Western news coverage of the war in the Middle East suggests that the future of Iran hangs in the balance. The United States and Israel continue to pound Iranian targets and insist that the regime should either capitulate to their demands or suffer an immediate demise. But the Islamic Republic of Iran has not fallen. Following the shock of the killing of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and key members of the Islamic Republic’s leadership, the ruling regime has managed to march on. It has demonstrated resilience in the face of superior Israeli and US firepower. With US President Donald J. Trump claiming the war could continue on for four to five weeks, and Iran striking US military bases and targets throughout the region, this is only just the beginning of what could be a more drawn-out conflict.
Un-diplomacy in Iraq
It is hard to ignore the similarities with the US-led attack on Iraq in 2003. That war was initially justified in terms of stopping then president Saddam Hussein developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). But soon after toppling his rule, it was revealed that Saddam did not actually possess WMDs, so the rhetoric quickly shifted to democratic nation-building and freeing Iraqis from the yoke of oppression. Regime change in Iraq pushed the state to the verge of collapse; Baghdad was unable to provide the basics to Iraqi citizens. More than two decades later, Iraq is gradually recovering from years of disorder, insecurity and economic stagnation.
The United Nations Secretary General António Guterres condemned both the United States and Israel on Iran, and Iran’s reprisal attacks. “The Charter clearly prohibits ‘the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations,’” he said on Twitter. Many analysts have argued US-Israel’s attacks could not meet the criteria of self-defence, as there appeared no imminent threat from Iran. But most European states, with the remarkable exception of Spain, have tacitly endorsed Washington’s decision, repeating the familiar justifications that Iran posed a threat to the region, was seeking nuclear weapons and suppressed its own citizens.
Europe’s seeming endorsement of the US and Israel’s attack have seriously shattered any hopes that Iranian authorities might have had about Europe as a potential mediator.
Iran’s leadership prepared for possibility of attack
The internal political structure has proven significant. A series of interlocking institutions ensure that there is enough flexibility built in the system to withstand shock and any holes that Israeli missiles might punch through. A troika of the president, head of the judiciary and a senior religious scholar from the Guardian Council have taken over the leadership. This troika has ensured continuity. All these men have occupied their office at the discretion of the now-deceased Supreme Leader. Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei (the head of judiciary) and Alireza Arafi (representing the Guardian Council) are direct appointees of the Supreme Leader. Masoud Pezeshkian, the Iranian President, was elected in a popular vote with a slim margin. But he had to go through a vetting process of the Guardian Council to ensure his loyalty to the regime and the Supreme Leader. Despite his reformist credentials (which seduced some voters), he did not step out of Khamenei’s shadow.
Meanwhile the Assembly of Experts, a body of 88 Islamic scholars who are tasked with appointing the successor have chosen Mojtaba Khamenei, the second son of Ali Khamenei, as the next Supreme Leader. This is a confirmation of the leadership’s uncompromising position in its foreign and domestic policies.
Mojtaba Khamenei is very close to the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), its Quds Force (that manages IRGC’s external network of proxies) and Basij (the paramilitary force that deals with internal dissent). He has not held any official post but has acted as advisor and gatekeeper for his father in the Office of the Supreme Leader. He was named as a key figure in the crackdown of electoral protestors in 2009 which confirmed the second term of the firebrand president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against his reformist contestant (Mir-Hossein Mousavi, under house arrest since 2011).
Regime now ruled by hardliners unlikely to compromise
The war with the US and Israel has allowed the hardline faction to consolidate its grip on power. This will have major regional and domestic implications. The IRGC was never in favour of nuclear talks and was happy when President Trump tore up the deal in his first term. The 2015 nuclear deal was a landmark victory for President Obama as it subjected Iran to an extraordinary inspection regime to prevent the weaponisation of its nuclear program, in return for sanctions relief. This deal was criticised by hardliners in Iran as shameful and a symbol of capitulation. There were scenes of hardline parliamentarians crying in grief and shame when the deal was signed.
At the time, the late Supreme Leader advised caution and forbearance, arguing that the benefits of sanctions relief for the continuity of the regime justified the compromise. But things have changed. The US and Israel have attacked Iran twice, both times in the middle of nuclear talks. The Iranian leadership now clearly does not believe the United States engages in diplomacy in good faith. This makes attempts at finding a negotiated ceasefire, let alone lasting peace, harder to achieve.
President Trump’s expectations of regime collapse have proven misplaced. This is not a short, sharp war. It has the makings of a long, drawn-out conflict with devastating regional implications. Iran has already attacked neighbouring countries in the Persian Gulf. This is done under the cover of hitting US bases in its neighbourhood. So, it is justified as a defensive retaliatory response. But the real motive may be to exert pressure on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states to distance themselves from the United States. Tehran may be calculating that by raising the cost of alliance with Washington, GCC leaders would rethink their strategic choice of hosting US bases and relying on the United States for protection. However, this may be a seriously misguided strategy and push GCC members even more firmly to the US fold.
Kurdish militancy could plunge Iran into civil war
Meanwhile, there are reports on contact between the US and Iranian Kurdish groups that traverse the Iran-Iraq border. Stoking the fire of Kurdish militancy against the central government risks opening another pandora’s box. Kurds in Iran have suffered state suppression during the monarchy and the Islamic regime. They have resisted attempts at the eradication of their culture and have paid a heavy price for that. The establishment of the Kurdish autonomous region in Iraq following the collapse of Saddam Hussein has served as an inspiration. The US appears to wish to leverage Kurdish aspirations to challenge Tehran, perhaps as a replay of the role by the Northern Alliance in removing the Taliban in Kabul.
A Kurdish insurgency in Iran risks plunging Iran into the abyss of civil war. A Kurdish-led insurgency is likely to inspire a Baluch rising in the south-east of the country. These are likely to be met harshly by the IRGC and the Basij force. Faced with the prospects of separatism, IRGC could recruit more soldiers by playing on the theme of Iranian patriotism. In such conditions, the distinction between the Islamic regime and Iran as a state would sideline many. Fending off separatism to maintain Iran’s territorial integrity would supersede political differences about the type of political order.
Given the extreme polarisation of strategic thinking between Iran and the US, it is difficult to conceive how mediation and ceasefire talks could commence in the immediate future. Iran does not trust the US and is very suspicious of neighbouring states. In this mix, Turkey has openly criticised the US-Israeli attack on Iran and maintains its border crossing with Iran open. This gives Ankara an opportunity to reach out to Tehran. And as a NATO member, Ankara has a direct line to Washington. But in the midst of a renewed war, the climate appears too volatile for any meaningful mediation process. The US and Israel and Iran will continue the battle.
Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh is the Director, Middle East Studies Forum, Deakin University in Melbourne, Australia and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha.
