The takeover of the eastern governorates of Yemen — Hadramout and Al Mahra — by the Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces represents a major turning point in the Yemeni conflict and marks the beginning of a new phase. It can be considered the most significant development in the history of the Yemeni conflict since the fall of Sana’a on September 21, 2014 and the intervention of the Saudi-led Coalition on March 26, 2015.
The significance of this development lies in two key issues. First, it has fundamentally altered the balance of power within the anti-Houthi camp, which is formally represented by the internationally recognized government. This camp has long been divided between two regional allies: Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Relations between the two countries have experienced repeated tensions, most notably during the clashes in the interim capital, Aden, in August 2019. These clashes resulted in the UAE-backed STC gaining control of Aden and eventually led to the Riyadh Agreement. However, the relationship has remained fragile, governed by an implicit power-sharing arrangement: UAE-backed forces dominate coastal areas and islands and maintain strong influence in Aden, while Saudi-backed forces control land borders and oil facilities. With the STC’s recent expansion, the regional balance has shifted in favor of the UAE, a change that may transform this tense partnership into open rivalry and reshape regional alliances. In this context, the UAE appears increasingly isolated in Yemen, while Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Oman have moved closer to the Saudi position.
Balance of power and internal divisions within Yemen likely to deepen
Second, this development is likely to reshape and deepen the internal divisions within Yemen. The STC claims to be the sole political representative of the Southern cause, which emerged in 2006 following the outcomes of the 1994 civil war that consolidated Northern dominance and marginalized the South. Formed in 2017 with UAE support, the STC has mobilized popular sentiment in southern regions. By capturing the eastern governorates, the STC now controls the entirety of the former South Yemeni state prior to unification with the North in 1990. For years, the STC has called for a return to a two-state solution in Yemen, a demand rejected by several Yemeni political actors, including the Al-Islah Party, as well as by Saudi Arabia, which viewed such calls as a distraction from what it considered the primary objective: confronting the Houthis.
As a result, this development has brought the Southern issue to the forefront, sidelining the conflict with the Houthis and deepening divisions within the anti-Houthi camp. However, the likelihood of maintaining a unified southern entity remains low due to deep-rooted historical divisions, intense regional competition over control of the South, the STC’s dominance by a single southern governorate (Al-Dhale), and its weak record in governance and political compromise.
“Road Map” political process has effectively collapsed
One of the most immediate consequences of these events is the effective collapse of the political process known as the “Road Map.” Following the truce announced between the coalition and the Houthis in April 2022, Saudi Arabia and the Houthis entered into negotiations hosted by Oman. These talks excluded other Yemeni parties, as well as the UAE, and culminated in the UN Special Envoy’s announcement in January 2023 that an agreement, referred to as the Road Map, was close. Although details of the agreement were leaked, no official document was published.
The STC was the most vocal critic of this process, not only because it was excluded, but also because one leaked provision reportedly allowed the Houthis to share revenues from exported oil and gas, most of which are located in southern governorates. In response, the STC promoted the narrative that southern wealth belongs exclusively to the South.
The Houthis’ involvement in the Gaza war effectively halted the Road Map process, as the United States opposed any agreement that could be perceived as rewarding the Houthis amid their threats to global maritime security. After the Gaza ceasefire, negotiations resumed in an attempt to adapt the agreement to new realities, including the designation of the Houthis as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), which rendered certain provisions unworkable.
While negotiations intensified in Oman over the past two months, the situation in Hadramout deteriorated rapidly, and the governorate fell to STC forces with little resistance. This shift has redirected the attention of Saudi Arabia and Oman toward southern Yemen. From Oman’s perspective, the expansion of UAE-backed, Salafi-dominated forces poses a serious national security concern due to longstanding tensions with the UAE and ideological apprehensions regarding Salafism. For Saudi Arabia, the STC now controls approximately 800 kilometers of its 1,200-kilometer border with Yemen, and Hadramout holds deep historical and social ties to the Kingdom, which views the region as integral to its national security.
Ultimately, the Road Map was designed to address a specific political configuration in Yemen, one in which the internationally recognized government represented the entirety of the anti-Houthi camp, despite internal divisions. That framework has now effectively collapsed, as northern ministers and members of the Presidential Leadership Council have departed Aden.
In conclusion, the developments in Yemen’s eastern governorates have added a new layer of complexity to an already multifaceted conflict. They have introduced new dynamics that are likely to reshape alliances and alter the future trajectory of both war and peace in Yemen.
Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen is a senior researcher at Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies. Her writing and analyses have been featured in many media outlets such as Jadaliyya, Assafir al Araby, al Araby al Jadeed, Carnegie, Foreign Policy, Arab Reform Initiative, and Al-Monitor. Shuja Al-deen holds a master’s degree in Islamic Studies from the American University in Cairo, and her thesis focuses on Zaydism
