The massive state funeral of the assassinated leader Ayatollah Khamenei that has unfolded across Iran, albeit four months after his death, seemed to be a symbol that the ceasefire was holding but with renewed strikes from the United States and Iran its clear that deal signed on June 17 is now crumbling. However, the event that has drawn dignitaries from over 100 countries, illustrates something more significant: a global diplomatic shift in which countries from the Global South are no longer following the step of the West. Leaders from Gulf States – Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman – affected by the US and Israel’s war on Iran attended, along with dignitaries from Russia, China, India and other countries from Africa and the Global South, while United States and members of the European Union were notably absent. Could this be a symbol of a shifting global order in the midst of ongoing disorder?
A Memorandum of Understanding, signed between US President Donald J. Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on June 17, was supposed to end the active military phase of the conflict. But the framework that was agreed upon had flaws, leading to each side interpreting its provisions differently. The two sides spent two days in Geneva discussing issues related to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz and the unfreezing of Iranian assets, with the next rounds expected to resume after Khamenei’s burial. However, this process is now in jeopardy. What unfolded could be best described as “conflict management,” but clearly it has failed to address the root causes of the war. Some provisions related to the Strait of Hormuz in particular were vague and gave rise to different interpretations.
The end result is a precarious “ceasefire” that could continue with periodic outbursts of violence, and therefore it is a shaky foundation for any genuine peace settlement. The “ceasefire” was initially a welcome respite for Iran after months of Israeli and US bombardment, along with the wider region that has been shaken by instability. This pattern of bursts of relative calm and deadly violence could become the new normal for many months to come.
Meanwhile in Lebanon, a ceasefire was signed following talks in Washington between representatives of the Israeli and Lebanese governments. The deal has reduced the frequency of the Israeli onslaught on Lebanon, but it is deeply flawed and will not resolve any of the underlying drivers of conflict. The agreement takes a minimalist “cessation of hostilities” approach with no binding timelines for Israeli withdrawal. Many are concerned that the deal may reignite existing divisions in Lebanon and only worsen the current governance crisis.
Over in Yemen, the first week of July was marked by a dangerous escalation between the Saudis and the Houthis, with Saudi Arabia threatening to respond with “unprecedented determination and force” after the Houthis blocked Saudi airplanes from intercepting an Iranian international aircraft that landed in Sanaa airport. In response Houthis are threatening “a comprehensive response” targeting Saudi airports and vital interests in Saudi Arabia. This reflects how the wider US-Iran war and its ceasefire are being refracted through Yemen’s unresolved political crises. The Houthis are using the ceasefire to consolidate their de facto rule over the north, while the so-called internationally recognized government is watching its legitimacy erode.
The United Nations’ approach to Yemen remains anchored in Security Council resolution 2216 which asked for the Houthis to surrender to a government based in Riyad rather than compromise. This resolution doesn’t reflect the political realities inside the country. Yemen’s conflict requires a new Security Council framework and a regional security arrangement that addresses both Saudi and Houthi concerns. What’s more is that it needs a Yemeni-led political dialogue, that is impartially facilitated and includes the full range of civil society actors, rather than negotiations limited to the warlords and armed factions that dominate politics in Yemen.
Sudan has now entered the fourth year of a conflict that has produced one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes since World War II. With more than 150,000 dead, 15 million displaced, and 24 million facing food insecurity, Sudan is a neglected tragedy. The mediation architecture remains totally fragmented between IGAD, the African Union, the Jeddah Track and a competing Gulf Initiative, with no coordinating framework to unite these disparate efforts. What is striking about Sudan, is not just the failure of diplomacy but the exclusions of actors most likely to produce a durable settlement – such as resistance committees, women’s groups and professional associations. The ones who hold the deepest legitimacy inside the country continue to be excluded by the armed factions and their international backers. The challenge is to consolidate the competing tracks and to formally include these other actors in any diplomatic efforts not as observers but as principal actors.
Meanwhile, in Europe, the G7 has attempted to elevate the conflict between Russia and Ukraine to the top of the agenda, after being sidelined by the crisis in Iran. But the prospects of progress in diplomatic efforts remain very distant with the absence of a clear political process and an impartial and trusted mediator. In this context the path through this impasse requires separate but mutually reinforcing tracks (prisoner exchanges, verifiable ceasefire along current contact lines without prejudice to final status, security assurance architecture for Ukraine and a provide for Ukraine’s security needs without requiring membership to NATO).
