Among international conflicts in the agenda of the United Nations Security Council, the one over Western Sahara between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario Front, has defied the efforts of five Personal Envoys of the Secretary-General, several Special Representatives and countless meetings between the two parties, trying to resolve it. As of now, the resolution of the 50-year-old conflict over the internationally recognized non-self-governing territory, annexed by Morocco in 1975, remains elusive.
The parties remain as divided about their expectations on the outcome as they were in 1988, when UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar persuaded Morocco’s King Hassan II to accept the joint UN/Organization of African Unity Settlement Plan for an internationally supervised ceasefire and referendum offering the people of Western Sahara the choice of independence or integration with Morocco. The king accepted the proposals in principle, leaving no doubt that he saw the coming referendum as “confirmative” for Morocco.
By resolution S/690 of 19 April 1991, the Security Council agreed to the creation of the UN Mission for a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), under its authority, to observe the cease-fire and organize the referendum. MINURSO was created under Chapter VI of the UN Charter which requires the consent and cooperation of the parties to a dispute. In fact, the cooperation of the two parties and the support of neighboring Algeria and Mauritania, were deemed essential for the implementation of the Settlement Plan.
After MINURSO’s establishment, the long-drawn process to implement the Settlement Plan started in September 1991 with the coming into force of the ceasefire and initial work for the identification of potential voters for the referendum. Both parties kept challenging and blocking the process whenever they considered actions not to their benefit. The Polisario suspected that MINURSO was succumbing to pressure by Morocco to approve ineligible voters and kept blocking the process. Ultimately the identification deadlocked at the end of 1996. In March 1997, Secretary-General Kofi Annan asked former United States Secretary of State James A. Baker to be his Personal Envoy with a mandate to break the deadlock either by helping the parties to complete the identification of voters, or through a mutually acceptable political solution to resolve the conflict.
Morocco’s rejection of the plan for self determination is the root of the current impasse
The current impasse started in April 2004 after Morocco rejected the ‘Peace Plan for Self-Determination’ for the people of Western Sahara developed at the Council’s request by Baker. By resolution S/1495 of July 2003, the Security Council had unanimously approved the Peace Plan, the only such document unanimously approved by the Council on the conflict of Western Sahara. However, less than a year later, after Morocco rejected the Peace Plan, the Council, by resolution S/1541, weakened its support for the document. The resolution asked Baker to help the parties find a mutually acceptable political solution, forgetting that in February 2002, after fruitless efforts to conclude the identification or help the parties reach a mutually acceptable political solution to the conflict, the Secretary-General informed the Council that such a solution was not possible due to the incompatible positions by both parties.
Baker resigned in June 2004, informing the Secretary-General that he had done all he could to help the parties find a solution, adding that the UN would not resolve the problem of Western Sahara without requiring one or both parties to do something that they would not voluntarily agree to do. More than 21 years later, this continues being the case with individual countries within and outside the Security Council unilaterally supporting an offer of autonomy for Western Sahara under Morocco’s sovereignty, which Morocco submitted in 2007, after three years of urging by the Council.
Polite meetings and four personal envoys fail to deliver end to the conflict
Four more Personal Envoys were appointed after Baker by three different Secretaries-General. Three of them admitted at the end of their service that during the seemingly optimistic meetings of the parties that they had organized, attended also by Algeria and Mauritania, no real progress was achieved. At the end of each meeting the Personal Envoy would issue a statement that the parties were polite and respectful of each other and agreed to meet again, omitting that both sides stood firm in their positions.
The current Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, remains in his position which he assumed in October 2021 despite the lack of any progress in his bilateral consultations with the parties and various UN member states with varying degrees of interest on the conflict. De Mistura’s October 2024 proposal to divide Western Sahara between the two parties, although not a new idea, earned him repudiation by both sides, but did not result in his losing his post.
In November 2020, the much praised by the Security Council September 1991 ceasefire was broken with mutual recrimination by the parties. Since that time, MINURSO has recorded low level hostilities.
P5 support Morocco or abstain from pronouncements on Western Sahara
As of now, the position of the five permanent members is as follows:
In December 2020 President Donald Trump announced US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara. This decision remains in effect. In October 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron stressed that “for France, autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the framework within which this issue shall be resolved.” In June 2025, Britain announced that it considered Morocco’s 2007 autonomy proposal as “the most credible, viable and pragmatic basis” for resolving the dispute.
