposals to form parallel institutions.
As with every year, crowds packed the hall to hear delegates and heads of state speak, but after a couple of days, audiences thinned, and the real diplomatic action unfolded outside the GA hall. Despite President Donald Trump’s threats to “annihilate the Islamic Republic,” diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Iran, mediated by Qatar and Pakistan, unfolded on the same day. Meanwhile a meeting brought together the Gulf Cooperation Council, who have come to the conclusion that the American-led security alliance they thought would have protected them hasn’t worked, and new ideas have emerged about creating other regional security arrangements. But the most important and widely publicized event of the week happened elsewhere, in Washington, between President Trump and President of China Xi Jinping in Washington, overshadowing the show in the GA.
Despite the war raging in Sudan, the north African state’s plight was out of sight in New York, and the nation’s de facto leader and head of the Sudanese Armed Forces Abdel Fattah al-Burhan was denied a visa by the US. President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas was also denied a visa for the second year in a row and it took the UNGA a vote to have him appear by video link.
Meanwhile French President Emmanuel Macron hit out at Israeli President Benjamin Netanyahu, claiming what had unfolded in Gaza was “a spectacle that should shame us all.” Netanyahu hit back on social media against Macron and called those who participated in a mass walkout of his speech “moral cowards.” The event showed that while the UNGA may lack real political clout, it still remains an important symbolic theatre in which less powerful countries can condemn the wars they did not start and do not have the power to end.
The outgoing Secretary-General Antonio Guterres’ speech, that covered human rights, climate change, global divisions and the dangers of Artificial Intelligence, was met with a standing ovation. However, in the corridors of the UN, diplomats lamented his failure to play a mediating role in any conflict during his tenure. Who will replace him is yet to be seen. While there is an assumption that the eventual winner will be a character of the lowest common denominator, who kowtows to the permanent five members of the Security Council, there is always a chance a dark horse could emerge.
On a more positive note, the European Union, Australia, Canada, Barbados, Brazil, Canada, India and Kenya, have launched an international alliance committed to protecting multilateralism, political cooperation, international law and global prosperity. The initiative, which will hopefully move from the page to the real world, is another example of the ways in which nations are seeking to collaborate outside of the orbit of the major powers.
Again, the GA has shown the UN at its most paradoxical. The fact is that the UN continues to be an indispensable meeting place even as it continues to decline in its role as a mediator and actor in peace and security. Crucial questions as to whether the GA could be empowered to act when the Security Council is deadlocked before and after escalations of conflicts must be considered. In the meantime, the economic effects of conflicts are painfully global, with higher energy prices and the disruption of shipping routes impacting vulnerable and import dependent economies throughout Asia and Africa. Could these countries – that have no voice in resolving the wars which impact them – one day have a say in how these conflicts are managed and resolved? What role could the next Secretary-General play in mediating conflict? And will the selection of the next SG reward independence, competence and mediation experience, or political compliance with the P5?
In this edition we feature an article on the US-Iran conflict and why a resolution remains elusive. We also feature an article on the ways in which UNSG candidates are compromised in the selection process by the demands of the P5 to continue to monopolize the top UN secretariat posts, followed by an article on the past successes and current challenges facing the UN peace operations. We then turn to the recent escalation of conflict in Yemen and the political and security turmoil in Niger.
As with every edition, the views expressed by contributors are not all necessarily our own. ICDI remains committed to the ethos and philosophy that open debate, dialogue, diplomacy, and mediation, rather than war and violence, offer the way forward to resolving any conflict.
Thank you for reading Diplomacy Now and we welcome your feedback at diplomacynow@dialogueinitiatives.org.
Jamal Benomar
Chair of ICDI
Iran and Middle East scholar Sahar Razavi writes about the new challenges ahead in the US-Israeli war with Iran and why peace or a genuine truce is still not yet in sight.
“The United States-Israeli war with Iran has reached a dangerous diplomatic inflection point. Contrary to US President Donald Trump’s expectations, neither military pressure nor economic coercion has produced Iran’s capitulation, but the war has created leverage that could ultimately support a negotiated settlement under certain conditions,” Razavi writes.
“Iran’s proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an end to the US blockade, sanctions relief, and a regional ceasefire creates a possible opening. However, deep mistrust, competing US and Iranian priorities, divergent foreign policy aims toward Iran on the part of the United States and Israel, and Israel’s continued military occupation of southern Lebanon make reaching a durable agreement extremely challenging,” she continues.
UN observer Ben Donaldson explores the way in which the permanent five Security Council members undermine the independence of the Secretary General during the selection process with their expectation that the top UN secretariat posts will be given in exchange for winning the post.
“As the UN faces critical financial shortfalls and a huge hit to its legitimacy as P5 members wage wars of aggression undermining the organization’s raison d’être, there is a growing chorus of states and civil society calling for reform and a renewal of multilateralism. In this context, if the incoming Secretary-General arrives in office owing favours, having promised the UN’s most consequential jobs to P5 countries, current structures will be frozen in place and meaningful reform constrained,” Donaldson writes.
Former Special Representative of the Secretary General Alan Doss and scholar David Harris explore why the UN was successful at stabilizing Sierra Leone and Liberia, two countries at conflict throughout the 1990s. They question how the UN might face peace security challenges in an increasingly politically polarized world.
“Today (…) the prospect of repeating long and deep engagements in conflict afflicted countries seems remote. The resurgence of great power rivalries, the underfunding and undermining of the UN, the vagaries and belligerency in the policies of the Trump administration, the Russian invasion of Ukraine all work against such a commitment. UN peacekeepers have been evicted from Mali and replaced with Russian soldiers that are clearly unable to hold the line. The UN missions in South Sudan, the Central African Republic and Somalia are struggling to get funding. The DRC has asked the UN peacekeepers to leave. So, do these disappointments mean that peacebuilding is a redundant relic of a more liberal and collaborative era? Not necessarily,” Doss and Harris write.
Yemen expert Farea Al-Muslimi looks at the future of conflict between Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
“The Houthi armed group recently captured the strategic port city of Mocha in southwestern Yemen and advanced along the coast of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. This represents the most consequential change in territorial control in Yemen for years,” Al-Muslimi writes.
“For Yemen, the offensive risks reopening a war that never formally ended but has become significantly less violent since 2022. For the wider region, the implications are also massive,” he adds.
Sahel expert Dr Nina Wilén writes about the possible mutiny or coup in Niger and what it might mean for the nation hard hit by rising jihadist violence.
“Whether the events are classified as a mutiny or an aborted coup matters less than what they reveal. This was the first serious armed challenge to the regime from within the security forces since the military seized power in July 2023. And in spite of several alleged thwarted coup attempts in neighbouring Burkina Faso, it seems as if this is the first real internal challenge to one of the AES states (Sahel States’ Alliance). It also exposes three vulnerabilities that have become increasingly difficult for Niger’s rulers to conceal: deteriorating security, divisions within the armed forces, and an increasing dependence on foreign partners for regime survival,” Wilén writes.
Nelson Mandela
