Armed conflict returned to northern Ethiopia this September. After months of mounting tensions, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and six other opposition movements formed the ‘Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival’, with the stated aim of toppling Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. The alliance’s initial gains were quickly reversed. The federal army and its Tigrayan auxiliaries, the Tigray Peace Force, are battling TPLF-aligned forces from their mountain redoubts after retaking Mekelle, Tigray’s regional capital, and have advanced along parts of the Eritrean border. The TPLF, once a formidable political-military force, has been badly weakened, harried by drone strikes and shorn of commanders lost to defection and arrest.
Relations between Addis Ababa and Asmara, allies in the 2020–22 Tigray war, have collapsed, with Ethiopia accusing Eritrea of orchestrating the alliance, expelling Eritrea’s diplomats on October 1, and telling the United Nations Security Council it would “exercise” its right to self-defence. While the situation remains fluid, the renewed fighting over Tigray has already spilt into direct exchanges of fire between the Ethiopian and Eritrean armies, and is only steps away from becoming a full interstate conflict. With relations between Ethiopia and Sudan deteriorating in parallel, the conflict further risks becoming entangled with Sudan’s regionalised war and the wider contest over the Red Sea, both fuelled by Gulf and Middle Eastern powers.
Old allies turn on each other over Tigray
The return to war comes as no surprise; it is a continuation of the last destructive conflict, but with a stunning reversal of alliances and perhaps more at stake. Within Ethiopia, it can be read as a contest over who governs Tigray, Amhara and to what end, as well as a broader dispute over the nature of the Ethiopian state. On one side is Abiy’s centralising, unitary project, pursued in Tigray since the Pretoria agreement of November 2022, through a calculated ‘no war, no peace’ policy that has sought to divide the devastated region. On the other is the TPLF, Ethiopia’s former ruling party, split between an old guard under Debretsion Gebremichael and the camp of the ousted interim president Getachew Reda, who now serves as Abiy’s adviser. Having reassumed control over Mekelle’s institutions in May, the TPLF wagered the party’s survival on toppling Abiy alongside a collection of other armed opponents, but seemingly misjudged both its partners’ appetite for a sustained, coordinated fight and the government’s military capacity.
The TPLF had already eroded the existential solidarity that bound Tigrayans in 2020 through its entreaties to Asmara, a gold rush that enriched its commanders and a campaign of forcible mass conscription; unlike in 2020, a wearied population has not rallied to its cause. Behind the TPLF and its new alliance is Asmara, with Isaias Afwerki, Eritrea’s president and Abiy’s ally in the last war, regarding Tigray with calculating self-interest. After railing against the TPLF for two decades and sending his troops to help devastate Tigray between 2020 and 2022, Isaias has since sought to cultivate the TPLF as a proxy and the region as a buffer zone against Addis.
For Abiy, ousting the TPLF from Tigray would simultaneously renew pressure on Isaias, offering avenues to undermine the Eritrean regime and the Sudanese army to the west. It would also ‘finish the job’ of 2020, removing the TPLF from Ethiopia’s political landscape and setting Tigrayan factions upon one another; a stratagem that the federal government has pursued in other domestic conflicts. Behind Addis stands the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Abiy’s principal external patron, while Riyadh, Cairo and the Sudanese army have gravitated towards Asmara and, more loosely, the TPLF.
A second war descends on a region still in ruins
Even at its current scale, renewed fighting is exacting a heavy civilian toll, with Tigray’s socio-economic infrastructure still in ruins from the last war. Hundreds of thousands remain displaced, and as El Niño ravages the harvest, an assessment by Tigray’s disaster risk management commission in September estimated that 3.9 million people will need food aid this year– of an estimated population of 5.5 million. A steady drumbeat of drone strikes has been accompanied by mounting reports of civilian deaths.
Beyond Tigray, the neighbouring Amhara region is consumed by its own war with Fano, a loose coalition of militias that served as Abiy’s allies in the last war before turning against the federal army in April 2023, when Addis moved to dissolve the Amhara regional forces. Though ideologically distinct from the TPLF, parts of Fano were drawn into the same orbit by a shared antipathy towards the federal government and enjoy their own relationship with Asmara, and Fano now controls much of rural Amhara. To the south, Oromia has been at war since 2018, when the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) emerged from a split within the Oromo Liberation Front, whose leadership had returned from exile, with its fighters resuming the armed struggle.
