None of the six nations that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) sought a United States–Israeli war on Iran this year — and for good reason. Preoccupied with ambitious economic development and diversification agendas that depend on regional stability, the Gulf Arab monarchies understood the risks of escalation with Tehran. They feared, correctly, that Washington and/or Tel Aviv bombing Iran would invite Iranian retaliation across the Arabian Peninsula. Since February 28, those fears have materialized with thousands of missiles and drones striking military and civilian targets throughout GCC states. Even after the announcement on April 7 of a Pakistani-brokered two-week “ceasefire” between the United States, Israel, and Iran, Tehran has continued firing missiles and drones at all GCC states, with the exception of Oman. Such unprecedented attacks on Dubai, Kuwait City, Manama and other cities in the Gulf have upended the sub-region’s security architecture and put the Gulf’s economic model under significant pressure.
Erosion of deterrence
Iran’s strikes on GCC states — with the United Arab Emirates being, by far, the most intensely targeted one — swiftly shattered Tehran’s fragile détente with Saudi Arabia and the Emirates. From the Islamic Republic’s vantage point, improved relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi had yielded few tangible gains, offering no relief to its sanctions-crippled economy. Although the Gulf monarchies neither sought nor supported the American-Israel war on Iran, and initially tried to remain neutral, Tehran launching these missile and drone attacks on its Arab neighbors has been part of a strategy that must be understood within the context of Iran’s regime being in a survival mode as it fights an existential threat to its rule. In that calculus, the collapse of détente with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi was a price worth paying.
First, Tehran seeks to impose costs so steep on the US for launching Operation Epic Fury that Washington is compelled not only to end the campaign for good–and not just for this two-week pause – but also to never consider undertaking similar action in the future. Central to this effort is the disruption of the global economy, fomenting chaos in the Gulf and closing the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the Islamic Republic aims to penalize GCC states for their close defense ties with the US and, in some cases, Israel. This is about driving home a point that Iran’s leadership has long made to Gulf Arab monarchies: Not only do American bases not lead to lasting security, but they are the source of insecurity. There has also been an Iranian desire to incentivize Gulf Arab leaders to leverage their influence with President Donald J. Trump to press for a permanent end to this war based on the assessment that the vulnerable GCC states have no appetite for prolonged conflict.
In the process, Iran’s assaults on Gulf Arab states, which continue even after the Pakistani-mediated two-week “ceasefire” went into effect, have laid bare a stark vulnerability. The region’s most lucrative and symbolically vital assets (energy infrastructure, commercial airports, luxury hotels, etc.) have proven highly exposed to relatively inexpensive Iranian drones, despite GCC states investing hundreds of billions of dollars in their security. The attacks on desalination plants in Bahrain and Kuwait have been a disturbing sign of the extent to which civilian infrastructure has been exposed, severely endangering civilian populations.
The damage inflicted has also accelerated the erosion of confidence in the US as a credible and effective security guarantor in the Gulf. While no alternative power can readily replace Washington in the near term, the events since February 28 are certain to intensify discussions within GCC capitals about diversifying defense partnerships and reducing reliance on the US. At the same time, Gulf Arab states are likely to place greater emphasis on self-reliance, investing more heavily in indigenous capabilities to better shield themselves from external threats.
Even as the Gulf Arab monarchies remain committed to their close ties with Washington, waning confidence in the US as a reliable ally — sharpened by the White House’s decision to wage this war with seemingly no regard for the grave dangers that GCC states face — will carry far-reaching consequences. As Iran and international relations expert Trita Parsi opined, “I think it’s the beginning of the end [of the American security order in the Gulf].”
Expecting divergent responses to a post-war Iran
Looking ahead, a critical question will be whether GCC states act in concert or diverge in their diplomatic engagement with Iran once the war ends. The six Gulf Arab monarchies recognize that Iran, as a country of 92 million, is a permanent neighbor and they will have to engage Tehran one way or another throughout the future. However, the terms of that engagement will be fraught, as they seek to balance the imperative of deterrence against the risk of inviting further instability, and to ensure that the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula do not become recurring arenas for Tehran’s retaliatory violence whenever it aims to impose costs on Washington.
