Sudan’s ongoing civil war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and its once auxiliary paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is giving no sign of abating as it approaches its third anniversary. The outlook for 2026 remains grim. Despite the intensification of fighting in the second half of 2025 along the frontline, stretching across the three states in the Kordofan region, neither belligerent has been able to secure a decisive military victory over the other.

Having secured full control over the five states of the western Darfur region, with the capture of El-Fasher by its forces in late October, the RSF is advancing eastward and has taken control of West Kordofan state following the fall of Babanoussa. In early December, it took over the strategically important Heglig oil fields in early December, seizing an important economic lifeline to the SAF-controlled government.

The war continues as new frontlines open up 

As of January, the RSF has tightened its siege of Kadugli and Diling, respectively the capital and the second-largest town in South Kordofan state, with the SAF deploying significant forces to defend its garrisons. A new war front opened over the past weeks, as the SAF rushed reinforcements to Blue Nile state to repel an anticipated attack by the RSF, reportedly backed by neighboring Ethiopia.

Despite the belligerents’ continued ability to deploy large numbers of fighters to shifting battle fronts, the internal cohesion of their coalitions and their capacity to maintain a reliable chain of command and control remain in doubt. Having apparently learned nothing from RSF’s buildup into a de facto parallel army, the SAF continues to rely on semi-autonomous armed groups motivated by the desire to secure a seat at the table in the postwar political order.

The lucrative economic rewards the SAF conceded to its allied “Joint Forces,” composed of former Darfur rebel groups, has encouraged the emergence of the Sudan Shield Forces, whose commanders are pressing for similar perks. Several militias in Eastern Sudan have also emerged to protest the continued marginalization of their region and its exclusion from benefits of its own resources, including gold.

These dynamics led to the emergence of security-business cartels that collude and, at times, compete for control of the economy in SAF-held areas across the country, leaving the civilian government it formed without financing to meet the essential needs of the population and reconstruction of the country’s dilapidated infrastructure.

The RSF relies on ethnically recruited militias that reward themselves from the proceeds of mass pillage in areas they control and often turn their arms against each other to settle local disputes over land rights and access to water and pastures.

Forces continue to pillage and plunder as services collapse and civilians suffer

The war has left the country a victim of two competing war economies that benefit the militaries executing the war and the civilian elite financiers, abandoning the majority of the population to hunger and epidemics.

The national GDP contracted by 40 percent, and the collapse of essential services, including education, health, transport, and communications, has further undermined prospects for growth and economic stability nationwide. Recent statements by the Finance Minister give a measure of the economic collapse: “Sudan lost all sources of state revenue in the beginning of the war.”

This was a result of the state’s loss of 80 percent of its revenue collection following the RSF’s takeover of the capital, Khartoum, where most of the industries and commercial enterprises were concentrated.

The Minister reported that 40 percent of the budget was allocated to the military effort in 2024.  However, this figure is likely much higher. Sudan’s natural resources are now split almost equally between the SAF and RSF areas.

Official agricultural and livestock exports have fallen by 43 and 45 percent, respectively, according to the finance minister, as the RSF-controlled western regions are the main producers of these livelihood and export commodities.

While the government has introduced policies that have encouraged gold production in areas under its control, it has been able to officially export only 20 tonnes of the 2025 official gold production of 70 tonnes.

Local fiefdoms controlled by warlords and militias likely to proliferate 

The longer the war continues, the more likely RSF and SAF territories will splinter into localized fiefdoms controlled by warlords for their own benefit. In short, the continuation of the war will drive Sudan further down the path to state failure. Evidence is emerging of splintered governance operations in SAF-controlled areas, and the RSF has not managed to establish credibly functioning civilian institutions in its territories.

The RSF drone attacks on vital targets in SAF-held territories throughout 2025, including oil depots, airports, dams and other power generation facilities, will continue to make vast swaths of the country hard to stabilize. This has reportedly pushed SAF’s regional allies, Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar, to increase their military support to the army to new levels, seeking to match the seemingly unlimited support that the United Arab Emirates continues to provide to the RSF.

Increasing regional tensions with the UAE have also prompted Saudi Arabia to abandon its initially reserved stance and extend financial support to SAF, mainly through weapon procurement, via Pakistan.

War contributes to worsening regional instability 

The conflict has significantly contributed to the worsening instability in neighboring South Sudan and Chad. Eritrean President, Assayes Afwerki, has also joined the fray, training pro-SAF militias, and using Eastern Sudan as a playground for his regional competition with Ethiopia for dominance in the Horn of Africa.

The RSF, for its part, is receiving support from ruling elites in South Sudan, Kenya, and Chad, and in areas controlled by General Khalifa Haftar in Western Libya. Seeking to establish naval bases on Sudan’s long coast on the Red Sea, both Russia and Iran remain engaged as weapon suppliers to the SAF. 

The unconditional backing both parties receive is only strengthening their determination to win the war militarily, thereby undermining the prospects for peace.

Mediation efforts fail in the face of regional backing of the conflict 

Mediation efforts have continuously stalled since the beginning of the war. Saudi and American-led talks in Jeddah in the first months of fighting failed to establish an end to the devastation, and US-backed talks in Geneva never materialized.

Efforts to push the belligerents to the negotiating table took a major step forward after the September 2025 declaration by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the US, known as the Quad. The statement called for an immediate unconditional ceasefire and a nine-month transition to civilian rule. However, SAF rejected the proposal due to the UAE’s backing of the RSF. 

Inter-governmental agencies that have been all but absent throughout the conflict are also stepping in to mediate the conflict, with the Arab League, AU, EU, IGAD, and UN, establishing a semi-formal mechanism, or Quintet, to coordinate peace efforts.

Nevertheless, these attempts have yet to meaningfully push the needle towards ending the violence, primarily because regional actors have diametrically opposed interests in Sudan. Egypt is unwilling to neglect its ally in SAF nor see Sudan controlled by the RSF, while the UAE’s economic and geopolitical interests in the Horn and Sahel are configured around the RSF as its main client. Similarly, Ethiopia and Egypt’s competition over Nile waters incentivizes them to back opposing sides.

Ruptures between the UAE and Saudi Arabia could shape the future conflict 

The recent rupture between Saudi Arabia and the UAE may lead to a major recalibration in the conflict if Riyadh decides to escalate its confrontation with Abu Dhabi in Sudan. If regional and international pressure increases against the UAE, the RSF’s advance will likely stall or become undone.

Containing the conflict within Sudan’s borders may also become increasingly difficult, as political instability in Chad, Ethiopia, and South Sudan may be exacerbated by the increasingly turbulent conflict in Sudan.

Barring any major efforts to converge regional and international consensus on peace in Sudan, the most likely outcome in the coming year is a calcification of the battle front across the central Kordofan region and continued entrenchment of SAF and RSF.

Unfortunately, Sudan’s de facto split will not lead to an end to the conflict, but likely the devolution of the fighting within the two rival camps, as competition over resources and power continue to fuel Sudan’s cycle of violence and destruction.

Dr. Suliman Baldo is an expert in justice, human rights and conflict resolution in Africa and served as the Africa head of International Crisis Group, the International Center for Transitional Justice, and has also held human rights and mediation posts in the United Nations. He has provided expert advice on human rights in Mali and Darfur and currently leads the Sudan Transparency and Policy Tracker.

Ahmed Kodouda is Senior Technical Advisor at Impact Policy Group, a firm advising global institutions in fragile contexts. He is also a Policy Fellow at STPT. He previously served as an advisor to the Civilian-Led Transitional Government of Sudan. His writing has appeared in Foreign Affairs, the Journal of Democracy, and The Washington Post.