Though the OLA was a signatory to the Alliance for Survival in September, it has not substantially escalated its campaign against the government. Rather, it appears to be consolidating its hold over western Oromia and parts of the centre, content to let others carry the burden of the calamitous war. Nor is mediation in prospect there, with Addis having pursued no political answer to either insurgency in Amhara or Oromia, directing emergency and counter-terrorism powers as a substitute for civilian administration. Little binds these distinct ethnic-based movements beyond their opposition to Abiy, however, with no common political programme nor coherent alternative governing project to speak of.
With the divided international community having failed to avert the looming war, space for mediation in Tigray or for preventing an inter-state conflict has narrowed. But the need for diplomatic intervention is more urgent than ever, with Addis emboldened by its battlefield gains and seemingly uninterested in compromise. The increasingly muddied diplomatic arena, compounded by the failure of the 2022 Pretoria agreement, makes a broader political settlement unlikely, either within Ethiopia or across the region.
Pretoria’s original sin: a truce without a settlement
Between 2020 and 2022, Addis and Asmara waged war against Tigray, a brutal conflict that left hundreds of thousands dead and millions displaced, with rape and starvation deployed as weapons of war. It remains among the deadliest conflicts of the 21st century, and its return reflects another failure of pre-emptive diplomacy in the Horn, as in Sudan, and the ‘original sin’ of the Pretoria agreement. Signed without structured political dialogue or a credible implementation framework, Pretoria briefly silenced the guns but, lacking buy-in or pressure, never matured into an inclusive political settlement. The root causes of the war remained unaddressed, leaving Tigray in a twilight between war and peace. Its provisions, which included an African Union-led monitoring mechanism, were only partially implemented, while Eritrea and key Amhara stakeholders remained outside the process, free to spoil it.
Warning signs of renewed violence emerged almost immediately after the agreement, intensifying in late 2023 when Abiy first cast the restoration of Ethiopia’s ‘sea access’ as an existential question. Ethiopian officials have repeatedly questioned the legitimacy of Eritrean independence, while agitating for the port of Assab, or a sliver of Red Sea coastline. This agitation helped drive the rapprochement between Eritrea and the TPLF, known as Tsimdo and a forerunner of the current alliance, as Isaias came to see a TPLF-held Tigray as a buffer against Addis’s irredentist ambitions.
Relations continued to deteriorate between Addis and Mekelle as the Ethiopian government declined to reintegrate Tigray into the federation in favour of an economic and political stranglehold, while the TPLF reasserted a vice-like grip on the region’s politics. This, too, chimed with a broader pattern of Addis weaponising peace agreements to subdue or divide its opponents, including through smaller deals with splinter factions of the Ogaden National Liberation Front, Oromo Liberation Army and Fano.
In the months leading up to the renewed fighting in September, Tigray was effectively besieged, with fuel and medicine blocked and budget transfers suspended, whilst federal troops were positioned on the region’s borders and intermittent drone strikes targeted the TPLF. Tens of thousands of young Tigrayans fled, accurately anticipating a return to war and escaping the TPLF’s conscription drives.
Sudan, Tigray and the Red Sea risk merging into one battlefield
Though the renewed fighting in Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara has distinctly Ethiopian contours, born of the country’s unfinished conflicts and ethnic grievances, it now sits within a far wider regional contest. It is a Gordian Knot; intersecting with the historic enmity between Addis and Asmara, the spill-over of Sudan’s internationalised war and the broader contest for the Red Sea, with outside patrons lining up behind the belligerents and inserting themselves into pre-existing fractures within the Horn.
