In October 2025, the Security Council held consultations to discuss the latest report by the Secretary-General on Western Sahara. The United States, which under the first Trump Administration had unilaterally recognized Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in December 2020, as main drafter (penholder) for the resolution, led the Council in adopting resolution 2797 on Western Sahara to achieve a timely conclusion of the 50-year-old dispute to the satisfaction of all concerned while also providing for the self-determination of the inhabitants of the Territory.
The substance of the latest resolution and responses to it
The first visible improvement of resolution 2797 is its two-page length. However, the substance of 2797 remains the same as that of resolution 1754, drafted in 2007 and endorsing the Moroccan autonomy proposal. For example, paragraph 3 of resolution 2797 asks the parties to negotiate to reach a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. Since the adoption of resolution 1754 in 2007, this request has been an inherent contradiction within the resolution, asking the parties to negotiate in order to arrive at a solution based on the concept of self-determination. For the past 18 years, this request has proved an impossibility. In meeting after meeting, the parties agreed only to meet again and again.
In addition, in operative paragraph 3, 2797 calls for discussions without preconditions taking as the basis Morocco’s Autonomy proposal. Isn’t that a precondition? Both operative paragraphs 2 and 3 ask that Morocco’s Autonomy proposal serve as basis for the discussions, thus creating a priori their own precondition about what will be discussed.
Endorsement with caveats, abstentions and concerns
Resolution 2797 was adopted by 11 of the 15 Security Council members who voted for it. Denmark and Slovenia – two of the members who voted in favor of the resolution – explained after the vote that their support of the resolution did not imply recognition of Morocco’s sovereignty over the Territory. Algeria refused to participate in the vote. Pakistan, Russia and China abstained, with all three expressing unease about the directions of the efforts to resolve the conflict, reiterating principles enshrined in the UN Charter that should be respected. Russia and China expressed their deep concern about the current direction of the Western Sahara efforts under the aegis of the US. Russia was blunter than China, calling the resolution unbalanced, with the process taking a fundamental departure from established practice by the Security Council to deal with the conflict. Russia expressed hope that the new approach would not backfire and reignite a conflict that has been smoldering for several decades.
By contrast, resolution 1495 of July 2003, unanimously supported the Peace Plan for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, prepared by then Personal Envoy James Baker after consultations with both sides and concerned states within and outside the Security Council. The resolution called upon the parties to work with the UN and each other toward its acceptance and implementation. This unanimous support demonstrated clearly that the Security Council, when motivated to make a consensual decision, takes decisive action that brings positive results. After the adoption of resolution 1495, even China, a Council member not easily given to pro-forma after vote statements, praised the consensus and cooperation of members and the parties themselves while expressing hope that the parties concerned would continue to act in the spirit of pragmatism.
Nevertheless, resolution 2797 was enthusiastically endorsed by Morocco, with some members of the Council and even the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, Staffan de Mistura, claiming it was a breakthrough in the 35 years since the Security Council took up the conflict. The selective mood of celebration and self-congratulation by Morocco and its supporters within the Council and outside, ignored the tortured, vague language of the resolution employed by the US which sought to avoid the possibility of a veto by Russia or China. It was reported that the US chose to abandon its original language that would have imposed Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the exclusive basis for negotiation, which could have offended even more members of the Council.
Unbridled optimism from the United States
After the resolution’s adoption, the all-purpose negotiators of President Donald Trump, Steve Wittkoff and Jared Kushner announced that within 60 days the problems between Algeria and Morocco which had ended diplomatic relations in 2021 would be resumed. So far, this has proved a very optimistic prediction.
For its part, on November 17, 2025, the Polisario issued a four and half page Memorandum which stated that the new resolution simply reaffirmed all previous Security Council resolutions on Western Sahara where the Council had reiterated its commitment to assist the parties achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution which guarantees the self-determination of the people of Western Sagara. And after an exhaustive review of the resolution which identified many imperfections, the Polisario concluded that the question of Western Sahara could not be resolved without the free exercise by the Saharawi people of their inalienable right to self-determination. According to Polisario’s reasoning, the Security Council itself made it clear that any just, legal, and realistic political solution must guarantee the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara as the only viable path to achieving a just and lasting peace in the region. In following statements the Polisario continues to assert this view.