There is ample reason to expect GCC states to strike this delicate balance in divergent ways. This is an unsurprising outcome given each monarchy’s distinct history with Iran and the varying degrees to which they perceive threats posed by Tehran. At one end of the spectrum sits the UAE, the hardest hit by Iranian missile and drone attacks since February 28 and seemingly the most aligned with the Trump administration’s approach to Tehran. According to Iranian sources, the Emirati military struck the oil refinery on Iran’s Lavan Island with Mirage 2000-9 fighter jets soon after the US-Israel-Iran “ceasefire” went into effect on April 7/8 – a charge neither confirmed nor denied by Abu Dhabi. At the other is Oman, which has sustained the least damage and has maintained open channels with the Islamic Republic. With Muscat’s top diplomat in regular contact with his Iranian counterpart, Oman’s position as the only Gulf Arab state to publicly condemn Operation Epic Fury, and the foreign ministry’s reluctant to name Iran in connection with strikes on Duqm, Salalah, and Sohar, the Sultanate continues to enjoy the most normalized relationship with Tehran within the GCC. This Omani position is further underscored by the fact that it is the only GCC member that Iran has not struck since the current two-week “ceasefire” began.
Given Oman and Iran’s shared geographic positions along the Strait of Hormuz and Muscat’s “friends to all and enemy to none” foreign policy doctrine, it is expected of Muscat to seek to prevent its healthy ties with Tehran from suffering as a result of fallout from the American-Israeli war on Iran. However, should Abu Dhabi press the view that Muscat’s posture undercuts broader Gulf security concerns while remaining overly accommodating to Iran, old Emirati-Omani tensions could possibly resurface in the period ahead. It would not necessarily be hard to imagine Emirati influence within the Trump administration shaping a shift that leads the White House to distance itself to some degree from Oman. In fact, there are signs this may already be happening with statements from Trump and his associates praising GCC states individually for their support in the conflict while Oman is often the one Gulf Arab monarchy noticeably absent from those acknowledgments.
Iran, for its part, may attempt to sow division within the GCC by drawing Oman and Qatar closer to Tehran in the post-war period, while simultaneously attempting to build up ties with Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan — the three main countries serving as diplomatic bridges between Tehran and Washington amid this current war. This strategy could help Tehran offset regional isolation in the wake of the collapse of its détente with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as hostilities with these Gulf Arab powers enter a new phase.
Another variable in the equation to closely monitor is tension between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Although the outbreak of the US-Israel-Iran war on February 28 brought Riyadh and Abu Dhabi close, serving to put their own frictions over southern Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan on the side, there has reportedly been a resurfacing of tension in Saudi-Emirati relations with Abu Dhabi signaling displeasure toward Pakistan for its mediation role between the US and Iran while Riyadh has been more embracing of Islamabad, along with Ankara and Cairo, playing their bridging roles.
Recalibrating Gulf strategy in a new regional order
In the final analysis, the upheaval since late February marks a decisive turning point in the Gulf’s geopolitical landscape. Iran’s direct strikes on military and civilian targets in GCC states, despite their initial neutrality and diplomatic efforts to thwart this war, have revealed Tehran’s willingness to cross new red lines, exposed the critical vulnerabilities of cities, ports, and energy facilities on the Arabian Peninsula, and reinforced perceptions that Washington brings more insecurity than protection to the Gulf.
After the dust eventually settles, the Gulf Arab monarchies will need to recalibrate on multiple fronts. The six GCC states are likely to prioritize strengthening domestic defense capabilities, diversifying external partnerships, particularly with China, France, Turkey, and possibly Russia, while redefining their approach to an increasingly radical and emboldened Islamic Republic, which is expected to survive this conflict. Equally important, the GCC’s post-al-Ula summit cohesion (January 2021–present) may be tested, as member-states pursue markedly different strategies toward Tehran based on their own threat perceptions and histories. How these differences play out may do much to shape the future of Gulf security.
Giorgio Cafiero is the CEO of Gulf State Analytics, a Washington, DC-based geopolitical risk consultancy, and an adjunct assistant professor at Georgetown University.