Abu Dhabi has cultivated close ties with Abiy since the 2018 rapprochement with Asmara that it helped broker, and particularly since its drones helped turn the tide when Tigrayan forces were marching towards Addis in 2021. Weeks after their Asmara summit, Abiy and Isaias met again under Mohammed bin Zayed’s auspices, then re-signed the same agreement in Saudi Arabia that September. It was the moment the region’s multilateral architecture began to bow to the Gulf’s personalised, transactional statecraft, a peace of pageantry without institutional underpinning. On the other side, Cairo, embittered by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, has drawn closer to Asmara and, at times, Mogadishu in opposition to Ethiopia, culminating in the tripartite summit Isaias hosted in Asmara in October 2024, while Riyadh has cultivated Isaias as a Red Sea ally.
Sudan’s war, which since April 2023 has pitted the Emirati-backed Rapid Support Forces (RSF) against an army supported by Egypt, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia, has helped crystallise these competing networks of patronage and military support. Increasingly, Sudan’s instability has bled into Ethiopia and vice versa. Addis accuses the Sudanese army of sheltering Tigrayan forces, including a formation known as Army 70, which has fought alongside the army against the RSF and is now reportedly active across Blue Nile. Tigrayan forces are also said to have crossed into Ethiopia from Sudan in August, and the Sudanese army is reported to have had a hand in the drone strikes on Addis in late September.
Ethiopia, in turn, is accused of facilitating dozens of drone strikes into Sudan against military and civilian targets and RSF cross-border attacks into Blue Nile, where Sudanese army drones have since struck RSF positions in Kurmuk and Geisan. Ethiopian forces have been reported massing towards the border near al-Fashaga since mid-November, a build-up that may look to seal a back door into Tigray, provoking the Sudanese army, and Asmara has purportedly signalled readiness to help defend the territory. There is discussion, too, of the Tigray Defence Forces and Fano opening a new front through Benishangul-Gumuz, though whether they have the capacity to do so is doubtful.
In late October Addis unveiled 12 Russian Su-35 fighter jets and the planned delivery of four S-400 air defence batteries, a commitment that may run into the billions. Such fearsome weaponry is unlikely to be intended primarily for Tigrayan guerrillas, but rather a signal to its enemies in Khartoum and Asmara that this conflict – and Addis’s distinct quarrels with its neighbours – is far from over.
Addis weighs invasion of Eritrea
Despite public and private pressure from the United States and others to avert war, Addis is believed to be weighing an invasion of Eritrea, regarding Asmara as the principal orchestrator of the insurgencies blighting northern Ethiopia. It could either seek to seize Assab outright, just a few dozen miles from Ethiopian territory, along with a narrow strip of coastline, or pursue regime change in Asmara, potentially with a view to negotiating ‘sea access’ with a more pliant successor.
But there is no promise that an invasion would be a straightforward affair. Eritrea is a personalised, centralised regime with no designated successor, and an invasion could well fracture the security apparatus while leaving a battle-hardened military establishment capable of continuing the conflict.
Behind the skirmishes, Addis is assembling the apparatus of pacification in Tigray, with a night curfew and house-to-house searches reported from Mekelle in early November, since extended to Shire, Abiy Addi and Idaga Hamus, as well as a demobilisation camp to process several thousand Tigrayan fighters. Yet the coalition Addis relies upon is already fraying, with members of Getachew’s Simret party having resigned, and the Tigray Peace Force quarrelling over regional appointments.
Once – or if – Tigray is subdued, Addis may well turn its full attention to the border, where, since November 9, the two armies have traded artillery and drone fire around Badme, the town over which they went to war in 1998, which was awarded to Eritrea in 2002 but never handed over, with fighting also reported around Rama and a federal build-up near Zalambessa. For now the shelling may be less a prelude to invasion than the logic of counter-insurgency, pushing Tigray’s frontier back to the border and severing the TPLF’s supply lines from Eritrea.
Whether this becomes an interstate war may well be settled in Abu Dhabi rather than Washington, though Abu Dhabi’s latitude is itself a dividend of American patronage. Over a decade, the Emirates have strung ports and bases along the Red Sea’s western littoral, including Assab– a base for their Yemen campaign against the Houthis– in 2015, before abandoning it in 2021. If Abu Dhabi provides the funding and weaponry necessary for an invasion, Addis may feel there will be no better moment to topple the Isaias regime– despite the attached costs. Moreover, with relations between Asmara and Abu Dhabi similarly soured, an Ethiopian invasion of Eritrea might yet return to their hands, whilst simultaneously ousting a key patron of the Sudanese army– a likely boost to the under-pressure Rapid Support Forces. Riyadh would read an invasion as an incursion into its own maritime backyard and accentuate the rift within the Gulf, though it is doubtful it could restrain either Abiy or the UAE.