China and Russia have not made pronouncements on the current situation. In the past, both have voted with the other permanent members of the Council, although in recent years both have been abstaining from voting on the issue. China and Russia have been cautious in their positions vis-a-vis the conflict due to their own internal and external politics. China sees itself as a supporter of the developing world but will not take a position on self-determination that could raise questions about Tibet. Russia has been in more of a bind being caught between Kosovo, the independence of which Russia protested vehemently, and the declared independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which Russia engineered with just a handful of states supporting it.
While Russia values its historic military ties with Algeria, it appreciates its growing economic ties, strategic cooperation, and mutual interests in regional stability with Morocco which has tried to maintain a neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. After omitting to vote in the first General Assembly vote condemning Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, Morocco voted with the majority in subsequent votes. The two countries continue strengthening their bilateral relationship.
The European Union officially supports the UN-led process for a “just, realistic, pragmatic, sustainable, and mutually acceptable political solution” to the Western Sahara issue and does not explicitly recognize Morocco’s sovereignty over the territory, while it continues economic ties with Morocco. This double talk by the EU was challenged by the European Court of Justice in October 2024 which found the fishing and agricultural agreements between the EU and Morocco in violation of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination.
France and Spain, the former colonial power of Western Sahara, are among the most significant states to have recognized Morocco’s offer, although others such as Germany, Denmark, Portugal coach their partiality for Morocco’s autonomy offer in varying degrees of support. Several states in Africa and South America have done the same and have opened consulates, accredited to Morocco, in Western Sahara.
Morocco undermines referendum pushing it further into the future
Morocco’s strategy for acquiring Western Sahara has been two-pronged. Locally, it overwhelmed the Identification Commission with applicants to have as many as possible approved, while Polisario insisted in remaining mainly with names that had been included in the 1975 Spanish census. Internationally, Morocco used its allies inside the UN Security Council, foremost among them France, but also the US, to obtain decisions beneficial to its position. Morocco also tried leveraging its influence with members of the UN Secretariat resulting in an impression that both members of the Council and the Secretariat were trying to facilitate Morocco’s chances to win the referendum.
Upon assuming his duties, Baker was assured by both parties as well as Algeria and Mauritania that they wanted to conclude the identification and arrive at the referendum. Baker helped unblock the identification and offered proposals to reach agreement in other aspects of the Settlement Plan such as cantonment of Polisario troops, exchange of prisoners of war, release of political prisoners and developing a code of conduct for the holding of the referendum among others. The Houston Agreements were confirmed and signed in September 1997.
Before long, this process came to a standstill again because when the results of the identification were announced, Morocco realized that its efforts to pack the voters’ rolls with its candidates had not worked to its advantage. This resulted in the number of appeals being higher than those found eligible to vote. At that point the roles of the parties reversed with Morocco finding reasons to delay the referendum while Polisario felt reassured and insisted on proceeding.
By early 2000, it had become obvious that the holding of the referendum was moving further into the future instead of closer. Baker was asked by the Council to help the parties find an agreed political solution without abandoning the original Settlement Plan. After Baker held a series of meetings with all concerned, in September 2000, Morocco announced that it was ready to explore every avenue, with the assistance of the Personal Envoy, to work out a lasting and definitive solution to the conflict, that would take account of Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Polisario promptly refused Morocco’s offer, insisting on staying with the Settlement Plan. Reminding all that nobody was walking away from the Settlement Plan but also that holding meetings where the parties stood by their initial positions would not serve any purpose, Baker asked the Government of Morocco, as administrative power of the territory, to show that it was prepared to offer or support some devolution of governmental authority for all inhabitants and former inhabitants of the Territory, that was genuine, substantial and keeping with international norms.
Morocco failed to provide anything substantive and in May 2001, Baker presented a “draft Framework agreement on the status of Western Sahara” that would result in the holding of a referendum, after five years, with the governments of France and the United States signing as guarantors. Morocco indicated that it would support the document. The Polisario, with the backing of Algeria, rejected the framework agreement because it did not explicitly mention independence among the choices. Baker invited the Polisario, Algeria and Mauritania in a meeting and sought to persuade them to accept the draft Framework Agreement. Not much was achieved, although both the Polisario and Algerian representatives promised to further discuss the document with their principals.
In a meeting with Baker in November 2001, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika informed him that Algeria and the Polisario would support a division of the Territory which, according to Bouteflika, had been proposed by King Hassan II of Morocco. Morocco promptly rejected this proposal when Baker discussed it in a private meeting with King Mohammed VI and his advisers.