Algeria, despite initial optimistic statements about the resolution, soon started reiterating its view that the conflict over Western Sahara is one of decolonization which should not be viewed as a bilateral dispute. Algeria promised to support the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to help the parties resume negotiations in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions and the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. Algeria expressed hope that one day the Council would be able to adopt a resolution that fully respects the principles upon which the United Nations was founded – truth, justice, and respect for the self-determination of peoples.
And with each passing week, Algeria steadily hardened its rhetoric and returned unequivocally to its adherence to self-determination as the inescapable way to resolve the conflict. In a meeting with the UN Personal Envoy, Foreign Minister Attaf reaffirmed Algeria’s support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy underlining the importance of negotiations without preconditions.
A long and complex history
The conflict over the non-self-governing territory of Western Sahara has been in the agenda of the Security Council since 1991, when the Council agreed to the proposal of the Secretary-General to assume responsibility for the resolution of the conflict which started in 1975 when Morocco invaded and annexed the Territory after the withdrawal of then colonial power Spain. The Polisario Front, a liberation movement consisting of Sahrawis born and raised in the territory itself or in surrounding states, (given the porous border and the nomadic nature of the Saharawi society), was established in May 1973 to fight the Spanish. When Morocco invaded and annexed the territory in 1975, Polisario started fighting the Moroccan army. A war between Morocco and Polisario ensued which stopped in September 1991 when the UN devised a Settlement Plan which would eventually lead to a referendum of self-determination where native Sahrawis would vote in a referendum of self-determination to decide their future. A cease-fire between Morocco and Polisario was the first requirement of the UN plan and came into effect on September 6, 1991.
Conceptual and structural problems of the UN plan and inability by the Security Council to convince the parties to cooperate with the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) led to continuous long-term delays in its implementation, ending up in frequent deadlocks. This has resulted in the conflict continuing to be unresolved 35 years after the beginning of UN involvement.
A comprehensive account of the UN efforts and the cooperation or impediment of the efforts by the parties, often supported by other states, can be found in a previous article published in Diplomacy Now in September 2025. The article questioned whether the capitulation by the Security Council to Morocco’s demands that the conflict be resolved in its favor, based on its 2007 offer of autonomy for Western Sahara, would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution of the conflict (ostensibly desired by all), when the other side has a completely different view of the matter. The Polisario and Algeria, a neighboring state identified as such in the 1991 Settlement Plan and expected to assist in the search for solution of the conflict, remain steadfast in their demands that the final decision on the status of Western Sahara be made by the people of Western Sahara through an act of self-determination. The article concluded that unilateral recognition of an illegal act, namely Morocco’s annexation of Western Sahara, would never solve a conflict nor would it gain legitimacy and recognition by the international community. The impasse would continue indefinitely with occasional spurts of conflict and consultations where the participants talk past each other.
The fine print: Moroccan rule over Western Sahara?
In early February 2026 the US announced that on February 8 and 9 the first negotiations would be held between the parties and neighboring states in its embassy in Madrid. This was followed by a second meeting on February 23 and 24 in Washington DC. Despite the resolution welcoming other constructive suggestions and ideas to support a mutually acceptable political solution, the US made it clear from the start that only the forty-page enlarged Moroccan autonomy proposal of April 2007 would be discussed. The meetings, which the US aimed at arriving at some kind of framework agreement in the spring of 2026, were co-chaired by the US and the UN. Michael Waltz, US ambassador to the UN and Massad Boulos, a senior Trump adviser for African and Arab affairs represented the US, while Staffan De Mistura, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Western Sahara since 2021, represented the UN.
