United Nations Security Council Resolution 2797 induced a radical change in efforts to resolve the 50-year-old conflict over the future of Western Sahara.  Drawing on the Resolution’s expression of “appreciation to the United States for its readiness to host negotiations in furtherance of the Personal Envoy’s mission,” the US in fact seized the initiative for facilitating and conducting those negotiations, displacing the United Nations’ Secretary General’s Personal Envoy into the role of “cosponsor.”  It remains to be seen whether this change and the accelerated series of meetings that have resulted will lead to a breakthrough, a step forward, or a return to stalemate. 

Walking the fine line between autonomy and self-determination

In a previous issue of Diplomacy Now, I analyzed the Security Council’s abandonment of the relatively neutral position it had held since at least 2003 and its adoption of a new approach “taking as basis [sic] Morocco’s Autonomy Proposal … [and … recognizing] that genuine autonomy could represent a most feasible outcome.”  In another innovation that reinforced the centrality of the Moroccan proposal, the Resolution made no mention of the Polisario Front’s referendum proposal.  In addition, in line with Rabat’s position, it drew no distinction between the two parties to the conflict and the two neighboring/observer states.  It did, however, retain the requirement for “a final and mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara” and added that it “encourages the parties to submit ideas to support a final mutually acceptable solution.” 

Three meetings in rapid succession

Proceeding on the basis of this Resolution and United States President Donald J. Trump’s proclaimed desire to end conflicts, the US, as penholder and now pacesetter in reviving the negotiating process after a hiatus of almost seven years, convened a series of three unannounced meetings of the parties in January and February. The first meeting was held by the State Department in Washington in mid-January; the second on February 8-9 at the US Embassy in Madrid; and the third on February 23-24 again in Washington.  

Additional meetings are planned but have not yet been announced. 

Reported but not announced as present were:

• The US Senior Adviser for Arab and African Affairs Massad Boulos and US Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Mike Waltz as cosponsors.

• UN Personal Envoy Staffan de Mistura as cosponsor.

• A Moroccan delegation headed by Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita and including GDSD head Mohamed Yassine Mansouri and Permanent Representative to the UN Ambassador Omar Hilale.

• A Polisario delegation headed by Foreign Minister Mohamed Yeslam Beisat and including New York representative Sidi Mohamed Ammar and Washington representative Mouloud Said.

• An Algerian delegation headed by Foreign Minister Ahmed Attaf

• A Mauritanian delegation headed by Foreign Minister Mohamed Salem Ould Merzoug.

These gatherings were the first ministerial-level meetings ever convened exclusively on Western Sahara. The proceedings were confidential – no communiques were issued, and most media coverage was limited to anonymous sources reiterating the parties’ long-standing positions, that can be outlined as follows: 

• Morocco: Resolution 2797 makes it clear that the autonomy proposal is the only possible basis for a settlement.  As a party to the conflict, Algeria must bring the Polisario to accept this.

• Polisario: Its presence is part of its ongoing diplomatic engagement and does not signal acceptance of Morocco’s proposal.  Only a referendum of self-determination can resolve the conflict.

• Algeria: It is not a party to the conflict but, as an observer, it is prepared to help Morocco and the Polisario reach a mutually acceptable solution that includes a referendum of self-determination.

• Mauritania: As an observer, it is maintaining its long-standing policy of “positive neutrality” and will help the parties reach a solution in any way it can.

Morocco’s expanded autonomy Plan

One exception to the lack of media exposure has been Atalayar, a digital Spanish news outlet with good ties to Moroccan sources.  On February 12, days after the Madrid meeting, it published what it presented as a summary outline of the 40-page expansion of Morocco’s original four-page autonomy proposal, describing it as the fruit of work coordinated by three Royal advisers, Taieb Fassi-Fihri, Omar Aziman, and Fouad Ali El Himma. 

According Atalayar, the participants at the Madrid meeting adopted the expanded proposal as a technical negotiating document on which, according to a road map agreed in Madrid, a permanent technical committee of experts will work in preparation for its approval at the next meeting(s).  No other sources confirmed this.

US adviser Massad Boulos on the negotiating process 

Another important exception to the lack of media exposure was the series of interviews that US advisor Massad Boulos gave on aspects of the negotiating process during the February 13-15 Munich Security Conference.  Boulos confirmed that he and the US team are working within the framework of Resolution 2797 even though the US national position is different.  He described the participation of “the four parties” and their acceptance and welcome of the “historic” Resolution as positive indicators, but refused to discuss the content of the talks, citing the parties’ request for secrecy.  He did say that each party is concerned “in one way or another” in the search for a solution depending on the dimensions of each specific issue.  The Western Saharans and the Moroccans are the parties concerned when it comes to the content of autonomy, and “the two sides” will both have to find any solution acceptable; Algeria and Mauritania are involved as observers who do not enter into the details of any discussion but support the process of finding an agreed solution.  The conflict is fifty years old, the issues are complex and may take “some time” to resolve, but the US hopes it will be short. 

Boulos added that the US and Algeria are forming a genuine long-term partnership.  A year ago, a defense and security agreement was signed as a very positive first step.  The US appreciates the support that President Tebboune, Foreign Minister Attaf, and their team are providing in the search for a solution that has the agreement of both parties. 