Despite all this, Abiy is no instrument of Emirati design, and his quasi-imperial longing for the sea predates Abu Dhabi’s calculations. And for all the competing pressure, if Ethiopia does invade Eritrea or further border clashes with Sudan erupt, it will be Abiy’s call in the highly personalised and centralised federal government.
But an invasion of Eritrea would likely fuse these mutually reinforcing, seemingly intractable conflicts further, potentially creating a single conflict zone stretching from Sudan’s Chadian border to the Bab al-Mandeb, just across the water from the raging Yemen war.
Mediation in a time of political famine
Though the US security umbrella in the Middle East has cracked under Iranian pressure, Washington still holds sway on both sides of the coalescing rival blocs. Its regional strategy in the Horn has been haphazard at best, however, failing to press its Gulf allies to contain the neighbouring Sudan conflict while courting both Addis and Asmara, and allowing the emergency declaration underpinning US sanctions on Eritrea to expire in September as the region slid towards another war.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s call to Abiy on October 14, urging de-escalation and respect for sovereignty, signalled Washington’s attempt to distinguish between domestic Ethiopian conflicts and the threat of an interstate war. It is a strategy not without risk, however, as Addis appears to read the distinction as a licence to forcibly consolidate its hold in Tigray. Addis is nonetheless understood to recognise that a full war with Eritrea would imperil its deepening ties with Washington, and US senators have since urged the State Department not to dangle Assab in any mediation.
Another route – in conjunction with the US – would be pressure through the various patrons of the key belligerents. Abu Dhabi has the most purchase on Abiy but appears willing to accept, if not actively support, an invasion of Eritrea; Riyadh and Cairo have the ear of Isaias. But these are rivals, not mediators, and any hope that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi might decouple their quarrels across the Red Sea faded in Yemen’s Hadramawt in December 2025, when Saudi warplanes struck a weapons shipment unloaded from Emirati vessels and allegedly destined for Abu Dhabi’s Southern Transitional Council ally. Decoupling was already a fraught endeavour, entangled with their contrasting theories of political authority, and with divergent positions on Israel and Iran, political Islam, maritime commerce and food security, all bleeding out across Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and beyond. The failure of the Quad, comprising the UAE, Saudi Arabia, the US and Egypt, is telling; despite Sudan’s immense humanitarian cost, ending the war has remained subordinate to the strategic priorities of its external patrons.
Nor is Ethiopia’s latest series of conflicts ripe for resolution. In 2022, the TPLF came to Pretoria facing battlefield defeat, and Addis was under economic and political duress, with its budgetary support frozen and foreign exchange exhausted. With drones and Gulf credit helping to absorb the costs of war, Addis is unlikely to face the mutually hurting stalemate that brings belligerents to the table, though Western creditors may retain some purchase through the IMF programme and Ethiopia’s unfinished debt restructuring. The federal government has also been content to keep the simmering violence of the Oromia and Amhara regions at bay in recent years, wielding drones and allied militias to keep the fighting far from the capital. But as Sudan’s metastasising conflict demonstrates, once war takes hold in the Horn in this era, it can prove extraordinarily difficult to end.
Forum-shopping
The current field of would-be brokers, too, is crowded and incoherent, with mediation being wielded as another instrument of influence in this multipolar era. What has replaced the liberal peace is a hybrid marketplace of Western and non-Western brokers, in which belligerents can shop around for whichever forum asks least of them.
Moscow reportedly offered to mediate ahead of the Russia-Africa summit in October, having cultivated close relationships with both capitals. Beijing, too, dispatched two envoys on separate errands in early November; Liu Xianfa, its special envoy for African affairs, travelled to Addis, and Hu Changchun, its Horn of Africa envoy, to Asmara, where Isaias received a reaffirmation of China’s support for Eritrean sovereignty. Neither has made much headway, nor has the UN reportedly applied pressure to both capitals.