With deadlock over a settlement plan four options were proposed
In his report to the Security Council of February 2002, the Secretary-General informed the Council that the implementation of the Settlement Plan proved impossible with both sides blocking action they disagreed with. Consultations Baker had held with them in the summer of 2000 had failed to break the deadlock. Morocco had failed to elaborate in its offer to explore ways to work out a lasting and definitive solution to the conflict, while Polisario supported by Algeria had refused to consider the draft Framework Agreement.
Baker proposed four options for the consideration of the Security Council:
- A. Proceed with the implementation of the Settlement Plan without requiring the concurrence of the parties.
- B. Revise the draft Framework Agreement, considering the concerns expressed by the parties but without seeking their concurrence as had been done in the past with respect to the Settlement Plan.
- C. Ask the Personal Envoy to explore with the parties, directly or through proximity talks, a possible division of the Territory, with the understanding that nothing would be decided until everything was decided.
- D. Terminate MINURSO, thereby recognizing and acknowledging that the UN was not going to solve the problem of Western Sahara without requiring one or the other or both of the parties to do something that they did not wish to do.
Following this bombshell of a report, the Security Council could not decide how to proceed until 30 July 2002 when it adopted resolution S/1429. In its resolution the Council supported strongly the efforts of the Secretary-General and Baker to find a political solution which would provide for self-determination and invited the Personal Envoy to pursue these efforts while considering the concerns expressed by the parties. The Council finally called upon all the parties and the states of the region to cooperate fully with the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.
The Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara was the response to the request, which was rejected by Morocco in April 2004, resulting in Baker’s resignation.
Morocco’s supporters in the SC unimpressed by 2007 offer of autonomy
When Morocco eventually presented its offer of autonomy in March 2007, it transpired through Wikileaks the embassies of France, Spain, the UK, the US and Germany (then president of the EU) were not impressed by the offer. Nevertheless, during a meeting of political counselors of the above-mentioned states, in response to the intensity of Morocco’s insistence, the decision was made to advise Morocco to submit its proposal to the UN and support it despite its shortcomings. And at France’s suggestion, the proposal was singled out for praise in the resolution.
In April 2007, the Security Council adopted resolution S/1754, which in addition to praising Morocco’s proposal as serious and credible, omitted any mention of resolution S/1495, calling on the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions in good faith, taking into account the developments of the last months, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. This became the mantra of the Security Council for the following 18 years.
All resolutions following S/1754, focused on efforts to achieve its successful implementation by the UN. In 2016, the Council decided that only efforts since 2006 needed to be taken into account, thus wiping out mention of any work done by the United Nations, itself included, to resolve the conflict from 1991 to 2006.
After SC capitulation to Morocco on the question of autonomy, what next?
The answer to the question of what exactly it is hoped to be achieved by capitulating to Morocco by key members of the Security Council and others, while the Polisario and Algeria remain adamant in their demand for a referendum of self-determination, remains unanswered. Has this blatant exhibition of selective memory by Morocco’s key supporters helped in any way in resolving the conflict? Far from it.
Morocco continues insisting that its offer of a loosely defined form of autonomy, under its presumed sovereignty over Western Sahara be the solution. As for Polisario, after temporarily accepting the Peace Plan that would have offered the option of independence among two others, through a referendum of self-determination, it has reverted to its hopes for the referendum envisaged under the 1991 Settlement Plan.
Unilateral recognition of an illegal act never solves a conflict and does not gain recognition by the international community. Recognition of Morocco’s annexation by the Security Council or the General Assembly remains unattainable unless China and Russia conclude that it is to their interest and go along. The refugees will remain in the camps, the EU courts will continue to reject trade agreements, and Moroccan – Algerian relations will continue to worsen further endangering peace in North Africa. Western Sahara will stay on the list of unsettled territorial disputes. Meanwhile, seeing the efforts that Morocco is putting to have Polisario designated as a terrorist organization rather than proposing a credible autonomy, one must wonder how sincere the Moroccan government is about its serious and credible efforts to move the process forward toward resolution, as the Security Council repeats since 2007.
Anna Theofilopoulou is a former UN official with experience in political and development issues. She covered the conflict over Western Sahara from April 1994 to July 2006 and worked as close advisor to former US Secretary of State, James A. Baker throughout his appointment as Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara from March 1997 until his resignation in June 2004. She holds a master’s degree in international politics and international business from City University of New York and has written widely about peacekeeping and mediation for academic journals and publications. This piece is part of ICDI’s Maghreb Dialogue Project series.
