On just about the day the assassination of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran at the hands of the Israeli and American armies was announced — or rather, in the middle of the night following that announcement — Hezbollah surprised the Lebanese government and most pillars of the Lebanese state, at least in appearance, by effectively and actively entering the ongoing war in the region, announcing that it had attacked a number of Israeli targets in the north of the occupied Palestinian territories, thereby bringing the Lebanese front effectively into the complex military and security confrontation currently existing in the region.
A deep dive into the key dynamics of the Lebanese crisis
Hezbollah stated at the time, then, that it had conducted this operation in loyalty to the blood of Sayyid Khamenei, and in response to what it considered to be repeated Israeli attacks on Lebanon for about the past 15 months. Its discourse then and thereafter emphasized Israel’s failure to abide by the agreement on the cessation of hostilities dating back to November 27, 2024. It also stressed the Lebanese state’s failure in practice to achieve any minimally fair outcome –for Lebanon, and for the people of southern Lebanon in particular — through diplomatic and political efforts and the like. All of this, of course, without forgetting to mention the aspect related to the incapacity of the Lebanese army, at least according to this same discourse, given its currently limited capabilities: its inability to fulfill the duty of defending the country and liberating the land in lieu of the “armed resistance.”
The discourse of Hezbollah and that of the elites and broad segments that support it within the country also emphasize holding the American side responsible in practice for failing to sufficiently arm the Lebanese Armed Forces, with the aim of protecting “Israel’s security,” as this same discourse repeats.
As for the current Lebanese government, and with the support of most of the forces participating in it, it has rejected this military involvement in whole or in part. It continues to consider publicly: first, that Hezbollah has, in practice, violated legal frameworks, particularly by breaking the principle of keeping decisions of war and peace exclusively in the hands of the state; second, that Hezbollah entered this battle at Iran’s implicit request or, at the very least, in support of the Islamic Republic of Iran, not in defense of Lebanon or as a response to Israeli attacks, as it claims; third, that this military — and perhaps political — organization has effectively begun straying outside the bounds of law, legitimacy, and institutions (in addition to its deviation from international legitimacy). Accordingly, this government has taken a number of decisions and measures that, in broad terms, go toward making the “Islamic Resistance in Lebanon” practically an outlawed organization, and toward opening the way to its disarmament even by force (that is, through the Lebanese Army itself).
Moreover, the executive authority in Lebanon, represented by the President of the Republic and the Council of Ministers, has taken several additional steps that go toward accepting the principle of direct negotiations with “the Israeli enemy” (according to the usual Lebanese expression). This has intensified internal divisions and tensions to a significant and dangerous degree, even as concerns certain political figures who had previously held a generally ambivalent, nebulous, or unconventional position regarding this operation of Hezbollah’s.
Max Weber and the shifting balances of power in the region
At the core of the matter, Hezbollah likely believes that the onset of the latest aggression against Iran has given the armed resistance a golden opportunity in Lebanon through which it can return to the battlefield and play the role it has defined for itself over the years, along with attempting, of course, to shift the current balances of power whether with respect to the exterior or even with respect to the interior that is hostile to its line and principles, according to this conviction. It is important here to recall that since November 27, 2024, and since the collapse of the previous Syrian regime, its strategic ally, the party has been receiving blow after blow from Israel without being able to mount any response in practice.
The party’s strategic and political thinking, therefore, likely holds that the aforementioned phase cannot continue, and its return cannot be accepted in any form, even if the current fighting drags on for a relatively long time and even if its course and its arenas perhaps become more complex.
The aforementioned conviction is further strengthened by the – perhaps often implicit –assessment held by Hezbollah and its local and regional allies of the current government and its international and regional positioning. They likely consider that they are facing a set of forces moving far into alliance with the American project on the one hand, and into convergence with various regional efforts to put an end to the armed resistance project — and Hezbollah as a system — both militarily and politically on the other.
