On August 29, Niger’s airport in the capital Niamey came under attack for the third time this year. The first two attacks were carried out by two different jihadist groups, illustrating the increasing threat they pose. This time, however, the attackers came from within Niger’s own armed forces and exposed a new vulnerability. The simultaneous targeting of the airport, presidential palace and national television and radio stations bore many of the hallmarks of an attempted coup, yet Niger’s Minister of Defence described the events as a mouvement d’humeur — literally a “mood movement” — carefully avoiding any suggestion of a coup.
Whether the events are classified as a mutiny or an aborted coup matters less than what they reveal. This was the first serious armed challenge to the regime from within the security forces since the military seized power in July 2023. And in spite of several alleged thwarted coup attempts in neighbouring Burkina Faso, it seems as if this is the first real internal challenge to one of the AES states (Sahel States’ Alliance). It also exposes three vulnerabilities that have become increasingly difficult for Niger’s rulers to conceal: deteriorating security, divisions within the armed forces, and an increasing dependence on foreign partners for regime survival.
A deteriorating security record
When the military overthrew President Mohamed Bazoum in 2023, it justified its takeover partly by claiming that the civilian government had failed to contain jihadist violence. Yet Niger had in fact performed comparatively better than both neighbouring Mali and Burkina Faso which were already under military rule following coups between 2020 and 2022. Contrary to its neighbours, Niger’s relatively successful counter-terrorist approach before the coups combined military operations and extensive foreign security partnerships with discreet negotiations with some local jihadist actors and deradicalisation initiatives.
Three years after the coup, the security indicators are considerably worse. In 2024, Niger recorded the largest increase in terrorism-related deaths globally, with fatalities rising by 94 per cent to 930. By 2025, Niger was ranked among the countries most affected by terrorism worldwide. Tillabéri, surrounding the capital, became one of the deadliest areas of the central Sahel, while kidnappings by both JNIM and Islamic State Sahel reached unprecedented levels.
The attacks on Niamey airport earlier this year by Islamic State Sahel and subsequently JNIM were particularly significant. They suggested that groups which traditionally are concentrated in peripheral borderlands have acquired the ability and confidence to threaten strategically important sites in the capital – a capital which up until this year was considered safe. Yet, the latest event demonstrates that the security challenge is no longer only external to the armed forces.
From battlefield grievances to regime vulnerability
The soldiers involved in the latest events reportedly included younger officers originating from Dosso, Téra and Tillabéri — areas that have borne much of the recent jihadist violence and where military casualties have increased. Fighting during the night between the 28th and 29th of August appears to have pitted elements of the armed forces against the Presidential Guard, the institution previously commanded by General Abdourahamane Tchiani before he led the 2023 coup. No public manifesto or coherent political programme emerged from the mutineers, which makes their precise motivations difficult to determine. Grievances related to battlefield losses, military leadership and deteriorating security conditions seem to have played a role.
In the 2023 coup, Tchiani and his allies were able to use the first 24 hours to rally senior figures from across the defence and security establishment. This time, forces reportedly expected to reinforce the mutineers from outside Niamey were either prevented from reaching the capital or mobilised too late to change the outcome. The regime survived thus this time, but survival should not be confused with stability. An armed confrontation between different components of the security forces illustrates precisely the kind of institutional fragmentation that jihadist organisations have repeatedly exploited elsewhere in the Sahel.
Regime security and the return of external dependence
The response to the crisis also reveals something important about Niger’s international partnerships. Russian Africa Corps personnel reportedly provided operational assistance to loyalist forces at Air Base 101, including support involving drones, marking a significant evolution of Russia’s role in Niger, which hitherto had remained comparatively discreet and centred largely on training, equipment maintenance and intelligence support. Direct assistance to defend the junta against elements of Niger’s own armed forces moves the relationship closer towards regime protection.
This creates an uncomfortable paradox for a government that came to power promising to restore national sovereignty after years of dependence on Western security partners. Niger may have reduced its dependence on France and the United States, but the events demonstrate how quickly one form of external dependence can be replaced by another. Russia was however not Niger’s only partner to respond. Algeria also expressed support for the Nigerien authorities and subsequently deployed fighter aircraft, a transport plane and an aerial tanker to Air Base 101, following an earlier donation of helicopters, ammunition and other military equipment.
The response illustrates the rapid improvement in Algerian-Nigerien relations and gives Niamey an alternative to complete reliance on Moscow.
Niger’s other new partner, Turkey, expressed solidarity with Niger and support for the Nigerien people, although without the same explicit endorsement of the junta. Ankara nevertheless remains a partner should the regime seek additional drones or other capabilities to reinforce its security apparatus.
European actors were markedly more cautious. Italy, the last European country maintaining an active military presence in Niger, confirmed that its personnel were safe but refrained from taking sides. Perhaps most striking was the relatively limited immediate response from Niger’s partners in the Alliance of Sahel States. Mali and Burkina Faso did not provide visible operational assistance, while the AES issued a supportive statement only later in the day. A similar pattern emerged when Mali faced coordinated attacks earlier this year: political solidarity among the three regimes has not necessarily translated into rapid collective security responses when one member comes under acute pressure.
What are the implications?
As predicted by analysts, the Nigerien regime went on to do a crackdown on suspected coup sympathizers following the mutiny and reshuffled the leadership of the armed forces. General Barmou who has been chief of defence for the past three years, prior to which he was the head of the Special Forces, was replaced by General Kiaou less than two weeks after the mutiny. The authorities have also made unsubstantiated claims about support for the events by France, the United Arab Emirates and several of Niger’s neighbours, including Chad. Chad has seen increased tensions with Niger since it welcomed back French forces to the country.
For JNIM and the Islamic State Sahel, the political aftermath of the mutiny has been valuable; The concentration of troops around regime protection in combination with a deeply divided army implies a much weaker adversary for the jihadist groups. Only days after the mutiny, JNIM claimed to have overrun a Nigerian security checkpoint about 10 kilometers west of Niamey in Koubia, targeting a gendarmerie post. While local sources report raids in villages in the Tillabéri region. The consequences of the mutiny will however play out more in the medium to long term.
The deeper problem for Niger’s leaders is therefore not simply whether the events of August 29 constituted a coup attempt or a mutiny. Both interpretations point towards the same conclusion: a regime that justified seizing power by promising greater security and sovereignty is facing worsening jihadist violence, visible divisions within its own armed forces and a growing need for foreign assistance to preserve its authority. The coming months will be indicative of whether the regime manages to reestablish cohesion within the ranks and to what extent the jihadist groups are profiting from the current situation.
Nina Wilén is Associate Professor in Political Science at Lund University and the Director for the Africa Programme at Egmont Institute for International Relations. She is also a Global Fellow at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO). Between January 2020 and December 2023, she was the Editor-in-Chief for the academic journal International Peacekeeping.
