The failure of United Nations-led mediation in resolving the Syrian conflict or making any significant progress toward easing humanitarian suffering under the regime of Bashar al-Assad has led to the sidelining of the global body in the nation’s critical transition period. The UN mediation legacy in Syria stems from two main reasons. First, the way the Assad regime manipulated the UN mediation process to perpetuate the conflict and stay in power. The second reason relates to external states’ motivations for offering and supporting the UN mediation process, often dubbed as the “peace process.”
Since February 2012, the UN has had four mediators including Kofi Annan (February-August 2012), Lakhdar Brahimi (August 2012-May 2014), Steffan de Mistura (July 2014-December 2018) and Geir Pederson (January 2019- present). Interestingly, the Assad regime engaged with all mediators. While engagement in diplomatic initiatives by a warring side is often seen as a positive step toward achieving peace, Assad’s engagement in the UN mediation undermined the UN’s mediation efforts and contributed to their failures. This raises the question of the efficacy of mediation as a conflict management tool in authoritarian settings and why Damascus accepted UN mediation efforts in the first place.
Assad’s regime used mediation to buy time and manage narratives of the war
One of the main motives behind the regime’s acceptance of UN mediation can be attributed to its desire to buy time while it attempted to crush the opposition movement militarily, particularly given that the Syrian Uprising presented an existential threat to the regime. Damascus was uninterested in the UN diplomatic initiative as it believed that it could win by using force, rather than sharing power with any of its political rivals. While stalling tactics are often used by warring parties when they are losing militarily, the regime stalled the mediation process despite military dynamics and viewed the process suspiciously.
Damascus also engaged in mediation to improve its diplomatic image, using the UN to spread its narrative of the Uprising and misinformation. The regime did not necessarily seek to dominate the narrative on Syria but rather spread confusion and uncertainty about what was happening in the country. The regime’s framing of the Syrian Uprising as part of the ‘war on terrorism’ and an attempted regime change imposed by Western colonial powers was particularly appealing to some international audiences. Damascus’ main international backer, Russia, also played a prominent role in further spreading the regime’s narrative and misinformation.
The regime used multiple strategies to undermine UN mediation efforts
By engaging in the mediation process, the regime also ensured its failure by acting as a spoiler. Damascus used coercive spoiling (violence) during critical junctures of the process, including breaching Annan’s six-point plan in 2012 and escalating violence in early 2016 which pushed de Mistura to suspend the negotiations. This is significant as previous research demonstrates that the use of violence during mediation undermines the negotiation process through eroding trust between negotiating parties.
In addition to the use of coercion, the Assad regime also engaged in a number of non-coercive spoiling tactics that contributed to the failure of mediation. For example, Damascus’ negotiating team refused to discuss the topic of political transition and the fate of Bashar al-Assad, viewing them as red lines and instead insisted on discussing terrorism. Other tactics involved opposing direct negotiations and creating delays and procedural obstacles.
Third parties’ motivations behind offering mediation
External states also played a critical role in undermining the mediation process as they pursued mediation for ulterior objectives that may not be aligned with peace-making in Syria. The literature on why third parties offer mediation may shed some light on why foreign states supported the UN mediation efforts in Syria. These include third parties’ perception of the UN as an impartial mediator, the mediators’ historical ties and fear of spillover effects if the conflict escalates. Mediation is also pursued because it remains an inexpensive conflict management tool compared to military intervention and economic sanctions.
While some of these motivations apply in the Syrian case, there are also other motives that drove external states to pursue and insist on relying on mediation in Syria despite the lack of progress. First, mediation was used by Western countries as a way to assert their liberal peace-making agenda amidst a rise of authoritarian conflict management globally. With its emphasis on diplomacy, negotiations and power sharing, mediation stands in contrast to illiberal forms of conflict management that centralise coercions as a way to manage conflicts. Second, proponents of the mediation also argue that the UN achieved some modest gains in Syria including securing short-lived ceasefires in 2012 and 2016 . Third, the reliance on meditation by external states also demonstrated a lack of political will to resolve the Syrian conflict using other costly tools.
The UN mediators failed to address or manage the way the Assad regime and the external actors used the mediation process for their own objectives. This was a significant risk as mediators require the consent of the warring sides and the cooperation of international states for mediation to work. It is not surprising therefore that the first two mediators Annan and Brahimi both resigned sooner after realising the futility with the mediation process. Meanwhile, de Mistura and Geir Pederson continued in their roles for a significant period with little to no progress, giving the illusion of progress in peace-making in Syria.
Can the UN restore trust amongst parties of the conflict and the Syrian people?
Given the failure of the UN mediation to resolve the Syrian conflict or make any tangible progress to relieve the suffering of the Syrian people under the Assad regime, it is not surprising that many Syrians mistrust the UN process and often view it as a proxy for external states to interfere in Syria’s internal affairs. Many Syrians I spoke with in a recent trip to Syria following the fall of the Assad regime felt betrayed by the international community for its inability to stop the regime’s atrocities or free political prisoners.
In this political environment and as argued by Hasmik Egian, former chief of staff in the Office of the UN Special Envoy for Syria, it is time to “concede that the UN’s decade-long political mediation work and the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria leading this role in settling the Syrian war needs to be abolished.” Indeed, for the UN to have any chance of successfully facilitating the transitional process, it must first regain the trust of the Syrians who lost their faith in the UN and focus on contributing to rebuilding the war-affected country.
Dr Rifaie Tammas is a Syrian activist and researcher with over a decade of experience working in Syria, Turkey and Australia. His work is driven by a deep commitment to justice. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of Sydney, where his doctoral research critically examined how mediation can sometimes sustain conflict rather than foster peace in Syria. Dr. Tammas has written widely on Syrian politics and refugees, with articles published by the ABC, Open Democracy and the Middle East Monitor. He currently leads the impact and evaluation portfolio at the Centre for Western Sydney, combining rigorous analysis with lived experience to advance equity and meaningful social change.
