Iraq has been on the road to recovery after two decades of turmoil, including the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, a United States military intervention, civil war, and conflict with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While Iraq now is more stable than it has been in recent years, it continues to struggle with many internal problems, such as militia rivalries and influence over the state, economic fragility, demographic pressures, a dysfunctional power-sharing political system, often referred to as the muhasasa system, in which state positions and ministries have been divided up between ethno-sectarian rivals. The quota-based system, which has been in force since the invasion in 2003, and 2005 elections, initially was utilized as a tool to ensure inclusivity and prevent one group from dominating another. While the system has been successful in preventing the rise of another authoritarian leader like Saddam Hussein, it has been criticized by many as a dysfunctional source of corruption that empowers militias.
Today, Iraq continues to face major divisions between the Shiite-dominated federal government in Baghdad and the Kurdish-led Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and Sunni groups. The power-sharing system has resulted in deepening the divisions, especially between Erbil and Baghdad. It has also allowed empowerment of militias and state capture by the elite which both of whom have resisted reform and citizens’ demand for change. Furthermore, the Hamas October 7 attack and the subsequent Israeli military operation against Gaza have shaken the region and created new political and military dynamics that are now affecting Iraq’s fragile recovery.
Regional upheaval and Iranian influence
In the midst of the Gaza conflict, that spread into southern Lebanon, Yemen, and was followed by the collapse of the regime of Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, Iran-backed Iraqi militias under the umbrella of Popular Mobilization Front (PMF) also carried out several drone and missile attacks against Israel and the United States and military and civilian targets both in and outside Iraq. Though there was an escalation immediately after October 7 against the US and Israel in the region, during the 12 Day War between Israel and Iran, the militias exercised strategic restraint and avoided further escalation and direct involvement in the conflict. For example, in a coordinated set of attacks by Iran-backed Iraqi militias, from October 17, 2023, up to the 12 Day War in 2025, about 150 missile and drone strikes were reportedly conducted against US and anti-ISIS coalition sites and Israel. On January 28, 2024, the militias claimed an attack against a US military base in Jordan which killed three soldiers and injured 47. While they deescalated during the 12 Day War, the actions prior to this put Iraqi Prime Minister Muhammad Shia’ al-Sudani in an embarrassing position as he had declared Iraq’s neutrality in the conflict and pledged to impose state authority over the militias. This starkly showed the militias’ capability of operations outside of state institutions and the state’s incapability to restrain their actions.
While PMF militias avoided direct involvement in the 12 Day War between Israel and Iran, and Iraq was saved from US and Israeli retaliations, this does not prove Iraq’s total sovereignty and authority over them. The militias chose not to be involved for several reasons. First, Iran did not want them to do so as Iraq serves as a lifeline for heavily sanctioned Iran and in the scenario of Iraq’s involvement in the war the risk of losing of this lifeline for Iran was very high. Second, the embedment of the militias into Iraq’s state institutions was of higher value for Iran than conducting attacks as Iraq’s November 11 parliamentary elections were on the horizon. Third, the targeted killing of militia leaders by Israel in Lebanon and Israel might have been a deterrent.
While Iraq now remains relatively stable and has not been drawn into a regional conflict, the influence of the militias over the state poses a risk for the nation. The militias’ strong capabilities, access to arms and enormous resources, including state resources, and their consolidation of both military and political power within state institutions put the nation at risk of destabilization. Furthermore, their power is an obstacle to political reform, economic development and strengthening the state’s capability to solve problems and be responsive to public demands, especially those of Iraq’s young demographic.
The November Election and the Aftermath of Tishreen
The recent November 11 election results underlined two major points. First, Tishreen’s attempts to reform the state have been unsuccessful. The Tishreen Movement which was ignited by a wave of protests took place mostly, but not only, in Baghdad between 2019 and 2021. The major demands of the movement included political and economic reforms, ending the influence of militias over the state, along with other demands such as solving climate change related problems.
Second, Iran’s massive influence over Iraqi politics cannot be ignored by any local change-and-reform-seeking actor. The Coordination Framework, which is an alliance of PMF-linked parties established after the 2021 elections, had many candidates on electoral lists, including that of Prime Minister al-Sudani, in the November 11 election. And all these lists together scored a huge success by winning about 170 parliamentary seats while openly Tishreen-aligned candidates and protest figures did not win a seat. Moreover, the two dominant Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), in the Kurdistan region in the north of the country also managed to maintain their power and weaken their rivals in the election. While both parties are contesting for more votes, political and economic power, they have common interests and US political pressure to reach an agreement on almost all disputing issues.
Tishreen protestors suffered severe repression by militias, resulting in thousands of casualties. However the demonstrations led to the resignation of then Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi, holding early elections and some modest reforms. They were small, but promising. This showed the state’s responsiveness to reform. For example, a new election law was passed by parliament which reduced the disadvantage of small electoral lists and individual independent candidates. This led to the entry of about 40 non-establishment candidates, including Imtidad Movement, many other protest-aligned candidates and many Sadrists into the parliament. The Imtidad Movement was established by protest figures in late 2020 as a political party to contest in the 2021 elections. On the other hand, militias connected to political parties like Fateh Alliance lost a significant number of seats. This gave the young demographic, which spearheaded the protests, some hope and trust in the state’s institutions as a mechanism for change.