Kenyan President William Ruto has also reportedly been tapped for shuttle diplomacy, with Abiy visiting him in mid-October. But passing back-channel messages between leaders is a far cry from the structured, open dialogue required for Addis and Asmara to unpick decades of interwoven conflicts, not least between two leaders with such personal animus.
Space for mediation must first be established
Realism is thus required. The immediate task is less to reach a settlement than to create space for mediation within Ethiopia, as well as deter a further slip towards war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, or between Addis and Khartoum. First, any prospective mediator must define the problem, understanding the different crises within Ethiopia as well as Ethiopia’s place in the wider Red Sea regional contest. Though these are mutually reinforcing, they call for different hands.
The interstate standoff can likely only be defused by pressure from the Gulf and Washington. In principle, the crisis in Tigray should be African-led, returning to the African Union role that Pretoria’s sponsors allowed to lapse. Olusegun Obasanjo, the AU envoy, visited Addis and Mekelle repeatedly this year and achieved little, regarded by the TPLF as too sympathetic to the federal government. The risk, as Sudan has shown, is that the tracks become parallel processes at cross-purposes, with a brokered border truce coming at Tigray’s expense, allowing the conflict there to rumble on.
Yet Addis is in no mood to negotiate with the TPLF, and it is unclear what it would negotiate over, or with whom, the party being split between Debretsion’s old guard and commanders scattered across the mountains. An African-led process presupposes that Addis wants an interlocutor, when its theory of peace has been to dispense with one in Amhara and Oromia. Until its militarised wager fails, mediation in Tigray may have to aim lower, maintaining humanitarian access and the protection of civilians, whilst keeping open lines to Tigrayan commanders.
To defuse the interstate tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea, a plausible starting point would be reciprocal pledges to respect one another’s sovereignty, with forces kept within their borders, Asmara ceasing to arm Ethiopia’s rebels – a persistent feature of Isaias’s stratagems – and Addis dropping its claims to Assab. Another possible avenue relates to Ethiopia’s stated interest in Red Sea security; Addis has repeatedly sought a seat at the table in shaping maritime security, only to be rebuffed by Cairo and Asmara. Offering Ethiopia a greater role in shaping maritime frameworks, including commercial access through ports beyond Djibouti without conferring sovereignty or conceding a military presence, could theoretically meet part of its demand.
Ideally, Addis and Asmara would negotiate an agreement granting Ethiopia commercial access to Assab. But this too is more complex than it first appears, with Ethiopia seeking a naval, not commercial, base and the 2018 rapprochement between the two countries that proffered the use of Assab leading nowhere.
Neither Addis nor Asmara appears inclined to offer concessions, and the strategies of both governments are likely to push them closer to conflict or leave them suspended in a militarised limbo. To bring about a lasting peace within Ethiopia and extinguish the insurgencies burning across the country, a far grander bargain is required, including transitional political arrangements that accommodate Tigrayan, Amhara, Oromo and other grievances, alongside a process of transitional justice for the atrocities of the last war. Addis, for its part, has resisted pressure for domestic reconciliation or compromise for years, citing a hollowed-out National Dialogue process as justification for refusing talks. Ethiopia’s myriad, fragmenting wars are political problems without military solutions, and the government in Addis has shown little interest in broader settlements.
Peace in the Horn has usually come in times of plenty, when there were enough rents at the centre to buy all parties into a settlement. This is a time of political famine, with money, gold, and weapons flowing into and out of the region, but not towards peacemaking. The price will again be paid by civilians in Tigray and across Ethiopia, who have already endured man-made famine and mass atrocity. Openings for mediation may yet appear, but only if those with leverage in Abu Dhabi, Riyadh, Cairo and Washington choose to spend it.
Matthew de Waal and Ngala Chome are freelance analysts on peace and security focused on the Horn of Africa and Red Sea, based in Nairobi, Kenya. Matthew is a doctoral candidate at King’s College London exploring Middle Power competition in the Horn of Africa and an Associate Fellow of RUSI. Ngala was a postdoctoral fellow at Ghent University, Belgium and before that, a Senior Analyst at Sahan Research.