The Moroccan paper consisting of nine chapters containing 42 clauses was confidential, although soon many key details were leaked. It was drafted by three royal advisors, and it described in some detail the kind of autonomy the Moroccan government was prepared to offer, at the conclusion of the process. Morocco’s main concern appeared to be keeping a political balance between an autonomous Western Sahara and other regions in the kingdom based on the already existing decentralization framework enshrined in the 2011 Constitution of Morocco. The plan envisaged an autonomous region with its government, parliament and justice systems with the Moroccan central government retaining all sovereign rights such as national defence, foreign policy, currency, nationality and sovereignty symbols, such as the flag.
However, there was a catch – the head of the local government would be appointed by the King and not elected, and the local authorities and the judicial system would render decisions in the name of the King. Avoidance of asymmetries with other Moroccan regions was one of the main preoccupations by the drafters and this included profit-sharing from the considerable natural resources of Western Sahara, where only part of the income would be kept within Western Sahara with the rest to be negotiated with the Central government in Rabat. This included foreign investment which would be under the dual control of regional authorities and the central government.
As for the return of refugees, which the Moroccan plan calculated to about 165,000, it would be done on a volunteer basis upon verification of certain criteria set by Morocco only. What sounds like a complicated formula of ascertaining the right of return was mentioned with disarmament and renunciation of independence as key requirements. And finally, once the terms of autonomy are negotiated, there will be a referendum to be voted by all Moroccans, not just the inhabitants of Western Sahara given that in Morocco’s views, this would affect all Moroccans and not just the inhabitants of Western Sahara.
Morocco’s main preoccupation appears to be to avoid inciting any notion of secession in any other Moroccan region. The concept of autonomy that Morocco presented in these meetings was very disappointing and a non-starter for any meaningful negotiation with the Polisario.
The uncomfortable reality presents itself again
With anticipation about the next steps building, soon after the Madrid and Washington DC meetings, the Personal Envoy started his usual rounds of visiting various governments to discuss the next steps to arrange the consultations. He mentioned October 2026 as the possible time to bring the parties together.
While he was visiting the Polisario in the Tinduf camps, on May 5, 2026, the Polisario Front fired three projectiles into the city of Smara inside Western Sahara. The strikes injured at least one civilian woman and caused minor material damage, but they jolted everybody into the realities of Western Sahara. There has been only speculation as to the reasons why the Polisario decided to attack a civilian site at this time with some venturing that this would play into Morocco’s unproven narrative that the Polisario is a terrorist organization linked to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Then on May 20, 2026, the UN Committee against Torture announced its findings that Morocco violated the rights of Sahrawi detainees linked to the Gdeim Izik 2010 camp protest in Western Sahara, reporting that ten similar cases examined pointed to “a consistent pattern of arbitrary arrests, solitary confinement, acts of torture or ill-treatment during interrogations, and the subsequent use of confessions obtained under duress in judicial proceedings.”
On June 7, 2026, a Moroccan drone near the defensive berm reportedly eliminated senior Polisario Front military commander Lahbib Mohamed Abdelaziz, son of the group’s late leader, along with two other Polisario officials.
The unfinished decolonization of Western Sahara
No tinkering with incentives to one side or the other, or confidence building measures which have failed so far to overcome mutual suspicion, can expedite the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict as the drafters and sponsors of resolution 2797 imagine. The basic premise upon which the US and others based the resolution 2797 is incorrect. The conflict over Western Sahara is not one based on territorial or border disputes. It is rooted on an unfinished act of decolonization in the early 1970s when then colonial power Spain decided, for its own internal reasons, to interrupt the identification of Saharawi voters for a future referendum of self-determination in Western Sahara. In 1975 Spain turned over the Territory to Morocco and Mauritania informing the UN that it was no longer the administering power of the non-self- governing territory as required by international law. Morocco, fearful for its own internal stability and future of the kingdom, invaded and annexed the Territory asserting historical ties. However, the International Court of Justice concluded in October 1975 that these ties did not affect the decolonization of Western Sahara or the principle of self-determination.