On the other side, it appears equally clear that the predominant deep conviction among the main actors composing this government is that this party and the institutions and currents orbiting around it are, at their core, nothing but an instrument or “proxy” in the hands of the Iranian player in the region. Accordingly, they consider Hezbollah and its weapons as posing a major threat to the country, and even to this government itself—especially if the party emerged victorious from this war – as a resistance movement, not of course as a conventional army. The outlook for the day after the victory, which has become possible for the party at this stage, after having perhaps been impossible in the minds of many of these actors: the outlook for the day after appears, therefore, to carry major concern for the government, its President, and its principal components.
Moreover, one can speak, this time at the level of the concepts of the social sciences, of a conflict no less intense or fierce between the two camps, even if sometimes unconscious, specifically over “the concept of the state.” The current governing team, its main allies, and the broad popular groups that support it appear to adopt a “top-down” or “principled” view of the state. In this latter perspective, the state is treated as an abstract concept in the mind, endowed with attributes that must be imposed on reality even by force. Foremost among these attributes, traits, or aspects is the issue of what is termed the “monopoly of violence.” On this specific issue, many researchers and observers today consider that the environments nurturing the orientations of the current Lebanese government largely embrace a Weberian conception of sovereignty and the monopoly of violence (in reference, of course, to the German sociologist Max Weber).
With the necessary caution regarding the meaning of the terminology used (for reasons there is no scope to go into here), one can argue, in contrast, that the second camp openly or implicitly defends a conception of the state that may be considered as “bottom-up” or “realist,” since this state is effectively asked – simply put — to “earn” its most important rights. Accordingly, those repeat that the “state” must not leave the population of certain regions unprotected against external attacks or without credible alternatives to armed resistance. Rather, in this framework, “the state” according to this view must first do its deterrent and defensive duty before it demands a monopoly of violence or “exclusive control of weapons” on the basis of top-down or principled justifications, as we noted.
What paths for mediation and dialogue and what possible peaceful ways out
From the security and political angles, and even at the conceptual level, the situation today appears to be largely a (Zero-sum game), as some mathematicians and probabilists would express it, and to a highly significant and dangerous degree. As of the time of writing these lines, and in short: each side still aims to achieve a radical victory over the other, pushing relatively far in its escalatory moves on the political and possibly security terrain. Objectively and realistically: the Lebanese situation today—especially regarding the day after the war—is extremely dangerous and resembles, to striking extent, conditions that precede the outbreak of deep internal (conflicts or civil unrest of a profound, perhaps existential, nature, as we have seen.
As for Hezbollah, it states and operates to date on the basis that “the final word belongs to the field” — the security, military, (and regional) arena. Accordingly, it does not in practice lend a listening ear to the escalatory measures that this government takes as long as the Lebanese Army does not take military steps against it that the party might consider dangerous (and it is, in all likelihood, still ruling them out at present, like probably most Lebanese as well, especially in the present circumstances). Naturally, and to this day as well, the saying that “the final word belongs to the field” also appears to be what the Israeli side is saying, which places the entire Lebanese state before challenges of escalating severity.
In this context, and based on these current realities as well as on past experiences, what diplomatic mediations and peaceful ways out are available?
In light of this dangerous internal zero-sum situation, of the ongoing war, and of the return of some key Arab actors – with the exception of the Egyptian side up to now – to a relatively hostile posture toward the Islamic Republic of Iran, it appears that the most realistic — and effective – way out lies today in attempting to reach a comprehensive and serious dialogue between the international community, with the United States as a key player of course, on the one hand, and the Iranian leadership itself on the other, with the file of Lebanon being one of its central items.
Again, we are here facing an orientation that, in our view, represents the most realistic look at the situation, and far from the usual slogans. It is clear within this same framework that: first, the file is in its essence largely regional, no matter how much we try to avoid this truth, as usually happens; second, this file is also deeply connected to the existing or potential strategic orientations of “the Islamic Republic” and its allies in the region and to the agreement or settlement they may reach with the United States in particular, especially after this specific military round; third, the issue has also become connected to a large extent, at a deeper level and in a direction not far from the preceding, to the pressing need for a specific agreement and/or settlement between the United States in particular and the main Shiite components and leaderships across the region as a whole.
From this perspective, it would be logical to entrust the mission of any mediation to actors whose role has become central in the general dialogue underway in the region at a relative depth today, namely: Egypt (on the Arab side), but specifically in partnership with Pakistan and Turkey.