The UN described the talks as ‘encouraging’ 

To highlight that the Personal Envoy remains involved, UN Spokesman Dujarric told the media February 25 that “in close partnership with the United States, as penholder on Western Sahara in the Security Council, Staffan de Mistura … co-chaired negotiations in Washington, D.C.  That was 23-24 February….  This was the third co-chaired inter-ministerial meeting on Western Sahara since January.  The negotiations saw in-depth discussions, taking as a basis Morocco’s autonomy proposal, as per Security Council resolution 2797 (2025).  This is encouraging, and significant work will still be required, including on the key issue of self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, to reach a mutually acceptable solution to the conflict.” 

Whither the search for an agreement? 

While the three meetings held to date do not add up to a breakthrough, they do constitute a step forward.  Ending years of absence, the Polisario and Algeria agreed to join Morocco and Mauritania at the table, and the US has forced the parties into an unaccustomed rhythm.   Many difficult issues lie in wait.  Looking ahead, will the revived negotiating process lead to a “mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara?”

At the insistence of the US – which has made clear its support for Resolution 2797 and its rejection of any alternative to the Moroccan proposal – the Polisario is being pressed to set aside its call for a referendum to determine the future of Western Sahara and to negotiate an autonomy regime within Moroccan sovereignty.  Given its fifty-year quest for independence, this is a bitter pill to swallow. 

Self-governance of Western Sahara from Rabat

Such a pill could be swallowed more easily if genuine self-government were on offer and gave the Western Saharans maximum control over the Territory’s affairs, including the exploitation of its natural resources, including phosphates and other minerals, fisheries, energy sources, and tourist attractions.  

So far, the expanded Moroccan proposal, at least in the summary published in Atalayar, ties many activities in a “self-governing” Western Sahara to supervisory bodies in Rabat.  It even foresees the suspension of self-government under certain circumstances.  Clearly, much work needs to be done to transform this proposal into a credible document.  It may well be that the Moroccan government, which is highly centralized despite its attempts at regionalization, may be unable to go the distance, especially since the full self-government that the Western Saharans demand could trigger similar demands in the Rif and in other regions of Morocco. 

Faced with US insistence and the baseless threat of Congressional action to declare the Polisario a terrorist organization, the tactical approach of the Polisario may well be to engage reluctantly on the Moroccan proposal on the basis that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”  At the proper time, and with Algerian support, it might remind all concerned that “the people of Western Sahara,” and not the entire population of Morocco and Western Sahara (as the Moroccan proposal posits), must validate any agreement through a referendum whose electorate could be determined by updating the work that  MINURSO’s Identification Commission and James Baker did in the 1990s.

The requirement for self-determination

Any agreement reached would have to garner the approval of most Western Saharans, be they those who have been living under Moroccan administration or those who will return from the refugee camps in Algeria or the wider diaspora.  Absent the approval of a good majority of this indigenous population, any agreement reached over their heads would be contested and unstable.  This could lead Morocco to reinstitute severe repression, hardly a desirable outcome.  In short, despite the urge to put this issue off, what constitutes a credible form of self-determination must be explored at an early stage if the Polisario and Algeria are to remain constructively engaged.  A referendum is the traditional tool, but there may be other paths to self-determination – the Afghan loya jirga is one example.

The need for international guarantees

The Polisario has no trust in Moroccan intentions as evidenced most dramatically in Morocco’s 2003 rejection of the referendum foreseen in the mutually agreed UN/OAU settlement plan of 1991.  Early thought should be given to the issue of effective international guarantees for any agreement reached.

Timing remains key

The US has expressed hope for rapid progress, possibly leading to a framework agreement by mid-year and a final agreement by the end of October, when the Security Council is to take up the renewal of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara’s (MINURSO) mandate.  Given the issues to be resolved and the past 18 years of stalemate, this is very optimistic.  That said, Resolution 2797 asks the Secretary-General to provide a strategic review regarding MINURSO’s future mandate, “taking into account the outcome of the negotiations,” by the end of April, suggesting that the possible removal of MINURSO is a potential element of pressure on the parties.   In the absence of progress, the removal of MINURSO, whose role in preventing the escalation of hostilities and providing the members of the Security Council and the UN Secretariat with the only independent information about developments on the ground, would be irresponsible. 

Success of any agreement will depend on a timetable acceptable to all

The US, with the Personal Envoy in support, is making an intensive effort to push the parties to this fifty-year-old conflict toward an agreement.  After a hiatus of eight years in the search for a solution, this is a step forward.  But it is a fragile step because the obstacles are daunting, not least because the Security Council has chosen to favor the proposal of one party and the US, having recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, is no longer seen as an honest broker. 

The contradiction between an agreement on self-government negotiated behind closed doors and the free exercise of a people’s right to self-determination is perhaps too great to overcome. When all is said and done, the success of any agreement hinges on the difficult task of finding a form or timetable of self-determination that will satisfy the Polisario and Algeria and that Morocco will accept.  This will require imagination, since neither inducements nor pressure will bring Algeria to accept settlement terms that the Polisario opposes.  The reasons for this are many and beyond the scope of this article.  The fact remains that, absent agreement between Morocco and the Polisario on both the content of self-government and the issue of self-determination, the stalemate will return. 

Christopher Ross spent over 20 years as a US ambassador and diplomat working in or on North Africa, serving successively in Tripoli, Fez, and Algiers for the United States State Department. He served as US Ambassador to Algeria and Syria and was Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General for Western Sahara between 2009-2017.