When war started between Morocco and Polisario, after Mauritania pulled out, the UN persuaded both parties, including neighboring Algeria, to accept a Settlement Plan that would lead to a referendum of self-determination with choices between integration with Morocco or independence. The implementation of the plan contained many steps which, if completed, would eventually give both parties the opportunity to compete as equals.
A fair and honest referendum was put on the table
Morocco was given every opportunity by the drafters of the original UN Settlement Plan and during its implementation, as many admitted in private interviews, to win a fair and honest referendum. It was an open secret among then UN officials and some member states involved in the initial negotiations that by all calculations Morocco could win the referendum if it played its cards right and won the hearts and minds of the Sahrawis who opted to stay in the Territory after Morocco’s annexation. Instead, Morocco’s preferred strategy was to transfer populations from Morocco to Western Sahara demanding their participation in the planned referendum.
Alternatively, it was also hoped that both parties would eventually agree on a mutually acceptable and sustainable political solution rather than face the uncertainty of the referendum given that like Morocco, Polisario was equally nervous about the outcome, not trusting that MINURSO could accomplish its tasks without succumbing to Morocco’s heavy handiness in Western Sahara. In fact, in December 1995 during closed consultations of the Security Council to deal once again with a deadlock in the identification of potential voters, then Secretary-General Boutros Ghali admitted that while he wanted the identification to be completed, personally he did not think that the parties would go to the referendum but would seek to talk.
When the 2003 Baker Peace Plan offered a real chance to both parties to hold a referendum of self-determination, the results of which would be based on the two parties’ performance during a 5-year autonomy period, initially both parties started criticizing it publicly. However, the Algerian government under President Abdelaziz Bouteflika at the time, grasped immediately that the Peace Plan, if accepted by both parties and implemented correctly with real UN supervision during the 5-year autonomy period, offered Polisario the possibility of winning the referendum envisaged at the end of it. Algeria instructed Polisario to stop complaining and accept the Baker Peace Plan which Polisario did on July 6, 2003, to Morocco’s surprise.
Morocco turned to its allies within the second Bush administration and convinced them to weaken US support for the Baker Peace Plan on the spacious claim that moving forward with the Peace Plan, would be catastrophic for Morocco, North Africa and US strategic interests in the region, despite its having been unanimously supported by all members of Security Council after extensive and in-depth consultations. Clearly, the possibility that boycotting the implementation of the Peace Plan and reverting to the dubious search for a mutually acceptable political solution, could only result in reverting the conflict to its status quo ante, did not even enter the calculations of those who still pride themselves for their 2004 action, while continuing to stick to their own reality which has nothing to do with Baker’s thinking and actions at the time.
And this is exactly what has happened. For the past 22 years, the efforts to resolve the conflict have not progressed by one iota. The unique “achievement” by the several UN Personal Envoys appointed after Baker has been to get the parties to meet and agree to meet again.
Conflict expected to trudge on
If the substance of the expanded and leaked Moroccan autonomy proposal is indeed what Morocco offers as autonomy, the conflict is still a long way away from the quick resolution that the US with Morocco and its supporters are imagining. Coming up with a so-called autonomy proposal, the main aim of which is to convince Moroccan citizens that Western Sahara is no different from the rest of Morocco’s regions, will clearly not entice the Polisario to enter serious negotiations.
For the moment, Morocco appears to be playing a double game: pursuing negotiations while at the same time spreading assertions about the Polisario’s terrorist ties that no US officials, except for a few members of Congress, find credible. The only certainty at this point is that the conflict is nowhere near “a mutually acceptable political solution that provides for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara” as the US and others would like to believe.
Anna Theofilopoulou is a former UN official with experience in political and development issues. She covered the conflict over Western Sahara from April 1994 to July 2006 and worked as close advisor to former US Secretary of State, James A. Baker throughout his appointment as Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on Western Sahara from March 1997 until his resignation in June 2004. She holds a master’s degree in international politics and international business from City University of New York and has written widely about peacekeeping and mediation for academic journals and publications. This piece is part of ICDI’s Maghreb Dialogue Project series.
