After nearly three years of devastating war, Sudan stands at a dangerous but decisive moment. Millions are displaced. Famine advances. Civilians are targeted deliberately. The state has been hollowed out. What began as a power struggle within the security establishment has evolved into a regionalized conflict system sustained by external actors, war economies, and geopolitical competition.

Yet, amid this devastation, something important is happening. Mediation efforts that once moved in parallel — African, trans-regional, and international — are slowly, painfully, and hesitantly moving toward convergence. This convergence, however incomplete, opens a window of opportunity.

That window must not be wasted.

A truce must be linked to path to civilian rule and democratic self-determination 

The immediate imperative is clear: the war must stop. An immediate humanitarian truce is indispensable. It is not a concession. It is a moral and political necessity. But a truce cannot become an end in itself. It must be explicitly and credibly linked to a parallel political process aimed at restoring civilian authority and democratic self-determination.

This is difficult — but it is doable.

War dynamics and deal-making among powerful external actors, particularly within the Quad, may shift the sequencing of negotiations. Adjustments may be necessary. The order in which security, humanitarian, and political tracks unfold may need recalibration. But if the overarching objective remains Sudan’s unity and sustainable peace, then maintaining convergence around a political end-state is indispensable.

Sudan’s predicament cannot be remedied by reverting to failed ideologies or procedural fixes. The crisis reflects long cycles of militarization, exclusion, and broken democratic promise. Yet across decades — from uprisings to neighborhood resistance committees — the Sudanese people have demonstrated extraordinary resilience and a persistent demand for dignity and self-rule.

The challenge now is to craft a political order that finally matches the integrity of the Sudanese populace. That will require honesty, new thinking, and a break from formalistic responses that confuse activity with progress.

A regionalized conflict that needs more than traditional mediation methods 

Sudan’s war has outgrown the mediation models currently applied to it. Unless that mismatch is addressed directly, even well-intentioned initiatives risk stabilizing violence rather than resolving it.

Sudan’s war is no longer primarily sustained by internal political disagreement. It has evolved into a regionalized conflict system driven by three forces: a struggle over sovereignty and coercive authority inside Sudan; a transnational war economy benefiting domestic and external actors; and sustained political, military, and financial intervention by regional and extra-regional powers.

Most mediation efforts have focused on elite bargaining between belligerents while treating war economies and external sponsors as secondary factors. The result has been repeated cycles of talks that unravel as battlefield realities or external incentives shift. Mediation has been procedural when it needed to be structural.

Against this backdrop, five possible trajectories now confront Sudan.

Scenario one: procedural mediation and strategic drift

Under this scenario, mediation continues largely as it has. Ceasefires are negotiated. Conferences are convened. Civilian actors are consulted but not empowered. External actors are acknowledged but not structurally engaged.

The assumption is that persistence and incremental sequencing will eventually yield progress.

The likely outcome is prolonged stalemate. Armed actors participate tactically. Civilian forces grow disillusioned. Institutional credibility erodes slowly. Mediation becomes a permanent process without transformation — a form of managed incoherence.

Scenario two: humanitarian de-escalation without political settlement

Here, the immediate priority becomes stopping violence through negotiated truces and humanitarian access arrangements, even if political questions are deferred.

This approach may save lives in the short term. It should not be dismissed. Indeed, a humanitarian truce is urgently needed.

But if such de-escalation is not explicitly linked to a political process, it risks entrenching militarized governance. Ceasefires become instruments of consolidation rather than transition. Relief becomes conditional on compliance by armed actors.

The danger is a frozen conflict — quieter, but structurally unchanged.

Scenario three: civilian convergence without leverage

In this trajectory, Sudanese civilian forces and segments of the international community align around a shared vision for civilian rule. Declarations multiply. Political clarity increases. Fragmentation is reduced.

This convergence is necessary and welcome.

But without leverage over war economies and external sponsors, alignment alone cannot shift power on the ground. Expectations rise without mechanisms to meet them. Civilian unity risks becoming symbolic rather than transformative. Convergence without leverage produces frustration.

Scenario four: deal-driven stabilization — the board of peace model

A more consequential trajectory is emerging. With the establishment of a Board of Peace under U.S. chairmanship and the growing centrality of the Quad, Sudan may become a candidate  for essentially a  deal-driven stabilization.

Under this model, the priority is immediate cessation of fighting. Negotiations focus on belligerents and their sponsors. Political settlement is deferred. Material incentives and strategic bargains replace structural transformation.

Multilateral institutions may provide retrospective endorsement, converting power arrangements into formally legitimate ones.

Such a model may produce rapid de-escalation. It may mobilize leverage unavailable to traditional mediation.

But such arrangement could  entail:  Sovereignty may be functionally outsourced. Civilian politics may be indefinitely postponed. Sudan could enter a trusteeship-like condition governed through external deal-making.

For Africa, the precedent could be consequential.  : the deferring  of multilateralism in favor of ad hoc power arrangements.

Scenario five: re-engineered mediation — convergence with leverage

The final scenario does not reject the others. It learns from them.

From Scenario One, it retains procedural discipline and institutional continuity. From Scenario Two, it affirms the urgent necessity of a humanitarian truce. From Scenario Three, it preserves and deepens civilian convergence. From Scenario Four, it recognizes that real leverage — including that held by powerful external actors — cannot be ignored.

But it integrates these elements into a redesigned, power-aware mediation architecture.

This approach would secure an immediate humanitarian truce; explicitly link that truce to a parallel, time-bound political process; structure engagement with external sponsors; introduce mechanisms to disrupt war economies; reframe neutrality as principled engagement with power; and preserve African multilateral relevance while utilizing available leverage responsibly.

Sequencing may shift. Tactical adjustments may be necessary. But the end-state — a united Sudan governed through constitutional trajectory — must remain explicit and non-negotiable.

Durable stability for citizens, neighbors, and investors alike depends on democratic self-determination. Anything less will produce only temporary calm.

Choosing intention over drift

Sudan is at a crossroads — not only between war and peace, but between competing doctrines of mediation.

Stopping the war is imperative. A humanitarian truce is urgent. But peace cannot be reduced to containment, nor politics postponed indefinitely.

Sudan’s people have repeatedly demonstrated courage, dignity, and resistance. What is required now is a mediation strategy worthy of that resilience — one that matches moral clarity with structural realism.

The choice before Sudan and its partners is not between realism and principle. It is between managed disorder and intentional transformation.

Peace remains possible — but only if convergence is preserved, leverage is structured, and Sudanese political agency is placed at the center.

Abdul Mohammed is a former United Nations Senior Political Advisor and head of the Sudan Mediation office. 

Dr Solomon Ayele Dersso is the Founding Director of Amani Africa Media and Research Services, an Addis Ababa based pan-African policy research, training and consulting think tank that works on matters African Union. Dr Dersso, who chairs the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, also serves as Adjunct Professor at Addis Ababa University College of Law and Governance Studies.