Wars do more than alter the balance of military power; they also reshape how states perceive the risks and rewards of future confrontation. The strategic significance of the United States-Israeli attack on Iran may therefore extend well beyond its immediate military outcomes. Three developments suggest such a shift: Iran’s broader willingness to retaliate directly, growing constraints on American force projection, and a widening gap between how Tehran and Washington assess their respective strategic positions.
A broader Iranian deterrence doctrine
Prior to the 12-Day War in June 2025, during which the US and Israel launched surprise military strikes on Iran in the midst of diplomatic negotiations, Tehran’s deterrence doctrine primarily followed an approach of restrained retaliation. Iran believed it was necessary to respond to attacks – including the US assassination of Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani in January 2020 and Israel’s strike on the Iranian consular compound in Damascus in April 2024 – in order to restore deterrence and signal to domestic and regional audiences that such actions would not go unanswered. Yet Iranian leaders typically telegraphed retaliatory strikes in advance, allowing the United States to move personnel and assets in an effort to minimize casualties and avoid uncontrolled escalation. Direct state-to-state confrontation remained limited, with Iran relying primarily on allied regional non-state actors to manage escalation.
In the months leading up to the 12-Day War, that doctrine began to shift. Warnings before retaliatory strikes became less consistent, and less than two weeks after the attack on its consular compound, Iran launched hundreds of drones and missiles toward Israel, breaking with its earlier pattern of restraint. As Israel and Iran exchanged strikes over the following months, Tehran’s approach became more assertive. Having been attacked while negotiations were reportedly making significant progress, Iranian leaders concluded that restraint and diplomacy were being exploited to facilitate military strikes and assassinations, in violation of both diplomatic norms and international law.
Following the US-Israeli attacks beginning on February 28, 2026, Iran’s deterrence doctrine hardened further. The strikes killed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, dozens of senior political and military officials, and Iranian civilians, including 168 schoolchildren, teachers, and parents at a primary school in Minab. Washington’s expectation, following a series of meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s team, was that the Iranian government was weak and on the brink of collapse. Because the strikes again occurred during active negotiations, they reinforced Tehran’s belief that engagement with the United States was not merely futile but dangerous. Some even accused the United States of using diplomatic engagement as a ruse to provide cover for the attacks. As the conflict escalated, Iranian responses became increasingly robust. Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters spokesman Ibrahim Zolfaqari declared that Iran would abandon its previous restraint and continue retaliating until its adversaries “regretted” their actions. Iranian messaging also increasingly framed attacks on members of the “Axis of Resistance” as attacks on Iran itself, culminating in a retaliatory strike against Israel following an operation in Lebanon in June 2026.
The war appears to have accelerated Iran’s shift toward a more assertive deterrence doctrine. Whereas earlier retaliatory strikes were largely symbolic demonstrations intended to restore deterrence while limiting escalation, recent operations have sought to impose material costs despite the attendant risks. If this shift endures, the United States and Israel face a qualitatively different deterrence environment than in previous years.
Force projection vs. escalation dominance
The US-Israeli war with Iran has exposed several constraints on American military power, particularly the depletion of interceptor stocks and the vulnerability of regional bases and assets. Interceptor missiles are expensive and time-consuming to manufacture, whereas drones are relatively inexpensive and can be produced quickly. This asymmetry is especially pronounced in Iran’s case because decades of sanctions have forced its defense industries to become increasingly self-sufficient, reducing both production costs and dependence on foreign supply chains. As the US expended multiple multi-million-dollar interceptor missiles to destroy Shahed drones costing only a fraction as much, the long-term sustainability of this approach came into question.
These constraints became more apparent as Iran damaged or destroyed radar systems at US bases across the region. Iran’s ability not only to launch large-scale drone and missile attacks but also to degrade the defensive capacity of the United States and Israel marks an important departure from earlier phases of the conflict. The implications extend beyond the battlefield. Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have long accepted reduced strategic autonomy in exchange for US security guarantees and economic partnership. The current war has strained both pillars of that relationship. By exposing vulnerabilities in the American security umbrella while disrupting regional economic stability, the conflict has raised difficult questions about the durability of the bargain on which GCC security and prosperity have rested for decades.