However, another election law was passed in 2023 after Sadrist MPs lost hope of demolishing the Muhassasa power-sharing system by making up a majority government in alliance with other non-pro-PMF parties and eventually withdrew from the parliament. Tishreen-movement MPs neither could prevent passing the law which reversed reforms nor were they strong enough to avoid being absorbed by the establishment which has unequal power and resources. To sum it up, pro-PMF Coordination Framework, within which many militias’ political parties take place, despite its internal disputes and rivalries managed to consolidate power and absorb the Tishreen movement. This also shows successful embedment of Iran-backed, US designated terrorist militias into state institutions. The youths and unsatisfied people’s loss of hope in state institutions as change vehicles can be felt in the election’s low turnout in Baghdad and southern provinces where the most of the protests took place. However, it is only loss of hope in the method not in the goal. The Green Tigress Movement, which is an initiative led by young activists, advocating for climate actions, water security and sustainability awareness, can be seen as another form and reflection of youths’ hope in and commitment for making change.
Despite demonstrations and a concerted push for reform, militia influence prevails and continues to deepen the gap between society and the elite. The reversal of small reforms after the 2021 election and the results of the November 11, 2025 election clearly suggest that Iranian influence, through its militias in Iraq, is strong enough to resist society’s demand for reform.
Erbil-Baghdad power struggles
The urgent problem for Kurdistan region of Iraq is its relationship with the federal government in Baghdad regarding several issues like budget, public sector salaries, energy and security. For example, until recently, Kurdistan Region of Iraq’s (KRI) independent oil export and Baghdad’s disapproval were the most discussed topic. KRI’s oil export through Turkey was suspended by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration court in Paris, ruling in favor of Baghdad in 2023. Recently oil export was fully restored after Turkey, Iraq and KRI reached an agreement with the help of US mediation.
However, the security issue has gained urgent attention in KRI-Baghdad relations as KRI’s critical facilities like oil and natural gas fields and refineries have been struck several times since July this year which KRI and the US blamed PMF militias for. The last incident involved a drone attack against KRI’s Khor Mor gas field which powers KRI and some other Iraqi provinces power plants. The attack caused an electricity outage in KRI and some other neighboring provinces. Though the federal government claimed the perpetrators to be unknown, KRG, all Kurdish parties and the US condemned “terrorist militias” for the action and asked Baghdad to hold them accountable and prevent repetition of such actions.
While the issue has an internal dimension as both Baghdad and the KRI strive to strengthen themselves and undermine the other’s authority, energy, especially natural gas, has an external dimension. As the US refused to renew a sanctions waiver for Iraq to buy natural gas from the US and sanctioned Iran for power generation purposes, KRI’s Khor Mor gas field has been seen by many as a viable option for Iraq as it needs to reduce its gas dependency on Iran and find alternatives. And this can end Iran’s lucrative natural gas trade with Iraq.
While negotiations and dialogues between rival militias and affiliated parties continue to be held, there must be more serious engagement, trust building and coordination between Baghdad and Erbil. The UN through the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has engaged, encouraged and facilitated negotiations with both sides. However, the UN focuses more on facilitating and advising, thus its influence is limited. The US has also played a major role in negotiations between Erbil and Baghdad through diplomatic pressure on both sides, public encouragement from high level officials directed toward both sides to engage in negotiations. For example, US diplomats were reportedly present and had a positive impact on the negotiations for resumption of KRI’s oil export. So, the US role and influence has been bigger and more effective as the US has leverage and influence on both Erbil and Baghdad. However, when it comes to mediating rivalries within Baghdad between state militias the US is limited because of its lack of formal relations with the militias who have close relations with Iran. Iranian effectiveness and influence have been proven when it comes to intra-militias and intra-shia rivalry. Emergence of the Coordination Framework after the Tishreen protests is a clear manifestation of this effectiveness and influence. However, it is not applied on other issues like that of Erbil-Baghdad. So, these show that no one external actor can effectively mediate these deep-rooted, overlapping and complex issues without regard for other factors and actors.
These interconnected internal issues and rapidly changing regional dynamics require effective communication, dialogue and a mediation mechanism between involved actors. Embedment of militias into state institutions can also be used by the state to strengthen its sovereignty by regulating them, enhancing resource and structural transparency and accountability of militias. On the other hand, regulating militias’ actions and development of an effective mechanism of communication and dialogue with KRI with the help of the US, the Iraqi government can provide security of energy production sites to KRI and pave the way for solving other sets of disputing issues between them like budget distribution, development and public sector salaries. Though the US and UN can play a positive and constructive role in this regard, at the end of the day local actors have a bigger stake at risk and also bigger responsibility to find solutions.
Rebaz Hasan is a Kurdish-Iraqi journalist reporting on social, political, and human-interest stories, with a focus on underrepresented voices, identity politics, and regional dynamics in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. His work has been published by the Network of Iraqi Reporters for Investigative Journalism (NIRIJ), KirkukNow, Agora International, and The AUIS Voice, where he has covered issues ranging from demographic change and governance in Kirkuk to women’s political participation, environmental challenges, and social resistance movements.