Across these five conflicts there is a pattern of precarious and temporary arrangements rather than principled diplomacy. Ceasefires have replaced political settlements and Memorandum of Understandings have merely deferred questions that cannot be answered.
The UN remains a bystander in all of these conflicts. Never in its 80 year history has the UN been so absent and ineffective in addressing the major conflicts of the time. The question that now confronts policy makers and mediators is how to forge a new way forward to more sincere and inclusive diplomatic negotiations that have a chance of moving towards lasting settlements and perhaps even peace?
In this edition of Diplomacy Now we have five articles from scholars, journalists and former diplomats on the new diplomatic dynamics between the US and Iran, the potential for a new peace and security framework in the Gulf, and an article on the changing world order that an incoming Secretary General and the UN will have to confront. The edition concludes with an article focused on the direction Libya could take after fifteen years of UN failure in the region and a deep dive into the recent US-led “negotiations” on Western Sahara.
As with every edition the views expressed by contributors are not all necessarily our own. However, ICDI remains committed to the ethos and philosophy that open debate, dialogue, diplomacy, and mediation, rather than armed conflict and war, offer the way forward to resolving any conflict.
Thank you for reading Diplomacy Now and we welcome your feedback at diplomacynow@dialogueinitiatives.org.
Jamal Benomar
Chair of ICDI
Sahar Razavi explores the long-term damage done to the diplomatic relationship between the United States and Iran that has only further augmented the possibility of violence in the future.
“The current war appears to have altered strategic calculations in ways few analysts anticipated,” Razavi writes.
“Prior to the war, many observers and pundits expected that Iran would avoid directly engaging militarily with the United States and Israel even at the cost of losing some deterrence capability. Instead, Iran seems to have taken strategic lessons about its battlefield capabilities and the power of the United States that have altered its decision-making toward a more assertive approach to deterrence and less willingness to make concessions during diplomatic engagement,” she adds
Security analyst Jamal al Tahat explores the possible options of security alliances and cooperations between Gulf States in the face of the US’s war against Iran. He focuses in particular on a possible alliance between (Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan).
“One practical option is to replace reliance on Washington for security with an alliance of four pivotal regional powers — Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and Pakistan (STEP) — to form a joint political-military umbrella undergirding regional stability,” al Tahat writes.
“This framework could deter both Iran and Israel from pursuing escalation while providing security coverage for Gulf states and key maritime corridors. Comparable to structures like the European Union, a strong regional security and governance architecture can discourage escalation by shifting belligerents’ calculations through the threat of collective action, effectively balancing the region’s security dynamics into equilibrium,” he suggests.
Former UN senior diplomat and human rights scholar Bertrand Ramcharan writes about the changing geopolitical and moral landscape the incoming Secretary-General will face.
“The UN strategist of the future will need to think of ways of enhancing cooperation and reducing friction among nations. That is the essence of the idea of international cooperation in the UN Charter. It is the UN way. And the UN way is that of the Charter. It is the fountainhead of contemporary international law. Everyone must be held accountable to it. Without it, humanity will be lost,” Ramcharan writes.
Libyan journalist and scholar Mustafa Fetouri writes about the UN’s missteps in Libya and which approach ought to be pursued to reunify the divided country.
“Until the international community stops managing the division and starts enforcing structural unification, Libya will remain a fractured nation whole only on paper, held hostage by foreign capitals and domestic elites clinging to power,” Fetouri argues.
“The issue of national reconciliation remains the foundational prerequisite and ultimate sticking point in all UNSMIL efforts so far. The most viable alternative to break this deadlock is a truly Libyan-led process with minimal, supportive intervention from Libya’s immediate neighbors, structurally anchored by the African Union (AU),” he writes
Former UN diplomat Anna Theofilopoulou offers another deep dive into the most recent developments surrounding Western Sahara, and US-led “negotiations” after the adoption of UNSCR 2797 last year.
“After the resolution’s adoption, the all-purpose negotiators of President Donald Trump, Steve Wittkoff and Jared Kushner announced that within 60 days the problems between Algeria and Morocco which had ended diplomatic relations in 2021 would be resumed. So far, this has proved a very optimistic prediction,” Theofilopoulou writes.
“The only certainty at this point is that the conflict is nowhere near “a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara” as the US and others would like to believe,” she concludes
Nelson Mandela