The consequences may extend well beyond the present conflict. Other adversaries of the United States or its allies may conclude that this is an opportune moment to test American resolve through military, cyber, or covert operations. Regionally, perceptions of a weakened deterrent could intensify the security dilemma, encouraging states to pursue more advanced military capabilities, including potentially nuclear weapons. The inability of the United States to compel Iran to allow unimpeded passage through the Strait of Hormuz or to accept unconditional surrender suggests that limitations on force projection can also erode escalation dominance. If so, the strategic consequences could prove more significant than the immediate military outcomes of the war. For Tehran, these developments reinforce the belief that the costs of direct confrontation with the United States and Israel, while significant, are no longer prohibitive.
A growing gap in strategic perception
Discussions of geopolitics often emphasize military capabilities and alliances, but strategic stability depends equally on how states perceive the balance of power. Decisions are made on the basis of perceived risks, opportunities, and the expected costs of confrontation. Iran appears to believe it occupies a strong strategic position for two principal reasons. First, since the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, Iran has prepared for a prolonged war of attrition with the United States. Second, Iran’s leadership believes it can outlast the political will of the United States to sustain such a conflict. This preparation has included the development of regional partner networks, underground “missile cities,” intelligence-sharing arrangements, extensive contingency plans for leadership decapitation and military decentralization, and closer economic and security ties with major powers. Tehran also recognizes the leverage it possesses vis-a-vis the Strait of Hormuz. In the past, concerns about provoking war discouraged Iran from exercising that leverage; once war had begun, however, the strategic calculus shifted, increasing the perceived benefits of doing so.
As the economic consequences of the conflict become more politically costly for US President Donald J Trump – particularly ahead of the midterm elections – and as American alliances come under increasing strain, Tehran’s confidence in its own position appears to be growing. That confidence is reflected in Iran’s willingness to retaliate against Israel and the US even after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on June 17, 2026. Washington, by contrast, continues to issue statements suggesting that victory is within reach or that a negotiated settlement is imminent. The divergence between how the US assesses Iran’s strategic position and how Iran assesses its own has become a significant obstacle to ending the conflict.
Perhaps more importantly, this divergence has hardened Tehran’s approach to diplomacy. Iranian leaders believe they have already endured decades of sanctions, covert operations, political assassinations, and now full-scale war without political collapse. Whether or not that assessment is objectively correct, it appears to have increased Iran’s willingness to accept prolonged confrontation. The deeper penetration of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps into Iran’s political leadership since the outbreak of the war has reinforced this shift. The widening gap between Washington’s and Tehran’s respective understandings of the strategic balance points toward a more assertive Iranian foreign policy and a persistent American underestimation of the incentives shaping Iranian decision-making. Such mismatched perceptions can make crises considerably more dangerous than the underlying material balance of power alone would suggest.
A new strategic landscape
The current war appears to have altered strategic calculations in ways few analysts anticipated. Prior to the war, many observers and pundits expected that Iran would avoid directly engaging militarily with the United States and Israel even at the cost of losing some deterrence capacity. Instead, Iran seems to have taken strategic lessons about its battlefield capabilities and the power of the United States that have altered its decision-making toward a more assertive approach to deterrence and less willingness to make concessions during diplomatic interactions. Whether Tehran’s assessments are ultimately correct is less important than how its perceptions of risks and rewards impact its decisions. The United States has consistently underestimated Iran’s willingness to sustain a prolonged armed conflict, a trajectory which, if sustained, increases the risk of repeated miscalculation leading to a deepening of war damages.
At the same time, as shared expectations about the costs and limits of confrontation diverge, crises like the current war become more difficult to contain. Likewise, arms races and other downstream consequences become more likely as the security environment shifts to one in which protection from the United States cannot be assumed by US allies and all parties perceive themselves to be more capable of absorbing costs and assuming risks than before. The strategic landscape is volatile and will likely continue to deteriorate as long as perceptions of strength remain divergent and constraints on US force projection persist and deepen.
Sahar Razavi, PhD, is Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Director, Iranian and Middle Eastern Studies Center California State University, Sacramento.
