As the United States seeks the endorsement of the United Nations Security Council for the Trump administration’s 20-point plan for Gaza, the failure of stabilization endeavors in such countries as Afghanistan, Iraq and the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be a cautionary reminder of the hazards of international intervention.

An alternative draft text, introduced by Russia on November 13, presents an abbreviated version of the peace plan for Gaza, focusing mostly on the international stabilization force being proposed for the postwar setting and dropping a reference to the Trump-led Board of Peace in the US draft text. It is unclear if Russia’s resolution will be put to a vote, while the American one is scheduled for a vote on Monday, November 17.

I was involved in several UN-led stabilization interventions with what was then the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, and is now the Department of Peace Operations, and later with Kofi Annan at his foundation, after he retired as UN secretary-general. From these experiences I distilled some empirical lessons about stabilization and why it worked or often did not.  These are the ones that I consider the most critical:

First and foremost, the population must be on board; stabilization cannot be imposed. Armed force alone is not enough. As the French revolutionary Maximilian Robespierre declared, “No one loves armed missionaries.”

Outside parties must acquire legitimacy for their interventions. A UN mandate helps. However, local legitimacy is crucial not only with political leaders and armed groups but also with the diverse ethnic, religious and communal groups that make up society. The latter requires a well-informed understanding of the political and social dynamics of society, including its political economy. A failure to grasp those realities explains why stabilization often goes astray.

A second, equally important caution about stabilization is that it must be built on a solid peace agreement. Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire, but they have not signed off on a deal. Without a solid political settlement, an outside stabilization force will be only a temporary palliative. As time goes by and a political deal proves elusive, the force itself risks being used by one side or the other to push their respective agendas. In turn, the countries providing the troops for the force will gradually lose confidence in the process, especially if their contingents suffer casualties.

The third lesson is we should not confuse stability with stabilization, which is a process that leads, if successful, to stability. In the early days, that process should focus on stopping the bloodshed but also on gaining local credibility by tackling the immediate needs of the population — securing a steady flow of food, jobs and income (labor-intensive public works, which Gaza desperately needs, can help to do that) and civilian protection.

This does not mean that donors should “flood the zone,” as they say, with aid that is not accountable. That will lead to abuses, such as in Afghanistan, which, perversely, undermined the legitimacy of the post-Taliban government. Instead of numerous quick-impact projects, or QIPS, donors should favor social-impact projects, or SIPS, that deliver aid to the population and not financial rewards to warlords, gangsters and corrupt politicians.

National partners over foreigners

To ensure continuity and local ownership, the stabilization process should be led by national partners rather than foreign or UN envoys. Guardrails should be installed, nevertheless, to prevent the transitional authorities from using their office to build patronage networks (especially in the security services) that favor them in future elections or referendums.

The 2003 Liberia peace agreement included an innovation to mitigate this risk. Members of the transitional government, which was made up of nominees from the various groups and factions that fought in the civil war, could not become candidates in the national elections that ended the transition. This formula succeeded, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf subsequently won a generally free-and-fair election as president. She was one of many women who were instrumental in restoring peace and stability in Liberia and in Sierra Leone. Women should also have that opportunity in Gaza with mandated participation in the transition negotiations.

 For Gaza, however, the 20-point plan envisages the creation of an international transitional body, a “Board of Peace,” chaired by President Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. While the board may accelerate the deployment of a stabilization force and release resources for reconstruction, the international presence should not be used to shield national leaders from their own responsibility to confront and address the underlying tensions and antagonisms that led to conflict.

Pivotal but tricky

 Another key lesson that I took away from my experiences with stabilization programs was the pivotal importance of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) of armed groups. But DDR is not just about handing over (or buying back) weapons; it should disband the military-command structures of insurgent groups. This is why we insisted that commanders should be the first to disarm and do so publicly. Failure to dismantle the chain of command increases the risk of remobilization.

DDR will likely be among the most difficult issues to manage in Gaza. Short of forcefully disarming armed groups, which troop-contributing countries are usually reluctant to authorize, disarmament can be a lengthy, frustrating process that often fails, especially if there is no trust between the parties to the conflict. That is obviously the case right now in Gaza. All of the DDR initiatives in which I was involved required several attempts before they succeeded, and even then, there were doubts that all the weapons had been given up.

Absorbing unvetted ex-combatants into the security forces (as was done in the Congo) is not advisable; it would likely perpetuate the status quo under the guise of state authority. However, it’s an illusion to believe that Hamas will simply disappear. It will try to continue as a political player. But it remains to be seen if it can retain its political authority without the power of the gun.

Amnesty may offer an incentive for Hamas to disarm. At the UN, however, we could not offer blanket amnesties as an inducement to cooperation. The Trump plan, however, does allow amnesty, which may encourage Hamas and other armed groups in Gaza to respond to the peace overtures. But amnesty will not solve the deeper dysfunctions in society that drive violence and, as we have witnessed time and again, impunity corrodes the rule of law.

Think Beckett

My final observation concerns stabilization and leadership. Gaza is not a state, but the governance of any society must be decided by its own citizens and leaders. The quality of leadership is critical. Where it is open-minded, honest and pragmatic, the chance of success is much greater. Leaders who come to power through force may initially present a better prospect for stability because of their control of security. However, the stability that follows may prove ephemeral or a prelude to further conflict as leaders consolidate power through autocratic means.

While I stress the importance of effective national leadership in the stability equation, the influence of outside players cannot be discounted. In the post-conflict operations in which I participated, there were always outside state actors that could disrupt or even derail the peace process.

Spoilers — external as well as domestic — have to be constrained, preferably by diplomacy, but if not, by meaningful sanctions (as was the case with Charles Taylor during the Sierra Leone civil war). Therefore, it’s essential to keep the international community engaged in the stabilization process. Practically, however, managing the daily demands of a post-conflict transition is not feasible with many external actors, each with an individual agenda.

Harmonizing those agendas through an agreed framework for stabilization will be a critical task for the proposed Peace Board. As Mats Berdal, a professor specializing in security and development, has pointed out in his trenchant critique of stabilization in Afghanistan, “NATO never functioned as an effective coalition of allies bound together by a common strategic vision and clarity of objectives.”

Stabilization is not a panacea for peace. We know that countries and societies afflicted by violent conflict are vulnerable to the return of brutality, called the “conflict trap.” Typically, UN-sponsored peace agreements have stipulated the creation of truth and reconciliation commissions and support for national human rights organizations to bind up the wounds of war.

The impact of such initiatives has been mixed, however. Truth and reconciliation have not always proved to be compatible partners. Nevertheless, as I have written in an earlier essay, Israelis and Palestinians must find some form of mutual catharsis that can help them overcome their traumatic past.

The Trump plan states that “An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mind-sets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace.”

That dialogue will have to be carefully framed and impartially led to ensure that it does not end in recriminations.

Perhaps the words of Samuel Beckett frame the challenges of stabilization best for Gaza: “Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try again. Fail again. Fail better.” In Gaza, however, failure cannot be an option: people on both sides of the border have suffered too much because of past failures. “Succeed better” would be the better option.

Alan Doss was the Secretary General’s Special Representative and Head of UN peacekeeping missions in Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. He was the former President of the Kofi Annan Foundation and is currently chair of the Oxford Global Society. This article originally appeared in PassBlue.