This proposition, in its realism if one may call it that, stems, as we indicated, from a reality that has become virtually a given in the current Lebanese scene: that fruitful internal dialogue between the two main parties cited has become stalled or suspended to a large degree, not only because of traditional political divergences, but also because each side has become more and more tied in practice and in a more dangerous manner to highly tense regional — principled and perhaps existential, as we have seen – alignments. Accordingly, any attempt to organize a purely internal dialogue without strong and clear regional and international leverage appears today to be of limited utility, if not practically unfeasible under current conditions. This is even more true if the objective is to reach a fundamental resolution of the ongoing internal conflict, particularly around “weapons,” and possibly extending (why not?) to the issue of the implementation of the Taif Agreement as a whole, as well as finding radical ways out for the basic fears of the country’s principal components.
In this context, the Arab Republic of Egypt stands out as a more balanced and realistic Arab option to lead such mediation, particularly as some other Arab powers, foremost among them the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, appear today to a certain extent as a clearly biased party in the ongoing regional conflict, whether in terms of political positioning or through their involvement in the associated security and military dynamics in one form or another. As for Egypt, and despite its clear interests, still maintains a relatively neutral position as a mediator capable of communicating with the various parties, which enhances its ability to play a conciliatory role in the Lebanese situation.
This Egyptian role cannot be completed or bear fruit without broader Arab institutional backing, of course, represented specifically in the Arab League, which provides a certain institutional legitimacy that could help embrace any initiative of this kind and transform it from a merely bilateral or trilateral effort into an integrated Arab process. In addition to that, Egypt benefits, in the Lebanese case as well, from a historical reservoir of positive empathy and a certain level of general political trust.
At a broader level, involving both Pakistan and possibly Turkey does not stem merely from formal balancing considerations, but from actual transformations in their regional and international roles. Pakistan, in particular, appears today to be in a relatively advanced position within regional dialogue tracks, with a growing presence in active communication channels with the United States, as we see, while at the same time possessing close strategic relations with China, which makes it a player capable of intersecting simultaneously with multiple international and regional axes.
In conclusion, it must be stressed once again that at its core the current Lebanese crisis is tied to the fundamental question of how to deal with the Israeli threat in Lebanon and in the region, and to the closely related question of Lebanon’s positioning in relation to the ongoing wars in the region, as well as to the geopolitical balances that are being reshaped today in an accelerating and dangerous way.
The challenge of “the ceasefire” or the temporary truce
The achievement of a temporary “ceasefire” or the provisional truce that we effectively witnessed this week can only be read as evidence of the relatively high viability of the approach we advocate regarding peaceful and compromise-based ways out of the Lebanese crisis.
It is clear that the Pakistani role was very pivotal in conveying Iranian pressure to the American leadership in a tangible way regarding the inclusion of the Lebanese front within the regional ceasefire equation.
Furthermore, it appears clear and noteworthy that, at this stage, the “Islamic Republic” did not object to maintaining the Saudi factor present in the internal Lebanese solution in a tangible way, of course with the Pakistani partner, most probably with the aim of establishing a kind of relative balance with the dominant American influence currently within the structure of the executive authority.
Based on that, it can be said that we are, therefore, facing two distinct paths today: a first path that proposes a rational and realistic way out, which is the path we generally advocate and whose contours have already begun to take shape on the ground, as we have seen; a second path that Benjamin Netanyahu is pushing for in Lebanon and that rests on fueling a sharp internal confrontation between “the authorities” and “the resistance” meant to ensnare the Lebanese government in a trap of internal escalation, or so it may be, benefiting of course from American pressure biased in his favor in this regard, which so far appears clear.
Consequently, the true challenge lies at present in anchoring and supporting the first path, given the greater degree of rationality and realism it embodies, and the significant capacity it offers to ward off the specter of internal confrontations along with anything that might cause the country to slide toward the possibility of civil war… whatever its form or designation.
This article was translated from English to Arabic.
Dr. Malek Abou Hamdan is a Lebanese researcher and writer specializing in global financial markets and geopolitical affairs in the Middle East and an author of numerous publications and studies focused on advancing the methodologies of social sciences and Islamic studies.
